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Abstract 
 
  Since the 1970s, revisionist art historians have elaborated how Abstract Expressionism was 
exhibited abroad by the post-war US establishment in order to characterise the movement, 
especially on Clement Greenberg’s account, as an artistic correlate to United States’ post-war 
dominance and worldwide imposition of capitalism. However, in this thesis, drawing on the 
theoretical resources of Theodor W. Adorno and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I argue that 
Greenberg’s criticism in fact indicates how Abstract Expressionism stakes a claim against the 
rule of exchange-value. I interrogate the still prevalent notion that a development which 
Greenberg would retrospectively identify as a shift from Trotskyism to art-for-art’s-sake in 
the New York art scene of the ‘30s and ‘40s resulted in a movement, Abstract Expressionism, 
which lent itself to co-optation by US imperialism. I show that Abstract Expressionism’s 
deployment in efforts of cultural imperialism was certainly informed by Greenberg’s 
positioning of it as the pinnacle of the European modernist lineage due to its determinate 
negation of non-medium-specific elements. However, taking cues from philosopher J.M. 
Bernstein’s Adornian account of Abstract Expressionism, I then contend that this determinate 
negation is at the same time the affirmation of particularity delegitimated by capitalism. I 
then take recourse to both Greenberg’s and the artists’ accounts of their praxis, to show that it 
entailed a dialectic of construction and mimesis whereby the latter is guided by that which it 
forms. I then elaborate how, contrary to predominate accounts of Greenberg’s criticism, he in 
fact indicates the way in which the artworks invite mimetic comportment on the part of 
spectators, and engage cognition in a manner inextricable from corporeality. I contend that, 
thus, rather than buttressing the reified pluralism of capitalism, Abstract Expressionism both 
condemns capitalism’s disregard for corporeal subjects and prefigures the possibility of 
reconciliation which capitalism debars. 
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Introduction 
  In an interview with Robert Burstow published in Frieze upon his death in 1994, the critic 
Clement Greenberg denounced the notion that ‘the State Department supported American art 
and that it was part of the cold war, and so forth’ as ‘a lot of shit’ (Burstow 1994: 33). In this, 
he was referring to the revisionist accounts of Abstract Expressionism forwarded by art 
historians since the 1970s, which interrogate how and why, in the years following WWII, 
Abstract Expressionism was promulgated in overseas exhibitions or organised by bodies with 
vested interest in US capitalism, particularly the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
and the International Council at the Museum of Modern Art (IC). While the differences 
between these accounts will concern us throughout this thesis, all of the revisionist historians 
contend that Abstract Expressionism was exported as a cultural buttress to the US post-war 
economico-military dominance of the world, particularly in Western Europe, and all of them 
argue that this decision was not arbitrary; that something in the artworks rendered them 
amenable to such co-optation. The most cited of these accounts is certainly Serge Guilbaut’s 
How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art (1983). However, it was preceded by shorter 
essays by scholars such as Max Kozloff and Eva Cockcroft, and succeeded by other book-
length studies, most recently Nancy Jachec’s The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract 
Expressionism (2000). Now, these accounts have consistently faced criticism.1 However, 
their conclusions are nevertheless so pervasively accepted that, as Claude Cernuschi notes, 
‘art historians and social critics now repeat [them] without deeming it in need of justification, 
documentation, or defence’ (1999: 32). As Irving Sandler, author of the once canonical and 
resolutely apolitical account of the movement, Abstract Expressionism: The Triumph of 
American Painting (1970), has recently written in frustration, ‘Guilbaut’s allegation has come 
to be the received wisdom for several generations of art historians’ (2009: 173). For an 
                                                          
1 I will address some of these objections throughout this thesis, notably that of David Craven. However, 
for surveys of the responses, see Francis Frascina ‘Looking Forward, Looking Back: 1985-1999’ (2000). 
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indication of the extent to which this is the case, one need only note that the writers of both 
the lead catalogue essay and educational guide to an exhibition as institutional as Abstract 
Expressionism at the Royal Academy of Arts in London in 2016, felt obliged to acknowledge 
the movement’s co-optation and cursorily exculpate the artists.2  
  Yet, in spite of the ubiquity of their conclusions, the revisionist accounts are, broadly, 
remarkable for precisely their lack of attention to the artworks in question. Their accounts 
rest almost entirely upon discourse on the artworks and the ends to which the artworks were 
deployed. For the revisionist historians, it is as if, to quote Benjamin Buchloh in a 
contemporaneous review of How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, ‘the ideological 
machinations [...] and critical follies to which a work was originally subjected’ exhaust ‘the 
esthetic construct itself,’ which in fact is ‘a force that continues to operate in the present and 
that outlives the forces that originally attempted to contain it’ (1984: 21). The question of the 
extent to which the ‘esthetic constructs’ of Abstract Expressionism align with these 
‘ideological machinations’ was taken up in the ’90s by the art historian T.J. Clark, under 
whose supervision Guilbaut developed his thesis as a doctoral dissertation, in the essay ‘In 
Defence of Abstract Expressionism’ (1994), later republished as the final chapter of his book 
Farewell to an Idea (1999). Clark works from the premise that Abstract Expressionism still 
holds a hegemonic grip over the present possibilities for art. For Clark, the task of modernism 
was to ‘imagine modernity otherwise’ (1999a: 9). To do so, however, he contends it was 
always necessary to make the ‘previous moment of high achievement a thing of the past,’ to 
‘lose it and mourn it and, if necessary, revile it’ (Ibid: 371). This, he posits, is precisely what 
we have been incapable to do with Abstract Expressionism. For Clark, proving that Abstract 
                                                          
2 In the lead essay for the catalogue, David Anfam acknowledges the ‘CIA’s advancing Abstract 
Expressionism abroad during the 1950s’ but affirms the artists ‘were neither chauvinists nor nationalists’ 
(2016: 31). In the educational guide Ben Street acknowledges that the CIA ‘[f]amously funded exhibitions 
of Abstract Expressionism abroad in an attempt to promote the notion of cultural freedom in the United 
States in contrast to the perceived restrictions of the Soviet Union,’ but stresses that the Abstract 
Expressionists ‘did not want to be associated with, and the paintings were not made to articulate’ the 
‘political messages’ which the US government thus tried to transmit with them (2016: 23). The catalogue 
pertinently also features an essay on the subject of the artworks’ co-optation by Jeremy Lewison entitled 
‘“A New Spirit of Freedom”: Abstract Expressionism in Europe in the Aftermath of War’ (2016). 
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Expressionism belonged ‘to a Cold War polity, with patrons and art world institutions to 
match’ has not resulted in a decisive attitude towards the paintings themselves: 
It was one thing to answer the question, “What are the circumstances in which a 
certain national bourgeoisie, in the pride of its victory after 1945, comes to want 
something as odd and exotic as an avant-garde of its own?” It is another to speak to 
the implications of that encounter for the avant-garde itself, and answer the question, 
“To what extent was the meeting of class and art practice in the later 1940s more than 
just contingent? To what extent does Abstract Expressionism really belong, at the 
deepest level – the level of language, of procedure, of presuppositions about world-
making – to the bourgeoisie who paid for it and took it on their travels?” (Ibid: 374).  
Clark thus endeavours to address Abstract Expressionism’s ‘place in a determinate class 
foundation [...] which took on the specific trappings of cultural power in the years after 1945’ 
(Ibid: 388). In this, he differentiates between Abstract Expressionism’s position ‘in a state 
apparatus [...] or a museum/art-world superstructure’ upon which the revisionist historians’ 
accusations are based, and its participation in ‘that class’s whole construction of a “world” 
(Ibid). Clark contends that, in terms of the latter, Abstract Expressionism indeed ‘grasps most 
fully the conditions of representation – the technical and social conditions – of its historical 
moment’ (Ibid: 401).  For Clark, the artworks reveal ‘a certain construction of the world we 
call “individuality” [...] in its true [...] vulgarity,’ the artists making work ‘under the sign or 
spell of such a construction [...] believing utterly (innocently, idiotically) in its power’ (Ibid: 
376-7). To exemplify this, Clark, for instance, describes Mark Rothko’s paintings as 
maintaining ‘a hectoring absolute of self-presence’ (Ibid: 387). He writes of Willem de 
Kooning as ‘sustaining the right pitch of tawdriness, idiot fallacy, overweening self-regard’ 
(ibid: 393). He asserts that Hans Hofmann’s work ‘is tasteless to the core [...] tasteless in its 
mock religiosity, tasteless in its Colour-by-Technicolor [...] and the cloying 
demonstrativeness of its handling’ (ibid: 397).  
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   On the whole, Clark’s argument is as oblique and contentious as these quotes indicate. As 
Jonathan Harris has noted, an ungenerous verdict of it would be ‘that Clark [...] is simply 
reading in his own meanings with a vengeance’ (112). Moreover, Clark’s lack of engagement 
with the specifics of the revisionist historians’ accounts means his speculations as to whether 
the artworks ‘really belong, at the deepest level’ to the post-war US bourgeoisie who wanted 
‘an avant-garde of their own’ and ‘took the art on their travels,’ do not take account of the 
reasons why they did. Central to the latter, I will show, is something which is in fact indicated 
by Greenberg in the sentence directly proceeding from his dismissal of the revisionists’ thesis 
quoted in the first line of this introduction, when he claims that it ‘was only after American 
art had made it at home and abroad, principally in Paris, that the State Department said we 
can now export this stuff,’ affirming that ‘[t]hey hadn't dared to before that’ (Burstow 1994: 
33). While the direction of causality Greenberg posits here is questionable, we will see that it 
is certainly the case that Abstract Expressionism was disseminated by the US establishment 
in the post-war era because it was anticipated that the movement was likely to be critically 
appreciated in Western Europe, thus shoring up US hegemony by reassuring the people of 
Western Europe that US culture was of the same civilisation. And I will show that 
Greenberg himself was instrumental to this assessment in his consistent championing of the 
Abstract Expressionist artists throughout the 1940s and ‘50s, because he identified their 
work as the latest instantiation in the European modernist tradition. As we will see, critics 
arguing for Abstract Expressionism’s divergence from the ends to which it was deployed 
have thus contended that Greenberg’s account does not adequately represent the movement. 
However, I will not take such an approach. Instead, reading Greenberg through the 
aesthetic philosophies of Theodor W. Adorno and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I want to argue 
that it is also via Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionism that we might best 
understand how the artworks are not aligned with these ends, and in fact (still) challenge 
them. 
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  In Chapter 1, ‘Greenberg’s Trotskyism,’ I will begin, as do many of the revisionist 
historians, by working from an aside made by Greenberg in an essay in the early sixties, 
wherein he claims that in the New York art scene of the late 1930s, Trotskyism became art-
for-art’s sake. For the revisionist historians, this claim is telling in terms of how Greenberg’s 
criticism helped effect an ideological shift which allowed for Abstract Expressionism’s co-
optation. However, I want to trace the development of Greenberg’s theory of avant-garde art 
in terms of the influence of Trotsky because I will ultimately contend that the fundamental 
dynamics which Greenberg inherited from Trotsky’s art theory also indicate how Abstract 
Expressionism opposes the ends to which it was put. I will first delineate how, for Trotsky, 
the revolutionary content of art is not to be sought at the level of prescribed themes, but rather 
in the extent to which the art follows its own laws, by which Trotsky affirms it constitutively 
bespeaks a protest against capitalism. Without interrogating Trotsky’s reasons for this in any 
depth at this point, I will then elaborate how for Trotsky this fulcrum of art’s ‘laws’ which 
propels revolutionary art, is the determinate negation of prior art’s conventions, which the 
artist accordingly must master. I will then elaborate how, in Greenberg’s essays, the same 
dynamic obtains, as Greenberg similarly contends that art guided by its own laws is corrosive 
to a capitalism in decline. However, whereas Trotsky makes clear that he is not arguing for 
‘pure’ art free of thematic content, even if the latter should not be prescribed, for Greenberg 
this determinate negation of prior art’s conventions entails the negation of thematic content, 
and affirmation of medium-specificity. Greenberg does not delineate how such art opposes 
capitalism. However, I will note that we might draw a parallel between Greenberg’s account 
of autonomous art, and that of Adorno, in so far as for both autonomous art is contrasted with 
the art of the culture industry, whose modes of distribution and consumption they both 
contend maintained the status quo. Nevertheless, according to the revisionist historians, 
despite Greenberg’s insistence that autotelic art posed a threat to capitalism’s existence, 
Greenberg’s championing of such art contributed to an artistic ferment that precipitated a turn 
away from the Social Realism which previously predominated, and thus gave rise to the 
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supposedly apolitical Abstract Expressionism, which was accordingly readily co-opted in 
efforts of US imperialism.  
  Before interrogating this co-optation, in Chapter 2, ‘Social Realism and Reification,’ I will 
explore how this negative reasoning for Abstract Expressionism’s assimilation is untenable. 
Drawing on research contemporaneous to the revisionist historians’ work by Frances K. Pohl, 
I will explore how, in fact, the pre-eminent Social Realist Ben Shahn was afforded a 
retrospective at the US Pavilion at the 1954 Venice Biennale, at which there was also a 
retrospective of de Kooning, and the manner in which Shahn’s work was presented did not 
obfuscate his work’s protest against the injustices of capitalism, but emphasised it. In this, it 
seems to confirm the way in which Adorno surmises that such realist work’s critique of 
capitalist epiphenomena, even when politically radical, entails an accommodation to the 
reified world, constitutively failing to challenge it on a fundamental level. Indeed, I will show 
how for many of the Abstract Expressionists this was precisely why they rejected Social 
Realism, that is, not because it was too politically radical, but because, in the face of 
modernity, it was not politically radical enough. Nevertheless, in Chapter 3, ‘Determinate 
Negation Depoliticised,’ I will show how the revisionist historians are certainly correct to 
claim that Greenberg had ostensibly depoliticised his championing of medium-specificity by 
the time he came to recognise its apotheosis in Abstract Expressionism. I will explore how, in 
the critical writing of the ‘40s and ‘50s in which he acclaimed the work of the Abstract 
Expressionists, he figures their significance primarily in terms of aesthetics, and disregards 
their non-western influences, thus positioning their art at the forefront of the European 
modernist tradition. I will then proceed in Chapter 4, ‘Extremely Impure Ends,’ to explore 
how Greenberg’s affirmation that the Abstract Expressionists’ negation of thematic content 
meant they had inherited this tradition, rather than this negation of thematic content negating 
Social Realism, certainly lent Abstract Expressionism to efforts of US imperialism. I will 
show how, after WWII, the Marshall Plan’s aid to Europe was necessary both to create new 
markets so as wartime levels of production could be maintained and stagnation avoided, and 
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to prevent economic collapse in those countries turning the populations towards the Eastern 
Bloc. However, this ostensible largesse was met with suspicion by these countries’ 
populations, especially France and Italy, who considered the United States to be culturally 
inferior, and whose coalition governments’ substantial left-wing representation did not 
decrease. Accordingly, the US establishment organised touring exhibitions of Abstract 
Expressionism in order to convince these populations otherwise, and, with recourse to both 
the revisionist historians’ research and primary documents, I will show that these efforts were 
certainly informed by the isomorphy of Greenberg’s critical framework with the progressivist 
history which undergirded US imperialism during the Cold War. That is, Greenberg’s 
account of Abstract Expressionism as the most advanced instantiation of the European 
modernist tradition, chimed with the notion that US capitalism marked the culmination of the 
Enlightenment’s progressive maturation. However, Adorno contends that authentic art traces 
this progressive history’s obfuscated underside. I will proceed in Chapter 5, ‘Artistic 
Abstraction Contra Societal Abstraction,’ to elaborate how Abstract Expressionism lends 
voice to precisely this nonidentity. I will do so by taking cues from the account of Abstract 
Expressionism forwarded by the philosopher J.M. Bernstein. Bernstein recasts the history of 
modernism at the pinnacle of which Greenberg placed Abstract Expressionism as the history 
of artworks affirming their particularity in resistance to the very determinate judgements of 
capital in the service of which Abstract Expressionism was deployed in efforts of US 
imperialism. I will elaborate how Abstract Expressionism affirms its particularity in this way 
in terms of two analogies drawn by Adorno to thus describe authentic art’s semblance of 
autonomy in a heteronomously defined world, by which Abstract Expressionist artworks have 
often been characterised – nature and language. It is this conviction that the artworks resist 
capitalist reification by way of their particularity, which will orient the second half of my 
thesis. 
  In Chapter 6, ‘Subjective Sovereignty and Social Democracy’ I will differentiate this 
defence of Abstract Expressionism from David Craven’s critique of the revisionist historians, 
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which is the most substantial hitherto published. For Craven, to discern Abstract 
Expressionism’s asymmetry with dominant ideology, we should disentangle Abstract 
Expressionist praxis from Greenberg’s account, and return to the characterisation of the 
movement as disalienated praxis in an otherwise alienated world by another of its 
contemporary critics, Meyer Schapiro. Craven contends that Greenberg’s so-called 
formalism, which he understands as prescriptive, contrasts with Schapiro’s account of 
Abstract Expressionism as Taylorist management contrasts with worker’s self-management. 
However, I will contend that, while registering something of the subjective intensity of the 
experience of Abstract Expressionist artworks, which will become crucial in chapters 9 and 
10, Schapiro’s account of the movement as a bulwark against reification in fact facilitated its 
co-optation. For Schapiro, Abstract Expressionist artworks are essentially impressions of 
their artists’ unreduced subjectivities, otherwise stymied under capitalism. Thus, contrary to 
Adorno’s account of authentic art as akin to the being-in-itself of nature, Schapiro 
characterises Abstract Expressionist artworks as stamped with the sovereignty of their artists’ 
minds. I contend that this dynamic not only reproduces the indifference of identity-thinking 
towards its object, but also that such conceptual subsumption lent the artworks to US 
imperialism. I argue that this is the case in so far as characterizing the artworks as 
manifestations of their artists’ subjective interiorities rendered them ideal for a US 
Department of State eager to convince Europe that freedom of expression flourished under 
corporate capitalism, a case which I make with recourse to both research by the revisionist 
historians, particularly Nancy Jachec, and the work of the liberal intellectual Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr., which is generally understood to typify the theoretical framework orienting 
US cultural imperialism during the Cold War. On the other hand, I will posit in Chapter 7, 
‘Making Things of Which We Know Not What They Are,’ that, far from imposing dictates 
for art production, Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionist praxis attests to the way in 
which it models reconciled labour receptive to its object. I will elaborate this in terms of 
Adorno’s description of authentic art production as a dialectic of spiritual construction and 
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mimetic expression. For Adorno, the domination of art praxis corrects extra-aesthetic 
domination with paratactic synthesis. That is, it is the organisation of compositional elements 
which eschews hierarchical subordination, maintaining the integrity of these elements. 
Whereas capitalist ratiocination curtails the irreducible particularity of its object, for Adorno 
the paratactic synthesis of art praxis renders its object’s particularity bindingly eloquent by 
way of the kind of mimetic impulses which Adorno claims have been extinguished by 
reification. I will argue that Greenberg might be read as characterising Abstract Expressionist 
praxis similarly, and in so far as this is the case, I will suggest that the determinate negation 
which he identifies as the fulcrum of the European modernist tradition, is less the determinate 
negation of non-medium-specific properties which he often characterised it as, but rather the 
determinate negation of reified, conventional forms. I will then conclude by showing that this 
characterisation chimes well with how the Abstract Expressionists appear to have worked, 
paradigmatically with reference to Joan Mitchell’s painting Mandres (1961-2). 
  Having established that we might read Greenberg as accounting for the way in which the 
Abstract Expressionist artists worked in mimetic receptivity to particularity, however, in 
Chapter 8, ‘Greenberg’s Kantianism contra Greenberg’s Positivism,’ I will address the 
accusation, levelled by many critics, that Greenberg’s ‘positivist’ account of Abstract 
Expressionism prescribes a mode of reception which primes the sensorium to subordinate 
precisely the contingency of one’s somatic and affective particularity in a manner amenable 
to the status quo. The most substantive account of this is Caroline A. Jones’s Eyesight Alone 
(2005), but it was preceded by significant accounts by Rosalind Krauss, Bryony Fer, and 
Amelia Jones. In the latter’s critique, as is not uncommon in similar dismissals of Greenberg, 
emphasis is placed upon Greenberg’s self-proclaimed Kantianism, in so far as Amelia Jones 
claims that, following Kant’s distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful, Greenberg 
demands disinterestedness on the part of spectators, whereby they must bracket their 
contingent particularity in deference to his categories of medium-specificity. However, I will 
argue that if we turn directly to Greenberg’s references to Kant, it is clear that he 
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overwhelmingly appeals to Kantian aesthetic reflective judgement in attempts to describe 
how Abstract Expressionism engages spectators on the basis of particular experience. To 
elucidate this, I will read Greenberg’s references to Kant through Adorno’s account of 
Kantian aesthetic reflective judgement. For Adorno, whereas the lineaments of the 
transcendental subject set out by Kant in his theoretical philosophy elaborate and legitimate 
capitalist reification, and thus certainly truncate and delegitimate elements of particular 
experience, aesthetic reflective judgement concerns that which is truncated and delegitimated. 
It is precisely the appeal to such elements of particular experience, I will contend, which 
Greenberg found compelling in artworks. Thus, his account of the response invited by 
Abstract Expressionist artworks might be understood as characterising the artworks as 
engaging us on the somatic and affective stratum of experience of which a corrected 
rationality would take account. 
  An elaboration of this claim will concern Chapter 9, ‘The Silent World of the Sensible.’ In 
this chapter, I will in the outset return to Trotsky’s theories on art, and show that the reason 
why Trotsky claims inherent seditiousness for art which follows its ‘own laws’ rather than 
prescribed themes is because it thus engages ‘feelings and moods’ stymied by capitalism. 
While Caroline A. Jones claims that focus on how art affects recipients in this way is 
abandoned by Greenberg after WWII in favour of reified categories of medium-specificity, I 
will argue that it in fact remained fundamental to his criticism. I will argue that Greenberg’s 
criticism attests to how Abstract Expressionism’s negation of non-medium-specific elements 
which I show in Chapter 7 might be understood as the determinate negation of reified forms, 
invites assimilation to otherness and through this engages cognition in a way that is 
emphatically inextricable from the corporeal. I will elaborate this not only with recourse to 
Adorno, but also Merleau-Ponty, who dedicates far more attention to the reception of art. In 
this, I will contend that Greenberg’s self-identified ‘positivism’ and the ‘metaphysical’ self-
description of many of the Abstract Expressionists, which are often counterposed, in fact both 
refer to the same elements of experience dismissed as fundamental determinants of life under 
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capitalism. Then, in Chapter 10, ‘Denunciation and Anticipation,’ I will contend that the 
assimilation to the other through which such elements of experience are engaged, also 
prefigures a world in which life would be fundamentally determined by such subjective 
experience in reciprocity with its object. I will show that when the revisionist historians, 
namely Guilbaut and Jachec, address the notion that Abstract Expressionism prefigures 
utopia, they dismiss it as a spurious projection which leaves the status quo untouched yet 
allowed the artists to maintain a superficial political radicalism. They make this case with 
recourse to two statements by Robert Motherwell. In one, written with Harold Rosenberg, he 
asserts that the Abstract Expressionists, in working without heed to organised thinking, keep 
faith in possibility. In another, Motherwell claims that Abstract Expressionism is 
fundamentally ethical. However, I will contend that these statements in fact attest to the way 
in which Abstract Expressionist artworks (still) promise another relationship with the world, 
whose possibility inheres in the present. Again reading Adorno alongside Merleau-Ponty, I 
will argue that the latter’s late phenomenology of a chiasmatic intercorporeity between 
subjects and objects, which he terms ‘the flesh,’ might be understood as a prefiguration of 
reconciliation extrapolated from the aesthetic experience which Adorno terms ‘distanced 
nearness,’ which I will contend is typified by Abstract Expressionist artworks. I will discuss 
this with particular reference to the painting City Night (1949) by Norman Lewis, the only 
African-American member of the New York School’s first generation. Lewis affirms that his 
decision to eschew Social Realism was informed by the inefficaciousness of the latter to 
effect social change, and he claims that to do so he instead turned to direct political protest. 
While Lewis does not correlate his adoption of an abstract aesthetic with such action, I hope 
my thesis will have established that, in spite of its co-optation by US imperialism, Abstract 
Expressionism is united precisely with the struggle by corporeal subjects against the 
domination of capital. I will then, in the conclusion, survey contemporary abstract painting in 
light of my thesis.   
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Chapter One 
Greenberg’s Trotskyism 
  Often taken as indicative of the development traced by accounts of Abstract 
Expressionism’s complicity with imperialism, is a bracketed addendum made by Greenberg 
to a sentence in his 1957 essay, ‘New York Painting Only Yesterday,’ upon its republication 
as ‘The Late Thirties in New York’ in Art and Culture four years later. The essay was 
occasioned by an exhibition at the Poindexter Gallery entitled The ‘30s: New York Paintings, 
and is one of Greenberg’s many retrospective surveys of Abstract Expressionism. It focuses 
particularly on how Arshile Gorky, Willem de Kooning and Hans Hofmann drew influence in 
the late 1930s from Matisse, Klee, Miró and early Kandinsky, in developing what Greenberg 
was then arguing was the most advanced art of its time. Early in the essay, Greenberg writes 
that ‘radical politics was on many people’s minds but for them Social Realism was as dead as 
the American Scene’ (CEC4: 19). However, in the revised version he adds ‘that is not all, by 
far, that there was to politics in art in those years; some day it will have to be told how “anti-
Stalinism,” which started out more or less as “Trotskyism,” turned into art for art’s sake, and 
thereby cleared the way, heroically, for what was to come’ (1961: 230). Without the 
addendum, the sentence is simply an acknowledgement that the neglect of so-called 
‘political’ subject matter did not necessarily coincide with a decline in political engagement 
on the part of the artists. With the addition of the bracketed aside, however, is implied the 
notion that the turn towards abstraction was both precipitated by, and eradicated, a 
commitment to radical politics on the part of the artists who would become Abstract 
Expressionists. This assumption orients many of the revisionist historians’ accounts, and 
these scholars understand as emblematic of this shift the way that, in his seminal essays 
‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (1939) and ‘Towards a Newer Laocoon’ (1940), both published in 
Partisan Review – whose editorial line at the time was firmly Trotskyist-by-way-of-Anti-
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Stalinism3 – Greenberg depoliticised the ideas central to two pieces by Trotsky previously 
published in the same journal in 1938. These pieces were an essay entitled ‘Art and Politics 
in our Epoch,’ and a manifesto for a proposed International Federation of Independent 
Revolutionary Art (FIARI) co-authored with Andre Breton and signed by the Mexican artist 
Diego Rivera in place of a fugitive Trotsky. 
  Now, Greenberg does not cite Trotsky in ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon,’ and in interviews late in 
his life Greenberg throws into question the notion that the essays might be understood as 
significantly informed by Trotsky’s preceding pieces. While assenting with Robert Burstow 
that ‘Kitsch’ was ‘alas’ written within a Trotskyist framework, he also claims that, despite 
having ‘great admiration for Trotsky,’ he could only have been described as a ‘half-assed 
Trotskyist’ and elsewhere asserts that he ‘didn’t agree with’ Trotsky’s articles on art 
(Burstow 1994: 33; 2003: 236). However, such a disclamation is in keeping with Greenberg’s 
tendency in old age, spurred by what he candidly referred to in 1984 as his ‘revulsion (a 
repentant sinners’) against leftist cant,’ to downplay his youthful commitment to 
revolutionary socialism (2003: 140).4 Instead, evidence in fact suggests that his engagement 
                                                          
3 Partisan Review was founded by Joseph Freeman, Edwin Seaver, William Phillips and Philip Rahv as a 
mouthpiece for proletarian literature when the editors were members of the New York chapter of the 
John Reed Club, the US arm of the communist International Union of Writers and Artists (see Wald 1987: 
81-82). In 1936, it dissolved, largely due to the ideological split in the left caused by the Moscow Trials 
cleaving its editorial team in two, with Freeman and Seaver remaining committed to the USSR, and 
Phillips and Rahv aligning themselves with the exiled Trotsky. In the next year, however, Phillips and 
Rahv re-established the magazine as an, to quote the editorial authored by Philips and Rahv, 
‘unequivocally independent’ publication ‘aware of its responsibility to the revolutionary movement in 
general, but [disclaiming] obligation to any of its organised political expressions’ (Partisan Review Editors 
2007: 60). It was a year later that Dwight Macdonald, a Trotskyist addition to the editorial board who 
would go on to commission Greenberg’s first essays, extended an invitation to Trotsky to express his 
views on the contemporaneous art, which Trotsky – albeit with misgivings – accepted, resulting in ‘Art 
and Politics in Our Epoch,’ much of the ideas in which Trotsky reiterated anonymously with Breton in 
‘Towards a Free Revolutionary Art.’ 
4 Caroline A. Jones speculates that this tendency extended to Greenberg most likely actively suppressing 
the republication in his otherwise almost comprehensive Collected Essays and Criticism of his ‘10 
Propositions on the War’ (EA: 445, n111), which was a 1941 piece co-authored with Dwight Macdonald 
and published in the July-August issue of Partisan Review, in which the authors argue against immediate 
US intervention in WWII, and instead contend that ‘[to] win the war against fascism, we must work for the 
replacement of the present governments in England and the United States by working class governments 
commited to democratic socialism’ (1941: 277). Whether Greenberg suppressed the republication of this 
essay is questionable, as the equally uncompromisingly radical ‘An American View’ is republished in the 
Collected Essays and Criticism, and it is thus likely that ’10 Propositions’ was not reproduced simply 
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with Trotsky was certainly more than lackadaisical or superficial. As one of Greenberg’s 
biographers Alice Goldfarb Marquis affirms, throughout the 1930s Greenberg ‘had been 
assiduously studying the works of [...] Leon Trotsky’ to the extent that it is very likely he was 
not only acquainted with the two essays in Partisan Review but also Trotsky’s writing on art 
going back to 1923 (2006: 50-1), and this dedication is evident in his youthful letters to his 
confidante Harold Lazarus, in which, for instance, he in 1936 enumerates as one of his 
paramount concerns the hope that ‘Trotsky gets safely into Mexico’ (2000: 171).5 Moreover, 
just months prior to the publication of ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch,’ he reports to Lazarus that 
he was invited to join the American section of the FIARI (2000: 196).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
because, as John O’Brian notes in the introduction to the first volume, articles that were jointly written 
were not included (CEC1: xviii). Nevertheless, Greenberg was certainly dismissive of ’10 Propositions’ late 
in life: In 1994, Greenberg blithely attributes this article to the influence of his Stalinist brother Sol, 
claiming that, like Sartre, in the 1930s he ‘reasoned that the Stalinists were showing him the true path’ 
(2003: 237). This of course makes no sense, not only because – notwithstanding his hope, which he held 
until at least 1944, that Stalinism might still have been fomenting the conditions for its own demise, as ‘an 
increase in production and productivity, coupled with the slackening of foreign danger’, may have 
released ‘the socialist tendencies which Trotsky said lay locked in soviet economy’ (CEC1: 187), it is easily 
demonstrable from Greenberg’s letters that his hatred of Stalinism, and specifically Sol’s dedication to 
Stalinism (2000: 127), was fierce and visceral at the time – he describes how Stalin’s ‘darkness infects the 
mind more thoroughly than syphilis infects the blood’ (Ibid: 177) – but more simply because opposing US 
intervention in WWII in July 1941 was of course anti-Stalinist, since the very trigger for US intervention 
was Germany invading the USSR in June 1941. In fact, Greenberg himself justified his stance as 
Luxembergian (EA: 44), which is certainly notable, because Rosa Luxemburg provides a model of 
revolutionary art very similar to Trotsky’s, writing that ‘[w]ith the true artist, the social formula that he 
recommends is a matter of secondary importance; the source of his art, its animating spirit, is decisive’ 
(qtd. in Siegel 1970: 28). 
5 Tracing the development of Greenberg’s politics in the ‘30s through these letters also reveals a more 
than trivial commitment to the radical left in general. To an extent, one can see the justification for 
Greenberg’s dismissive retrospective characterisation. At times it seems as if Marxism as just another 
curio amongst his cultural activities: He at one point writes that he’s ‘been reading Communist pamphlets 
and Henry James’; makes a point of his aloofness even when affirming that he voted for the socialists in 
1932; and, rather than Trotsky, the Marxist figure who receives the most attention in these letters is 
Brecht, who Greenberg discovers in 1931 and swiftly proclaims as ‘everything!’ (2000: 140; 76; 55). 
However, he repeatedly describes his investment in contemporary struggles in markedly affective terms, 
as if his ‘faith in the revolution’ is wholly imbricated with his ‘faith in [himself],’ as he puts it in one letter 
(Ibid: 251). In 1933, for instance, he describes being moved to tears and going ‘home all jagged up’ after 
attending a Communist mass-meeting about a cotton picker strike in the San Joaquin valley, and three 
years later, he uses similarly affective phraseology to describe his emotive responses to reading a book 
about the Socialist uprising in Austria, and news of a strike in France – ‘all cut up’ and ‘all stirred up’ 
respectively (Ibid: 108; 150; 164). Furthermore, while his commitment did not extend to volunteering for 
the Spanish civil war, it preoccupies him constantly; he bemoans that it is ‘all [he] can think of in the 
morning,’ and ‘[i]f the Loyalists were winning [he’d] really be happy in a personal way’ (167; 174). 
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  As we will see, in Trotsky’s essays he propounds that dedication to art’s own laws, rather 
than prescription in terms of content, is necessary if art is to be allied with revolution. He thus 
identifies a crisis in the fact that such revolutionary art was contemporaneously losing the 
bourgeois patronage by which it had been hitherto fostered – albeit only to ultimately 
assimilate it – and hence, rather than existent Stalinist organisations, which exacted servility 
from artists and thus stymied dedication to art’s laws, he calls for the establishment of an 
anarcho-communist federation to support revolutionary art. Greenberg’s essays argue a 
markedly similar case. Greenberg, too, posits that art dedicated to its inherent laws was a 
threat to capitalism’s existence in 1939, and he similarly calls for socialism to preserve it in 
lieu of bourgeois patronage. However, whereas Trotsky’s pieces bear a political urgency at 
the expense of discussing aesthetics in any specificity, Greenberg’s pieces are concerned 
overwhelmingly with aesthetics, and the dynamics by which socialism was to preserve an 
avant-garde art which supposedly posed a threat to capitalism, or indeed the question of how 
avant-garde art posed a threat to capitalism, are not addressed to any meaningful extent. 
Accordingly, the revisionist historians argue that Greenberg thus developed a paradigm 
which both legitimated the Abstract Expressionists’ praxis in pseudo-politically radical terms, 
despite – indeed due to – its ‘distance from party politics and political organisation’ (Orton 
and Pollock 1985: 181), and by the same token allowed for the sloughing off, or total 
assimilation, of these terms by the time the work was exported in efforts of US imperialism 
during the 1950s. 
  In the face of these accounts, art historians defending Abstract Expressionism against its 
synonymy with US imperialism over the last three decades have been eager to establish how 
such a move from Trotskyism to an art-for-art’s-sake only applies to Greenberg’s criticism. 
David Craven, for instance, writes that ‘far from encapsulating the dominant ideological 
journey of the US art world,’ the transformation from ‘Trotskyism’ to ‘art for art’s sake’ 
‘merely summarizes [Greenberg’s] own rather lonely, even singular, trek to the right of the 
political spectrum’ (ACC: 42), and David Anfam stresses that this move was ‘Greenberg’s 
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private odyssey’ (1990: 55). Accordingly, Stephen Polcari accuses the revisionists of 
‘specious associations [...] dismissal of the personal, cultural, and intellectual concerns; 
sweeping abstractions and generalizations; and wilful ignorance of intentions, subjects, 
forms, and imagery of the artists’ (1988: 177). Guilbaut’s case, especially, relies upon 
homogenising claims that the American art world was able to aggressively impose its 
painting as the heir to European Modernism because it comprised ‘liberal Modernists’ unified 
behind ‘the leading force’ of Abstract Expressionism in full knowledge of its ‘symbolic role 
in international cultural politics’ (1990: 33-36). Yet, while other Marxist New York 
intellectuals such as Sidney Hook moved to the right in the same era (see Wald 1987: 193ff), 
it has been ably demonstrated that there was no such broader ideological shift for the artists 
and intellectuals associated with Abstract Expressionism, who generally retained their left-
wing convictions  (not least Pollock, whom Greenberg himself dubbed a ‘Goddamn Stalinist 
from start to finish’ in an interview with Clark, a claim which Clark thinks Greenberg ‘meant 
[...] seriously’ (1999a: 442 n16)).6 However, in what follows I do not want to trace the 
development of the paradigm by which Greenberg championed Abstract Expressionism as a 
                                                          
6 Pollock is known to have been staunchly anti-capitalist and actively involved with left-wing politics as a 
youth. To adduce this, Craven quotes a letter from the young Pollock to his father, in which the artist 
‘repeatedly criticized the capitalist system and “the rest of the hokum that goes with the price system”’ 
(ACC: 48), and in B.H. Friedman’s biography of the artist, Pollock is quoted claiming to have attended  ‘a 
number of Communist meetings’ (12). Despite all this, Pollock is one artist singled out by Eva Cockcroft as 
having ‘left behind his earlier interest in political activism,’ and for Cockcroft this is tantamount to his 
submission to the status quo (129). Yet, as Anfam writes, Pollock ‘so far is known, kept his youthful left-
wing views’ (1991: 55; see also Naifeh and Smith 1989: 406). Similarly, As David Anfam observes, those 
Abstract Expressionists who began as committed radicals, such as David Smith and Ad Reinhardt did not 
abandon their socialist principles afterwards’ (1990: 55). While Reinhardt’s support of the Communist 
Party of the United States (CPUSA) into the ‘50s is well documented, (see most recently Corris, 2008: 52-
59), he was not the only Abstract Expressionist whose dissidence lead to investigation by the FBI. As 
Craven details, Reinhardt’s file ‘runs to around 123 pages,’ but ‘Motherwell’s comprises 45, Rothko’s 21, 
Gottlieb’s 5, and Krasner’s a mere 2 pages, albeit very provocative ones’ (ACC: 81). The inclusion of 
Gottlieb and Rothko in this list is particularly notable, because their involvement in the Federation of 
Modern Painters and Sculptors (FMPS) is often adduced as evidence of their active complicity with ‘the 
social and political function to which [their work] was put,’ due to the Federation’s role as ‘an active agent 
for anti-Communism in the art world’ (Stonor Saunders, 275; see also Cox, 29; Jachec, 34, 149). Now, this 
judgement is questionable, because, while Annette Cox demonstrates that the FMPS ‘sought to expose 
Party influence in such organisations as Artists for Victory and Artists’ Equity’ (29), its opposition to the 
CPUSA was expressly rooted in anti-Stalinism rather than pro-Americanism. It was founded in reaction to 
the American Artists’ Congress passing a resolution ‘that to many [...] appeared to sanction the Russian 
invasion of Finland’ (Ashton 1996: 67), and, similarly to Trotsky and Breton’s earlier manifesto which I 
will discuss below, its first statement of aims ‘described the Soviet and Nazi regimes as two examples of 
“totalitarianism of thought and action” which valued the artist “only as a craftsman who may be 
exploited”’ (Cox 1982: 28-29).  
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move from Trotskyism to art-for-art’s sake as microcosmic of a wider ideological shift in the 
New York art scene. Rather, I want to identify Greenberg’s criticism as rooted in Trotsky’s 
art theory because I will contend that the fundamental dynamics of Trotsky’s account of 
revolutionary art as art which refutes heteronomous constraint and yet progresses by 
determinately negating elements of preceding art, are not only central to the way in which 
Greenberg’s criticism, when hypostasised, contributed to Abstract Expressionism’s co-
optation, but also to how Greenberg’s criticism bears witness to the way in which Abstract 
Expressionist artworks indict the ends for which they were enlisted. 
  In his two Partisan Review essays preceding ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon,’ Trotsky espouses 
conviction that revolutionary art must be free from heteronomous constraint as opposed to the 
mandated socialist realism of the USSR, from which he had been exiled by Stalin a decade 
before. He writes of how, in the USSR artists ‘who still [consented] to take up pen or brush’ 
had been reduced ‘to the status of domestic servants of the regime, whose task it [was] to 
glorify it on order, according to the worst possible aesthetic conventions’ (LA: 117). For 
Trotsky, socialist realism was to be discredited as ‘based on lies and deceit’ (LA: 106). He, 
for example, indicts Alexei Tolstoy’s novel Bread (1937), which glorifies the military 
exploits of Stalin and Voroshilov at Tsaritsin, when in reality both were relieved of their 
posts; and various paintings which portray a then-recently retrospectively fabricated auxiliary 
central command of the October revolution consisting of figures who were 
contemporaneously faithful to Stalin (LA: 107-109). It is understandable, then, that in 
discussing Trotsky’s influence on Greenberg, Erika Doss surmises that Trotsky’s opposition 
to art ‘determined by its function, such as the Soviet style of socialist realism’ was ‘shaped’ 
by ‘personal anti-Stalinism’ (327). However, Trotsky had already maintained the necessity of 
artists’ independence fifteen years before in his work Literature and Revolution (1923), when 
Lenin was still head of the government and socialist realism was not mandated to artists. In 
Literature and Revolution, Trotsky claims that a ‘work of art should, in the first place, be 
judged by its own law, that is, by the law of art’ (LA: 37). He affirms that the ‘Marxist 
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conception of [...] the social utility of art, when translated into the language of politics, does 
not at all mean a desire to dominate art by means of decrees and orders’ and Marxists do not 
‘regard only that art new and revolutionary which speaks of the worker’ or describes ‘a 
factory chimney, or the uprising against capital’ (LA: 31).7 Instead, for Trotsky, if free of 
heteronomous prescription, art fulfils its revolutionary role whether or not ‘it appears in a 
given case under the flag of a "pure" or of a frankly tendentious art’ (LA: 30). Thus, it is 
wholly in keeping with his earlier writing on art when Trotsky counterposes to Stalinist 
socialist realism art for which what is decisive is its significance as art, contending that ‘true 
art’ cannot tolerate orders ‘by its very essence,’ and becomes ‘a strong ally of revolution’ by 
remaining faithful to ‘its laws’ (LA: 114).  
  Commentators have seemed to interpret Trotsky essays as thus advocating fidelity to one’s 
conscience, values, ideological commitments, or whatever other concept might come under 
the rubric of ‘self.’ Robert Wistrich and Isaac Deutscher make such assumptions, both 
apparently paraphrasing a letter which Trotsky wrote to Breton subsequent to the publication 
of the manifesto, in which he vaguely defines ‘the struggle for artistic truth [...] in terms of 
the immutable faith of the artist in his own inner self’ (LA: 124). Wistrich writes that for 
Trotsky the ‘ultimate criterion for the artist’ is faith in their ‘inner self and in [their] struggle 
for truth’ (156), and Deutscher claims that for Trotsky an artist might act as ‘a necessary part 
of revolution,’ through ‘unyielding faithfulness to himself’ (433). It is certainly the case that 
                                                          
7 Nevertheless, in this early work he censures art whose content actively opposes the revolution, and 
maintains the necessity to enforce ‘a resolute and severe, but of course, not petty, censorship’ (LA: 240, 
n.11). Because of this, Alice Goldfarb Marquis asserts that Trotsky equivocates ‘wildly between asserting 
the freedom of the creative artist and the need to control his or her output to support the revolution’ 
(2006: 118). However, this exigency should be understood not as a transhistorical mandate, but rather in 
terms of the supposed necessity for the transitional regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat to lay 
down ‘severe limitations upon all forms of activity, including spiritual creation’ (LA: 96). Moreover, 
Trotsky still maintains that these limitations did not mean the government could act as ‘commander in 
the sphere of science, literature and art,’ and formulated its relationship to artists as ‘holding over them 
all the categorical criterion, for the revolution or against the revolution,’ while giving them ‘complete 
freedom in the sphere of artistic self-determination’ (LA: 96-7). Thus, it might be said that, rather than 
equivocating, for Trotsky freedom for artists and censorship so as their art does not oppose the 
revolution are coextensive, because for him it would be impossible to consider art which actively opposed 
the revolution as the product of free creativity. That is to say, for Trotsky, as Adorno claims four decades 
later, ‘political falsehood stains [...] aesthetic form’ (2007c: 186). 
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extra-aesthetic impulses as central to Trotsky’s account of radical art. Trotsky’s ferocious 
invectives against the formalism of Victor Shklovsky, whose ‘assertion of complete 
independence of the aesthetic “factor” from the influence of social conditions’ Trotsky 
condemns as idealism, mean that one could never assume that he considers art’s laws wholly 
internal to it (LA: 32-41).8 As will be addressed in Chapter 9, for Trotsky the notion that art 
dedicated to these laws is ‘unable not to be revolutionary, not to aspire to a complete and 
radical reconstruction of society’ is bound up with his conviction that unmet and repressed 
‘inner needs of man and mankind’ are engaged by this dedication (LA: 117). However, he 
continually stresses that these needs are mediated by artistic technique – ‘artistic creation is 
[...] a deflection, a changing and a transformation of reality, in accordance with the peculiar 
law of art’ (LA: 34) – and implies that they cannot be transparently expressed in rhetoric 
shared with art which serves as an apology for the status quo.9 As Adorno would assert 
twenty years later, for Trotsky in 1938 it seems that the latter cannot be countered ‘simply by 
a determination to look at things in what purports to be a more objective manner,’ but instead 
art reveals ‘whatever is veiled by the empirical form assumed by reality’ by the progress of 
its autonomous laws (2007b: 162). Trotsky accordingly contends that ‘the development of 
tendencies in art’ unhindered by heteronomous prescription, always bespeaks ‘a protest 
against reality’ (LA: 104-5). To adopt a distinction between senses of the word ‘content’ in 
German employed by Adorno in his aesthetic theory, Trotsky’s opposition to the officiated 
art of the Soviet Union is premised on its Inhalt (paraphrasable subject matter), but he 
                                                          
8 It should here be noted, however, that in 1923, the same year as the publication of Literature and Art, 
Shklovsky and the Russian Formalists joined the Left Futurists and Mayakovsky, of whom Trotsky had a 
far more sanguine opinion, to produce the magazine LEF, in which formalism was politicised in a way that 
Stanley Mitchell has argued should be understood as marking it out as an antecedent of Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekt (1974: 76). 
 
9 Admittedly, the only specific examples of ‘true artworks’ Trotsky gives in either Partisan Review essays 
are Rivera’s frescoes inspired by the October revolution, which he asserts reveal its ‘hidden springs’ in a 
way which art of the USSR could not (LA: 110). However, for Trotsky this veracity is to be understood less 
in the sense that these murals correct the falsehoods peddled by the likes of Alexei Tolstoy, and more in 
the sense that these murals bear witness to the revolution’s essence by manifesting its ‘mighty blast,’ a 
claim which Trotsky corroborates not by detailing the correspondence of the murals’ imagery with fact, 
but by pointing out that the murals provoked the ire of ‘Catholics and other reactionaries, including, of 
course, Stalinists’ evidenced by the vandalism inflicted upon them (ibid). 
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conversely champions as inherently revolutionary what he refers to as ‘true art’ on the basis 
of its Gehalt (unparaphrasable import).10 
  Now, while previously these avant-garde tendencies had found patronage in the bourgeoisie, 
in 1938 Trotsky asserts they risked losing even the minimum conditions for their existence at 
a moment when their protest against reality might have actually become a transformation of 
reality, for precisely the reasons why the conditions for this shift were so fecund. That is, 
Trotsky contends that the bourgeoisie was no longer willing to support avant-garde art 
because, due to the acuteness of the economic crisis, it feared ‘superstitiously every new 
word, for it [was] no longer a matter of corrections and reforms for capitalism but of life and 
death’ (LA: 105). It is in the face of this impasse, then, that in ‘Towards a Free Revolutionary 
Art’ Trotsky calls with Breton for the founding of the FIARI as a revolutionary International 
in support of this art. The manifesto’s indeterminacy as to the particularities of the FIARI has 
lead scholars such as Martin Puchner to claim that Trotsky and Breton leave open ‘the 
question of how to bring revolution and art into unison,’ and denote the authors’ attendant 
slogan ‘the independence of art – for the revolution / The revolution – for the complete 
liberation of art’ an ‘oscillating chiasmus’ (2006: 195). Yet, while certainly ambiguous, this 
unison of art and revolution is not tautological in the way that Puchner implies; for Trotsky, 
as we have seen, ‘true art’ could only be revolutionary, and thus the revolutionary 
                                                          
10 As Robert Hullot-Kentor writes in a translator’s footnote to Aesthetic Theory, ‘Inhalt’ means ‘the idea of 
thematic content or subject matter,’ while ‘Gehalt’ means ‘content in the sense of import, essence, or 
substance of a work’ (AT: 368). Ulrich Plass notes that Adorno inherited these terms from Goethe and 
Schiller, and draws this quote from Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby to further elucidate the 
distinction: ‘If we are capable of responding to the totality of the form the artist has made, then we have 
access to the “meaning” inherent in it, a meaning which is different from any or all of the meanings of the 
various materials which has gone to its making. For this “meaning,” which is implicit in the form of a work 
of art, and never to be explicated out of it by formulation in any other terms, Goethe and Schiller usually 
reserved the term Gehalt [...] Whereas Gehalt is the unitary import of a unitary form, Inhalt has something 
of the multiplicity of the materials out of which the latter was made [...] Inhalt is that which, unlike Gehalt, 
can be abstracted from any representational work of art, and expressed in other terms’ (qtd. in Plass 
2012: 223, n15). In an aside in ‘Laocoon,’ Greenberg draws a similar distinction between the axes ‘subject 
matter’ and ‘content,’ with the former as Inhalt and the latter as Gehalt, when he claims that the avant-
garde rejected ‘[s]ubject matter as distinguished from content: in the sense that every work of art must 
have content, but that subject matter is something the artist does or does not have in mind when he is 
actually at work’ (CEC1: 28). Central points in what follows will pivot on the notion that Greenberg’s 
concept of ‘medium-specificity’ refers to the former rather than the latter. 
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International of the FIARI was to be founded in lieu of a bourgeois willing to provide an 
economic base for art which by its very nature challenged their declining society. 
  In detailing the historical dynamic of such art’s development, in 1938 Trotsky indicates that 
it is rooted in negation, in terms of how ‘[e]very new artistic or literary tendency (naturalism, 
symbolism, futurism, cubism, expressionism, and so forth and so on) has begun with a 
“scandal,” breaking the old respected crockery’ as each movement was totally assimilated by 
its patrons and ‘from the ranks of a new generation of bohemian artists [...] a fresher revolt 
would surge up to attain its turn’ (LA: 102; 105). These negations, then, are determinate 
rather than abstract; ‘united to the tradition from which [they were] seeking to break,’ as Paul 
N. Siegel puts it (1970: 11). This emphasis on the importance of ‘the methods and processes 
evolved in the past’ also bears continuity with Trotsky’s earlier writing on art (2005: 195). In 
Literature and Revolution, this contention sets Trotsky against the Proletkult, the 
Organisation for Proletarian Culture founded in 1918, which rejected bourgeois art tout court 
and set up a network of studios throughout post-revolutionary Russia in which proletarians 
were to develop entirely new art-forms (see Laing 1978: 20-45; Arvon, 1974: 56-70). Quite 
aside from the fact that the idea of proletarian art presupposes the very ‘class culture’ that the 
Soviet Union’s transitional dictatorship of the proletariat was established to abolish in order 
‘to make way for human culture’ and thus it is not a proletarian art but a socialist art befitting 
the latter which must ultimately be conceived, Trotsky contends that any such socialist art 
would be developed through ‘a systematic, planful and [...] critical imparting to the backward 
masses of the essential elements of the culture which already exists’ (LA: 42; 49). For 
Trotsky, ‘[m]astery of the art of the past is [...] a necessary precondition [...] for the creation 
of new art’ and the groundless repudiation of art of the past would only render a culture ‘at 
once [...] poorer spiritually’ (LA: 86-7). Thus, Trotsky contends that the verses which 
appeared in pre-revolutionary workers’ publications are ‘a political event, not a literary one’ 
(LA: 65). These verses ‘contributed not to the growth of literature but to the growth of the 
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revolution,’ and the latter would only give rise to a new art upon ‘the cultural growth of the 
working people’ (65). 
  Like Trotsky, Greenberg maintains a dialectical conception of artistic development 
fundamentally propelled by determinate negations. Furthermore, as we will see, in ‘Kitsch,’ 
Greenberg also implies that this progress is endangered by the very same circumstances of 
economic crisis which mean it might serve revolution. Yet, for Greenberg this fundamental 
model of art’s progress which he shares with Trotsky manifests in a genealogy of avant-garde 
art for which not only is art’s adherence to its ‘own laws’ rather than thematic content 
decisive for its quality, but the former eschews the latter. As he puts it in an insight which he 
attributes to Hans Hofmann: 
Picasso, Braque, Mondrian, Miró, Kandinsky, Brancusi, even Klee, Matisse and  
derive their chief inspiration from the medium they work in. The excitement of their 
art seems to lie most of all in its pure preoccupation with the invention and 
arrangement of spaces, surfaces, shapes, colours, etc. to the exclusion of whatever is 
not necessarily implicated in these factors. (CEC1: 9) 
Trotsky, it seems, disclaims such developments when he affirms that it is ‘far from [his] wish 
to revive a so-called pure art which generally serves the extremely impure ends of reaction’ 
(LA: 120). And below, I will of course address the ways in which the revisionist accounts 
contend that Abstract Expressionism, the ‘so-called pure art’ which Greenberg would come 
to champion, served the ‘extremely impure ends’ of US imperialism. In ‘Kitsch’ and 
‘Laocoon,’ however, Greenberg certainly roots the origins of the avant-garde in leftist 
politics. While he notoriously affirms that the avant-garde has hitherto been attached to the 
ruling class by an ‘umbilical cord of gold’ (CEC1: 11), he aligns its emergence with ‘the first 
bold development of scientific revolutionary thought in Europe’ – by which, as Clark notes, 
Greenberg of course means ‘pre-eminently the thought of Marx’ (1985: 48) – in so far as the 
avant-garde’s rejection of academicism was bolstered by such thought’s rejection of ‘the 
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prevailing standards of society’ which was thus ‘shown to be, not an eternal, “natural” 
condition of life’ (CEC1: 7). Nevertheless, the fact that in both essays Greenberg focuses 
upon how avant-garde artists proceeded to ‘escape from ideas’ (CEC1: 28)  has lead some 
critics to wholly differentiate Greenberg from Trotsky even at the point of ‘Kitsch’ and 
‘Laocoon,’ on the basis that, as Robert Storr contends, while Greenberg professed a desire for 
social revolution in the late 30’s and early ‘40s, it was already his ‘conviction that continuity 
of tradition was an ultimate value and art itself was a product of purely artistic dynamics’ 
(1990: 169). However, Greenberg maintains in ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon’ that, in spite of its 
ostensible lack of politics, the reason why the avant-garde has tended toward the ‘so-called 
pure art’ which Trotsky derides, is in fact a principle which I have shown Trotsky affirms as 
politically vital, at least in his writings on art prior to the Partisan Review essays: the 
exigency to retain continuity with art of the past, ‘to keep culture moving’ amidst the 
‘ideological confusion and violence’ of social upheaval (CEC1: 8), which Trotsky avers 
should not lead to the wholesale repudiation of art of the past. Admittedly, whereas Trotsky 
in 1923 makes this argument in opposition to the Proletkult, on the precipice of World War II 
in 1939, in his most evocative statement on the matter Greenberg identifies this abstract 
negation of bourgeois art – this ‘plebian’ resentment towards the culture of those who 
‘administer’ the social order – with fascism’s ‘statue-smashing’ in ‘the name of godliness or 
the blood’s health, in the name of simple ways and solid virtues’ (CEC1: 18-9). Nevertheless, 
in targeting fascism’s orchestration of mass antipathy towards the art of the bourgeoisie, 
Greenberg is not siding with the latter because it is the product of bourgeois society any more 
than was Trotsky in his disputes with the Proletkult in 1923. Contrarily, as I will now 
explore, Greenberg’s affirmation that it is necessary for the avant-garde to maintain 
continuity with the bourgeois art which preceded it, is both rooted in a desire shared with the 
Trotsky of the ‘20s to retain the baby of culture while throwing out the bathwater of 
capitalism (to adopt a figure of speech which Adorno deploys in order to make the same point 
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in Minima Moralia (43-45)), and a faith shared with the Trotsky of the Partisan Review 
essays that this culture is in fact corrosive of capitalism, at least when the latter is in decline.  
  As we will see, many of the revisionists persist in identifying the avant-garde culture which 
Greenberg champions in these early essays as inherently bourgeois. Guilbaut, for example, 
deploys a similar figure of speech to that which I cited from Adorno to inverse ends when he 
summarises Greenberg’s position in ‘Kitsch’ as ‘The house might be in danger, but by 
fighting to protect Western culture, at least the furniture might be saved’ in order to 
characterise the critic as ‘sanctioning a conservative mission to rescue bourgeois culture’ 
(NY: 35-6). Certainly, in ‘Kitsch,’ Greenberg claims that under prevailing relations of 
production avant-garde art ‘actually belongs’ to the ruling class (CEC1: 10). However, as 
Clark writes, for Greenberg this was always a ‘contradictory belonging-together-in-
opposition’ (1985: 51), and as Guilbaut in fact acknowledges (without this, apparently, 
problematising the avant-garde’s bourgeois character11), it was precisely because the 
bourgeoisie was abandoning the avant-garde that this rescue mission was necessary.12 As 
Trotsky claims the crisis of capitalism in 1938 had left the bourgeoisie reluctant to support 
avant-garde art, in ‘Kitsch’ Greenberg claims that the bourgeoisie, pandering to the 
aforementioned resentment towards bourgeois culture on the part of the masses, had devised 
the ersatz culture of kitsch. Greenberg thus claimed it was no longer enough ‘to have an 
inclination towards [avant-garde art]’ (CEC1: 13). Instead, it was necessary to harbour ‘a true 
passion for it,’ so as to ‘resist the faked article that surrounds and presses in’ (CEC1: 13). In 
the 1920s, after the Russian revolution, Trotsky saw it as necessary to develop universal 
                                                          
11 Guilbaut notes that for Greenberg ‘the causes of the crisis of Western culture were similar to the ones 
listed by Trotsky in “Art and Politics,” namely, the crisis of capitalism and the decline of the ruling class’ 
(NY: 33). 
 
12 It should, however, be acknowledged that for Clark the negations of modernism championed by 
Greenberg are symptomatic of this abdication on the part of the bourgeois of cultural (while, of course, 
not economic) hegemony, and to this extent, for Clark, the avant-garde for whose rescue Greenberg is 
calling in ‘Kitsch’ remains ‘bourgeois art in the absence of a bourgeoisie,’ as opposed to art which might 
challenge ‘the notion that art stands only to suffer from the fact that now all meanings are disputable,’ and 
work towards the contestation of those meanings on the part of ‘those who stand to gain from their 
collapse’ (1985: 59-60). As should be evident from the introduction, for Clark Abstract Expressionism is 
certainly not the latter kind of art, while in the second half of this thesis, I will essentially argue that it is. 
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literacy amongst the proletariat, so that the socialist culture which eventually emerged would 
sublate rather than abstractly negate bourgeois culture.13 In the context of US capitalism in 
1939, however, Greenberg contended it was precisely the universal literacy to which the 
industrial revolution had given rise in the West that had led to the demand for kitsch. The 
proletariat had learned to read and write ‘for the sake of efficiency’ but they lacked the 
‘leisure and comfort’ which Greenberg contends is necessary to cultivate receptivity to 
‘genuine culture’ (CEC1: 12). Nevertheless, feeling ‘entitled to [their] opinion,’ the 
proletariat were ‘hungry [...] for the diversion that only culture of some sort can provide’ 
(CEC1: 18; 12). Yet, for Greenberg, while the culture with which the proletariat were 
accordingly provided draws its stratagems from a ‘fully matured cultural tradition,’ it both 
dilutes this tradition and constitutively impedes its development, not least because it ‘has 
been capitalised at tremendous investment which must show commensurate returns’ (CEC1: 
12-13). Here, we might infer an account of the culture industry not dissimilar from Adorno’s, 
the parallels of whose thought with Greenberg’s may be less than coincidental, as the two 
were warmly acquainted during Adorno’s time in America.14 Greenberg’s analysis is akin to 
Adorno’s in so far as for both the art produced by the culture industry is enmeshed in new 
modes of distribution, and attendant forms of consumption, all of which operate as forms of 
social and political control, thus reproducing the status quo.15 On the other hand, Greenberg 
                                                          
13  Accordingly, he, for example, celebrates the fact that Russia, a country whose population was largely 
illiterate, had expropriated 4,250,000 books from private libraries to make the collections of the 
Leningrad Public Library the largest in the world (LA: 89). 
 
14 These parallels have certainly been noted by many scholars, as we will see throughout this thesis. On 
the specific subject of avant-garde art’s resistance to the culture industry, see Thomas Crow’s 1983 essay 
‘Modernism and Mass Culture in the Visual Arts,’ specifically his discussion of how as ‘Greenberg does in 
the American critical tradition, so Adorno stands in his as the preeminent defender of removed, inward, 
self-critical and self-referential artistic practice’ (1984: 262, n.45); Francis Frascina, ‘Greenberg and the 
Politics of Modernism’ (1987), and Peter Osborne, ‘Aesthetic Autonomy and the Crisis of Theory: 
Greenberg, Adorno and the Problem of Postmodernism in the Visual Arts’ (1989). All of these accounts 
ultimately derogate Greenberg in light of his criticism’s subsequent apparent depoliticisation. As for the 
friendship between Greenberg and Adorno, Adorno claimed in 1962 that he knew Greenberg ‘very well 
from [his] American time and [thought] exceedingly highly of him.’ (EA: 360). Greenberg, for his part, 
recounts his acquaintance with Adorno by saying he ‘had high regard for him’ because ‘he was a nice man 
[...] not arrogant at all,’ and they ‘really had no basic differences of opinion’ (2003: 235-6; 224). 
 
15 In his book Political Aesthetics, Crispin Sartwell contends that, thus, Adorno and Greenberg are both 
elitists who deride ‘art emerging from and aimed at “the people” or a people’ (2010: 21). Certainly, both 
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contends, similarly to Adorno, that avant-garde art is less pliable to the dominant mode of 
consumption in so far as its production entails, as Adorno puts it, ‘uttermost consistency in 
the pursuit of [...] technical laws’ (2007a: 122). For Adorno, as I have already indicated in 
this chapter and will elaborate throughout this thesis, this is the source of autonomous art’s 
radical political Gehalt. On the other hand, Greenberg affirms in ‘Kitsch’ that avant-garde art 
is necessarily corrosive to capitalism in decline, although he does not draw a connection 
between the avant-garde’s autotelism and its supposed seditiousness. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that for Greenberg in 1939 the ‘demagogy’ of the culture industry conversely effects social 
and political control over the masses, whose immiseration at the tail-end of the Great 
Depression Greenberg presumably thinks may have otherwise precipitated revolution, 
bearing in mind his then-optimism about the ripeness of conditions for such an event.16  
  From this account, Greenberg draws a conclusion which could scarcely be closer to 
Trotsky’s theories on art as detailed above. That is, avant-garde art poses a threat to 
capitalism because the latter is in crisis, and yet, in no small part due to this crisis, the 
bourgeois patronage for avant-garde art has declined. Thus, in lieu of this patronage, 
Greenberg appeals to socialism to preserve avant-garde art rather than to devise a new 
culture, due to his confidence, following Trotsky, that a new culture would emerge with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Greenberg and Adorno ‘understood kitsch as commercialized, mass-produced, formulaic, standardixed, 
and aesthetically and politically rearguard ersartz culture,’ as Richard Leppart assimilates the two (2002: 
363). However, rather than attacking art ‘emerging from’ a people, Adorno’s critique is rooted in his 
conviction that the ‘customer is not king, as the culture industy would have us believe, not its subject but 
its object’ (1991: 85). Indeed, Adorno claims that ‘when art has allowed itself, without condescension, to 
be inspired by a plebeian element [it] has gained in an authentic weightiness’ (AT: 313). As Ben Watson 
points out, for Adorno, while the ‘folk’ music of industrialised countries was ‘a bourgeois fantasy of class 
reconciliation, evoking a patriotic never-never land,’ the music of the Transylvanian Gypsies from which 
Bartok drew ‘was a living tradition, an unsettling reminder of the marginalised and oppressed’ (2011: 
157-158). Similarly, for Greenberg in ‘Kitsch,’ the culture industry only manages to throw up ‘something 
of merit’ when its products have ‘something that has an authentic folk flavour’ (CEC1: 13). 
16 Guilbaut contends that ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon’ formalised the position of a contemporaneous avant-
garde which ‘rejected revolutionary hopes that had still been strong only a few years earlier’ in 
advocating for a ‘nonrevolutionary approach’ in the wake of ‘the disqualification of the CPUSA and the 
impotence of the Trotskyists’ (NY: 34-5). However, as I have established, at the time of writing these 
essays Greenberg was certainly aligned with the latter – as is made clear by his essay ‘An American View’ 
published a year after Laocoon, in which he insists that ‘in order to keep democracy there must be a 
socialist revolution’ (CEC1: 39) – and was arguing for a nonrevolutionary approach to art in the service of 
extra-aesthetic revolution. 
34 
 
socialism. This conclusion is worth reproducing in full, because partial or selective quotation 
and paraphrase from it abound in secondary literature: 
Capitalism in decline finds that whatever of quality it is still capable of producing 
becomes almost invariably a threat to its own existence. Advances in culture, no less 
than advances in science and industry, corrode the very society under whose aegis 
they are made possible. Here, as in every other question today, it becomes necessary 
to quote Marx word for word. Today we no longer look towards socialism for a new 
culture – as inevitably one will emerge, once we do have socialism. Today we look to 
socialism simply for the preservation of whatever living culture we have right now. 
(CEC1: 22) 
Certainly, both the practicable logistics of this preservation and precisely how avant-garde art 
might pose a challenge to capitalism remain imprecise in this passage. However, the clarity of 
Greenberg’s position in political terms renders claims by certain of the revisionists as to how 
‘Kitsch’ directly informed the conditions which lead to Abstract Expressionism’s co-optation 
by US imperialism erroneous, in so far as these writers contend that the essay advocates for 
the umbilical cord of gold attaching the avant-garde to its ruling class patronage.17 
Particularly egregious in this respect is Frances Stonor Saunders, who admittedly only 
dedicates a chapter in her larger history of the US government’s Cold War cultural 
propaganda to Abstract Expressionism. Stonor Saunders wholly ignores Greenberg’s politics, 
which, as will be clear from my précis, are evident throughout ‘Kitsch,’ even without their 
explication in the final paragraph quoted above. Instead, Stonor Saunders simply frames 
‘Kitsch’ as ‘the definitive article of faith for the elitist and anti-Marxist view of Modernism’ 
(1999: 258). On Stonor Saunders’s telling, the essay is an exhortation for the ruling class to 
support avant-garde art, and it is thus where the ‘really deep connection between Abstract 
Expressionism and the cultural Cold War can be found,’ having provided ‘the principle [by 
                                                          
17 Even a number of years later, in 1946, when Greenberg does claim that ‘[t]he future of art and literature 
will brighten in this country only when a new cultural elite appears with enough money and enough 
consciousness to counterbalance the pressure of the new mass market,’ he makes sure to clarify that 
‘[t]he other alternative is socialism, of course’ (CEC1: 58). 
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which] the CIA, together with its private venture capitalists, operated’ (Ibid: 258-9). 
Similarly, while acknowledging that Greenberg’s position was informed by Trotsky, David 
and Cecile Shapiro claim that ‘Greenberg says that the cream of the rich, educated class will 
support the new art’ which his article precipitated (1985: 140). Jachec, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that Greenberg at this point held to his faith in revolutionary socialism – 
indeed, as we will see below, her central thesis is that the capitulation of the New York art 
world entailed a co-optation, rather than surrender, of radical politics. Yet, she claims that in 
‘Kitsch,’ contrary to Trotsky, Greenberg abandoned the idea that art bore the ‘capacity to 
destabilise a bourgeois society already in decline’ and that instead art ‘was given a tellingly 
passive role in the struggle for socialism [...] one that, ironically, was for an indeterminate 
period to be dependent on the bourgeoisie for its success,’ two claims directly contradicted by 
Greenberg’s conclusion quoted above (PPA: 25-6). However, for these scholars, the assertion 
that Greenberg is appealing to the ruling class to provide an economic base for avant-garde 
art, is coupled with the assumption, shared explicitly or implicitly by all the revisionist 
historians, that Abstract Expressionism, as the movement which emerged from the 
intellectual ferment cultivated by ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon’ to become the next instantiation of 
avant-garde art in the trajectory which these essays trace, was itself particularly amenable to 
co-optation by the State Department in collusion with the expansionist faction of the national 
bourgeoisie. In the next chapter, I will explore this in reference to the notion, broadly 
accepted by the revisionists, that a significant determining factor in these imperialist forces’ 
promotion of Abstract Expressionism was the fact that the movement’s ostensible rejection of 
extra-aesthetic content meant it did not threaten the status quo in the same way as had Social 
Realism, the politically-committed style which Abstract Expressionism supplanted as the 
dominant mode of US painting. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Social Realism and Reification 
 
  While, as we will see throughout this thesis, the revisionists forward varied positive reasons 
as to why Abstract Expressionism was amenable to US imperialism, one negative reason 
broadly shared by the revisionists is that the supposed shift from Trotskyism to art for art’s 
sake resulted in the Abstract Expressionists rejecting all elements of the formerly dominant 
socio-politically engaged art of left-wing variants of American Scene painting, notably Social 
Realism, in which idiom many of the Abstract Expressionist artists had previously painted, 
for example Clyfford Still, Franz Kline, de Kooning and, notably, Pollock, under the 
mentorship of the left-wing Regionalist painter Thomas Hart Benton.18 This theory is 
systematically explicated in David and Cecile Shapiro’s 1977 essay ‘Abstract Expressionism: 
The Politics of Apolitical Painting.’ In that essay, the authors posit that the cooperation of the 
US government and MoMA in arranging exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism abroad which 
Eva Cockroft had delineated three years earlier in her essay ‘Abstract Expressionism: 
Weapon of the Cold War’ (1974), was due to the fact that, influenced by Greenberg’s 
transfiguration of Trotsky’s art theory, the Abstract Expressionists had developed a style 
which, in rejecting heteronomous ends for art, was not ‘programmatically critical of 
capitalism,’ unlike Social Realism, an art whose ‘stated aim, in fact, is to serve as an 
instrument in the social change that will disestablish capitalism’ (1985: 147). The Shapiros 
thus surmise that the ‘extremely rich private collectors’ who had founded and funded MoMA 
welcomed the emergence of Abstract Expressionism because they ‘had no wish to preside 
                                                          
18 For synthetic accounts of these painters’ roots in this idiom, see Chapter 2 in David Anfam Abstract 
Expressionism (1990). For an account of the influence of Benton on Pollock and comparative study of how 
both the paintings of Pollock and Benton were co-opted see Erika Doss Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of 
Modernism (1991). 
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over the dismantling of the economic system that had served them so well,’ and had 
accordingly been ‘helped off a hot spot’ (Ibid). 
  The Shapiros’ revisionist account is the only one which is more or less explicitly partisan in 
terms of proselytising the cause of Social Realism, as Francis Frascina acknowledges (1985: 
100). However, Eva Cockcroft was otherwise invested in Social Realist muralism as both a 
historian and practicing artist, in which capacity she painted paeans to the dignity of labour,19 
and the other revisionist historians generally presuppose that a shift from Social Realism to 
Abstract Expressionism as the hegemonic style of painting in America, constituted a shift 
from art meaningfully aligned with the oppressed, to art aligned with the interests of post-war 
US capitalism.20 Guilbaut, for instance, conspicuously notes that, in 1942 as the war effort 
intensified and MoMA placed its facilities ‘at the disposal of the nation,’ it did away with 
‘depressing images of the American countryside produced by social realist painters,’ and 
definitively frames the development of Abstract Expressionism as an ‘emptying out’ of 
politics (NY: 88-9; 113). He identifies as pivotal a catalogue essay written by Barnett 
Newman for a 1943 show entitled American Modern Artists, in which Newman proclaims 
that he and the other participants in the show were attempting to ‘free the artist from the 
stifling control of an outmoded politics’ (SWI: 29). Despite Newman’s lifelong commitment 
to anarchism – which Guilbaut writes off in a footnote as ‘romantic individualism’ (NY: 221, 
n66) – Guilbaut interprets this call for a sloughing off of ‘outmoded politics’ as the adoption 
of apolitical bipartisanship, and asserts that, in doing so, Newman is ‘using some of Trotsky 
ideas but eliminating the political commitment associated with them,’ and contrarily 
imploring artists ‘to reject politics’ (NY: 69-70). For Guilbaut, whereas previously ‘artists 
                                                          
19 See Cockcroft’s New York Times obituary by Myrna Oliver, ‘Eva Cockcroft; Venice Muralist Who Used Art 
to Explore Social Themes’ (1999). 
 
20 It might here be noted that in a recent article, Francis Frascina appears to presuppose the dichotomy 
between the presumed politicality of Social Realism and apoliticality of Abstract Expressionism in an 
argument for Abstract Expressionism’s political significance. While not in reference to Social Realist 
painting, but instead the contemporary Social Realist fiction film by Ken Loach, I, Daniel Blake (2016), he 
posits an affinity between the Abstract Expressionists and Social Realists, in so far as both are concerned 
with ‘representations of human integrity, the respect of their own and others’ experience’ (2016/7: 8). 
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had tried to develop styles that expressed the aspirations of the masses,’ Trotsky’s call for art 
free of heteronomous constraint was taken up by the artists who would become Abstract 
Expressionists to justify eschewing art which placed ‘social concerns [at] the centre of 
attention’ and developing ‘individualised styles,’ which resulted in these artists emphatically 
turning their backs on these ‘masses’ (NY: 75; 46). A similar trajectory is traced by Jachec, 
who takes it as given that Gottlieb and Rothko’s move away from a Social Realist practice in 
the early 1940s prefigured an ideological realignment in their art which would accordingly 
better lend itself to the Cold War manoeuvres of US imperialism, as ‘the idea of 
communicating with a mass audience [was] swapped for that of communicating with 
[individuals]’ (PPA: 34-40).21 Both the significance of Abstract Expressionism’s negation of 
paraphrasable content, and the notion that this development marked a shift from art which 
addressed collectives to art which concerned individuals, will be explored in following 
chapters. In this chapter, however, indeed in order to develop the context in which I will 
discuss these ideas, I will address the assumption that the discursive political content of 
Social Realism which ostensibly addressed the concerns of the oppressed, challenged 
capitalism in a way which meant Abstract Expressionism’s negation of such content was a 
determining factor in its adoption by the US establishment at the expense of Social Realism.  
  The Shapiros imply that by the 1950s, US establishment forces had long determined that 
Abstract Expressionism was to be the only style that predominated. To exemplify just how 
dominant Abstract Expressionism became in such a short time, they cite the fact that MoMA 
had in 1946 gone so far as to show the work of the leading Social Realist painter Ben Shahn 
in ‘a retrospective that established his reputation,’ assuming that such an exhibition would 
have been unthinkable in the 1950s, when they argue Abstract Expressionism had become 
‘the only art acceptable on a wide scale’ (1985: 147). However, at the 1954 Venice Biennale, 
the US Pavilion, which at the time was owned and controlled by MoMA, featured a Ben 
Shahn retrospective alongside a Willem de Kooning retrospective. This, then, is enough to 
                                                          
21 For an account of this development with respect to Rothko specifically, see Jonathan Harris, ‘Mark 
Rothko and the Development of American Modernism: 1938-1948’ (1988). 
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contest the revisionists’ assumptions. Yet, I also want to contend that, furthermore, the way in 
which the Shahn retrospective was promoted shows that Social Realism’s opposition qua 
opposition was that which invited its co-optation. That is, in so far as Shahn’s art’s solidarity 
with the oppressed amounted to exhortations for the amelioration of particular injustices – or 
simple affirmation of the dignity of those who suffer such injustice – within the realm of 
possibility circumscribed by prevailing relations of production, it failed to indict these 
relations of production and their accordant modes of subjectivation, and was readily adopted 
by a ruling class eager to express its concern for the working class. 
  While the Shapiros explicitly presuppose that Social Realism was more politically 
subversive than Abstract Expressionism because it was ‘art with a “message”’ (1985: 135), 
Adorno contends that ‘the notion of a “message” in art, even when politically radical, already 
contains an accommodation to the world’ (2007c: 193). The content in terms of Inhalt of 
discursively tendentious leftist art decries the epiphenomenal effects of capitalism, but by that 
very token its content in terms of Gehalt poses no fundamental challenge to capitalism, 
because such art necessarily argues on the latter’s turf, denouncing particular injustices rather 
than the very identity-thinking and instrumental reason due to which these injustices occur 
(an account of which will be given in Chapter 5). That is to say, while it may be critical of 
them, such art affirms spectators’ identification with familiar ‘institutions, commodities, 
things, and relations’ which Adorno asserts renders people ‘incapable of perceiving their 
dependence upon processes at some distance from them, the actual objective processes’ 
(2006: 77). Following Adorno, we might contend that this is particularly the case when the 
tendentious art in question employs ‘realist’ modes of representation, because ‘art as integral 
replication’ simply becomes ‘the world over again, an ideological doubling, a compliant 
reproduction’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 18). Whereas in the previous chapter, I 
showed that Trotsky argues that the socialist realism mandated by the Soviet Union provided 
apologism for the status quo because its content was empirically false, for Adorno realist 
aesthetics per se tend to confirm and reproduce the status quo, in so far as, in ‘regurgitating 
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tel quel whatever social material they treat and [counting] this metabolic exchange with 
second nature as the glory of art as social reflection,’ they represent this reified second nature 
as if it were first, and disavow the possibility that it could be radically different (AT: 231). 
On Adorno’s account, as Simon Jarvis succinctly puts it, the “reality” such art imitates ‘is not 
reality tout court, but is entangled in a social context which is a real illusion’ (1998: 122); art 
which ‘duplicates existence [only does] justice to a reality which [...] suppresses its truth in 
favour of a merely classificatory order [...] passively accepting objects as they come’ and, 
‘following the bidding of the alienated world [...] persisting obdurately in a state of 
reification’ (2007b: 159-160). 
  It is, in part, because Merleau-Ponty contends that artistic verisimilitude’s great 
breakthrough of Renaissance perspective entails this reification of the given – its ‘culturally 
specific expressive register’ masquerading as ‘historically invariant sense data,’ as Veronique 
M. Fóti puts it (2013: 28)22 – that he makes his case for painting bound up with corporeality 
which below I will deploy in elaborating Abstract Expressionism’s challenge to reified 
consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, as he elaborates in his 1961 essay ‘Eye and Mind,’ 
Renaissance perspectival art’s presumption to have instituted a perspective artificialis which 
overrides lived perception and projects ‘the existing world [in a manner] which respects it in 
all aspects and [deserves] to become the fundamental law of painting,’ finds its historical 
analogue in Descartes’s attempt ‘to erect [space] into a positive being, beyond all points of 
view,’ which in turn has culminated in the ‘“technized” thought’ which reproduces the status 
                                                          
22 Indeed, to an extent, as Christopher S. Wood notes in his entry on ‘Perspective’ in the Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Merleau-Ponty might be seen to precursor the critique of ‘the conventionality 
of perspective [...] in the field of film theory’ (1998: 480). This is notable here, because the latter discipline 
has systematically elaborated how Hollywood film reproduces and naturalises dominant norms (the 
definitive articulations of which were mainly elaborated in the post-1968 era, in journals such as Screen 
and Film Quarterly), and the increased admittance to European markets of Hollywood film was stipulated 
by the Marshall Plan as a condition of American aid. Thus, unlike the notion that Abstract Expressionism’s 
aesthetic imposed US values, it is relatively uncontentious to claim that Hollywood film did the same. As 
Fredric Jameson argues, ‘the consumption of Hollywood film form is the apprenticeship to a specific 
culture, to an everyday life as a cultural practice: the practice of which commodified narratives are the 
aesthetic expression, so that the populations in question learn both at the same time’ (2009: 443). As 
Jameson notes, the fact that apologists for US hegemony answer the claims that Hollywood breaks up ‘old 
ways of life’ and sets ‘new ones [...] in place,’ by claiming that ‘these countries want that...,’ implies that to 
desire US culture ‘is in human nature; and further, that all history has been moving towards American 
culture as its apotheosis’ (2009: 443). 
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quo as according to instrumental reason, or ‘operationalism’ as Merleau-Ponty terms it (PP: 
135-138; 123). Now, the praxis of Ben Shahn and other significant Social Realist artists was 
certainly not uncoloured by the radical dislocation of Renaissance perspective since 
impressionism. Indeed, Greenberg himself admires Shahn to the extent that the figures in his 
paintings are placed before ‘flat [planes] uptilted sharply to [...] contradict the indication of 
deep space’ (CEC2: 173), and the paintings of other Social Realist artists are so stylistically 
diverse that in 1957 Shahn enumerated his fellow Social Realists Philip Evergood and Jack 
Levine in an attempt to claim that there were greater ‘variations in form, in the look of 
painting’ among the extant ‘avowedly figurative painters’ in the US than among the Abstract 
Expressionists (1957: 68). Nevertheless, the political force of these painters’ work whose 
negation on the part of the Abstract Expressionists the revisionists argue lead to the latter’s 
co-optation, is rooted in representing the lives of the oppressed (or, as was more often the 
case for Levine, oppressors) in discursively communicative terms from a third-person 
perspective. I will now show that, in the case of Shahn at least, the way in which this art was 
deployed by US imperialism seems to confirm the theoretical risks I have elucidated in 
reference to such aesthetic stratagems. Rather than indicting the dominant rationality which 
causes the suffering it portrays, Shahn’s work was presented as simply ‘certifying that [the 
proletariat] was beautiful humanity and noble nature,’ as Adorno contends realism dovetails 
with bourgeois ideology (AT: 230). 
  It is clear how the ouvrieriste dimensions of the work of a left-wing Regionalist such as 
Thomas Hart Benton might tend toward this dynamic. Despite Benton’s politics – which were 
reformist and liberal rather than radical, and in fact lead him to denounce Social Realist 
artists (Doss 1991: 115) – his paintings’ accordant focus upon the working class takes the 
mode of ‘a narrative style of upbeat content and dramatic form,’ as Erika Doss puts it (1991: 
1). Thus, as Peter Wollen writes, Benton’s paintings often seem to celebrate ‘the process of 
production, the power of American capitalism, by representing it in action – heroic figures 
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working in symbiosis with powerful machines’ (1993: 84).23 Indeed, in 1933 Benton was 
taken to task for simply reproducing the status quo by John Kwait in the pages of the New 
Masses, a Marxist journal closely aligned with the Communist Party. Kwait asserted that 
‘[t]he mere presence of such “social” elements in [Benton’s painting] does not indicate any 
social viewpoint, since these elements are often treated [...] picturesquely without reference to 
a social meaning of the objects’ (1973: 66). However, if we turn to the Shahn retrospective at 
the 1954 Venice Biennale, we can see that the work of an ostensibly more critical Social 
Realist also lent itself to such affirmation of the status quo, by way of the very elements 
which supposedly discursively condemned it.24 Guilbaut contends that artists such as Shahn 
who ‘wanted to continue, despite all pressures against it, an engaged painting, a realist work,’ 
were convinced to ‘drop their political stance of opposition in order to fit into a more central 
and less belligerent position’ and after 1950 ‘treated in their pictures the plight of humanity 
rather than the plight of the working class.’ (1990: 37).  Yet, a few years after the Shapiros’ 
essay was published, in 1981, Frances K. Pohl wrote an essay entitled ‘An American in 
Venice,’ in which she identifies precisely Shahn’s treatment of the plight of the working class 
as crucial to its felicitousness for US imperialism. I will turn to the stratagems by which the 
US attempted to establish hegemony over Western Europe in the post-war era in Chapter 4. It 
suffices here, however, to note that Pohl shows that in 1954, there was a risk that many 
                                                          
23 Moreover, For example, in a 1935 article in Art Front Stuart Davis claimed that Benton’s ‘gross 
caricatures’ of African-Americans were similar to ‘the body of propaganda which is constantly being 
utilised to disenfranchise the Negro politically, socially, and economically’ (qtd. in Doss 1991: 118), and in 
a 1938 review of Benton’s autobiography, Meyer Schapiro asserts that the ‘exaggerated awkward energy’ 
and ‘lack of pathos’ in Benton’s painting is indicative of Benton’s intolerance of ‘effeminacy [...] in 
homosexuals,’ which he ‘cheaply [denounced] as a menace to [...] American culture’ (ACC: 117). 
 
24 Also notable here is the fact that a Social Realist painting entitled An American Tragedy by Philip 
Evergood, which depicts the brutal quelling of a strike at a steel mill, was purchased by the millionaire 
investment banker Armand Erpf (Shapiro 1972: 3), a man who was likely as little inclined to preside over 
the dismantling of the economic system that served him so well as the trustees of MoMA, especially since 
he was ‘reputed to be extremely right-wing’ (Biddle 2001: 115). Evergood was a painter who in his own 
statements explicitly positions his art in (defensive) opposition to abstract art in terms of the ‘sound 
ideology’ by which he purports it might help to ‘accomplish social betterment and change’ (155-8), and 
American Tragedy certainly strives for this end in its depiction of ‘injustice [done] to the working class 
[as] the result [...] of capitalist exploitation,’ in the words of David Shapiro (1972: 3). However, one might 
surmise that Erpf’s purchase of the painting was informed by the fact that he was wholeheartedly 
opposed to injustice done to the working class, while still fully in support of capitalist exploitation, as we 
might assume was also the case for many bourgeois clients who accounted for the majority of sales of 
Social Realist painting, as David Shapiro himself notes was the case (1972: 28). 
 
43 
 
people in Italy ‘had lost faith in the superiority of the American political system and way of 
life’ (1981: 86). Thus, deploying Shahn was a concerted effort in allaying a potential rise of 
communism by reassuring the Italian people that the rights of labour were enshrined in 
capitalist democracy. Pohl makes her case largely from two essays written by Alfred H. Barr 
Jr. and James Thrall Soby, both of whom were MoMA officials.25 Barr’s essay was in the 
magazine La Biennale, and Soby’s was in the official Biennale catalogue and a smaller one 
published by MoMA. Pohl shows that both essays strive to emphasise how Shahn, and by 
extension the contemporaneous US administration, held the same values as working class 
Italians who may have been swayed by the Italian Communist Party.  
  To this end, Barr and Soby focus upon Shahn’s paintings of the people of Italy amidst post-
war devastation, along with two series about injustices meted out to the working class in the 
1920s US – one concerning the wrongful execution of the Italian-American immigrants and 
labour agitators Sacco and Vanzetti, a second concerning the trial of the wrongfully convicted 
labour leader Tom Mooney. However, Pohl shows that, while emphasizing Shahn’s sympathy 
with the poor and condemnation of the (past) flaws of US democracy, in his essay Soby 
explicitly stresses that Shahn did not question or doubt the basic tenets of capitalism, writing 
that Shahn’s ‘sympathies always have been with the oppressed, though he has vigorously 
repudiated the cure for their ills proposed by Communism’ (Soby, qtd. in Pohl 1981: 92). 
Rather than a challenge to the cause of their poverty, Shahn’s sympathy with the oppressed is 
represented as valorization: Soby writes that the Italian children in paintings such as 
Liberation appear ‘unquenchably imaginative [, exploring] the new ruins of ancient 
buildings,’ and Barr adduces a quote from Shahn in which the artist equates Sacco and 
Vanzetti to Christ, asserting that upon hearing of their execution in the late ‘20s he ‘realized 
                                                          
25 We might note here that elsewhere both Barr and Soby seem to subordinate Social Realism in a way the 
supports the revisionist’s claims. For instance, in his introductory essay to the touring show of Abstract 
Expressionism of 1958-9 ‘The New American Painting,’ which will be discussed below, Barr makes sure to 
mention the fact that while many of the artists ‘had been naively attracted by Communism,’ they had since 
‘grown disillusioned [...] with Socialist Realism’ (11). And, in an article in a 1951 issue of Saturday Review, 
Soby derides the fact that, for Benton, ‘the arbiter of taste in art [...] has been [...] the American public at 
large,’ which Doss adduces to reinforce the notion that ‘any art or artist geared toward the masses was 
viewed with suspicion in the post-war period’ (377). 
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[he] was living through another crucifixion. Here was something to paint!’ (Ibid: 91; 93). 
Furthermore, Pohl shows that reception of Shahn at the 1954 Biennale largely accorded to the 
account given by Barr and Soby, with a summary of European press reaction compiled by 
MoMA (which Pohl corroborates with evidence) stating that Shahn’s ‘understanding of 
poverty and tragedy and his sympathy with the oppressed struck an immediate responsive 
chord with the Europeans’ (qtd. in Pohl 1981: 95).  
    The notion that Abstract Expressionism lent itself to co-optation by US imperialism 
because it negated the political Inhalt of Social Realism is questionable, then, because 
political Inhalt is precisely what lent Social Realism to co-optation by US imperialism. 
Indeed, the impetus for such negation on the part of many of the Abstract Expressionists – 
their ‘horror of being easily understood’ as one among their number, William Baziotes, put it 
in 1949 (qtd. in Gibson, 1990: 196) – was in part rooted in convictions that aesthetic ‘realism’ 
was tantamount to reification. While Guilbaut and Clark both contend that the Abstract 
Expressionists ultimately failed in this effort, they each pithily acknowledge that the painters’ 
praxis often constituted an attempt to evade representations which simply served to reproduce 
the status quo: Clark writes that for the Abstract Expressionists ‘the “non-figurative” 
[happened] because the world no longer [fell] into an [...] order of images [...] not overlaid 
with lies’ and thus ‘no work of real concentration was possible without it being fired – 
superintended – by [...] some form of intransigence or difficulty in the object produced, some 
action against the codes and procedures by which the world was lent its usual likenesses’ 
(1999: 364), and Guilbaut claims that what united the Abstract Expressionists as an avant-
garde was their ‘rejection of artistic options that seemed to them out of touch with the new 
post-war realities’ (1990: 37). He summarises the Abstract Expressionists’ attitude broadly as 
‘to describe was to accept the unacceptable. It was to incorporate an object into an expressive 
system by means of a code that sapped all critical force and revolutionary significance’ (NY: 
197). As David Anfam notes, in the case of the majority of the Abstract Expressionists this 
disavowal of representation should not be conceived as programmatic, since it was informed 
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by ‘the usual mixture of studio and bar talk, casual reading and sensitivity to the intellectual 
stimuli of the day’ (1990: 87). However, a number of the artists did elaborate the thinking 
behind their turn to a non-representational aesthetic, and generally it was founded in the 
notion that such an aesthetic had been forced by ‘the pressure of reality,’ as Robert 
Motherwell and Ad Reinhardt quote Wallace Stevens in their 1951 jointly-edited publication 
promoting American non-representational art entitled Modern Artists in America (MAIA: 
40).26 Rothko, for instance, asserts that ‘[t]he familiar identity of things has to be pulverised 
in order to destroy the finite associations with which society increasingly enshrouds every 
aspect of our environment’ (2006: 59). Still describes the ambition of his art as to evolve ‘an 
instrument of thought which would aid in cutting through all cultural opiates, past and 
present’ (qtd. in Sandler 1970: 150). Pollock famously claimed in an interview that ‘new 
needs call for new techniques,’ and thus the ‘forms of the Renaissance’ did not suffice to 
‘express the present age of the airplane, the atom bomb, and the radio’ (NY: 246, n5). And 
Norman Lewis frames as the ‘most effective blow against stereotype and the most irrefutable 
proof of the artificiality of stereotype in general,’ his choice of an abstract aesthetic over the 
figurative modes which were expected of him as an African-American artist, namely 
‘“African Idiom,” “Negro Idiom,” or “Social Painting”’ (2005: 134). Particularly relevant 
here, however, considering Guilbaut’s reference to Newman’s 1943 catalogue essay as 
emblematic of the Abstract Expressionists’ putative depoliticisation accordant with the 
rejection of Social Realism, is an unpublished essay by Newman drafted in 1942, in which he 
argues that all variants of American Scene painting are ‘founded on the bad politics of 
chauvinism’ (SWI: 23). This essay finds parallels with Adorno’s critique of realism as 
correlating with reified consciousness irrespective of its ostensible politics, in so far as 
‘conformism, respect for a petrified facade of opinion and society, and resistance to impulses 
                                                          
26 In addition to the editors, the Abstract Expressionist artists included were Gorky, Hofmann, Rollin 
Crampton, Weldon Kees, Mark Tobey, George McNeil, Pollock, Newman, Lewis, Rothko, Ralph Rosenborg, 
Tomlin, Fritz Butlman, James Brooks, Gottlieb, Baziotes, Still, Pousette-Dart, Sterne, de Kooning, Kline, 
Buffie Johnson, Theodoros Stamos, Balcomb Greene, Richard Diebenkorn, Philip Guston, James B. Dixon, 
Martha Hoskins, Mary Callery, Ibram Lassaw, Herbert Ferber, David Smith and David Hare. 
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that disturb its order or evoke inner elements of the unconscious that cannot be admitted’ are 
inherent to its form (2007b: 179). As Adorno contends that ‘hostility to anything alien or 
alienating can accommodate itself much more easily to [...] realism of any provenance, even 
if it proclaims itself critical or socialist’ (Ibid), for Newman the predilection for ‘home and 
homey’ subject matter that ‘good old straight-standing, straight-shooting, clean American 
folks [...] can understand’ in American Scene painting, was counterpart to thinking which 
railed against modernism as ‘foreign, degenerate [...] art appealing to [...] perverts’ and 
created by ‘a filthy, penny-pinching [...] drunken lot of foreigners’ and a ‘bunch of New York 
Ellis Islanders who aren’t even fifty percent American, most of them communist’ (SWI: 24). 
  As I noted above in reference to the work of Benton, to claim that Regionalism befitted an 
ossified mindset in this way was commonplace among left-wing artists and critics. However, 
Newman also summarily dismisses what he refers to as the ‘leftist “revolt”’ of Social 
Realism’s endeavours ‘to infuse American Scene painting with ‘the introduction of class 
struggle’ as doing nothing to subvert the basic chauvinism of the American Scene’s 
presuppositions (SWI: 26). For Newman, while Socialist Realist art incorporates ‘the 
Pittsburgh smelter alongside the Kansas farmer’ into paintings of the American Scene, it 
nevertheless concurs with ‘the fundamental [...] premise of painting America’ (Ibid). We 
might here interpret Newman as indicting Social Realism for precisely the reason why 
Shahn’s art could be assimilated as propaganda for capitalist democracy: the working class is 
represented, and yet the fundamental premises by which its conditions are perpetuated are not 
thrown into question. To draw another parallel with Adorno, in his discussion of the classical 
aesthetic category of the ugly, which in classical art’s portrayal of subaltern figures is ‘that 
element that opposes the work’s ruling law of form [yet is] integrated by that formal law and 
thereby confirms it,’ Adorno claims that modernist art ‘must take up the cause of what is 
proscribed as ugly, though no longer in order to integrate or mitigate it or to reconcile it with 
its own existence’ – as Newman seems to imply is the case with Social Realism – but rather 
to ‘denounce the world that creates and reproduces the ugly in its own image’ (AT: 49). In 
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Chapter 9, I will contend that Newman’s account of Abstract Expressionism as 
‘metaphysical’ has similar implications. However, it might be objected that Newman in 1942 
is not calling for art which denounces the world in this way. Instead, he accuses American 
Scene painting’s parochialism of impeding the development of an art which might befit the 
‘new political outlook’ signalled by the recent intervention of the US into WWII, which he 
claimed boded well for the fomentation of a ‘new philosophy of American politics and world 
society’ (SWI: 28). Nevertheless, this projected society is misunderstood if it is elided with 
the ‘apolitical’ consensus which would emerge to legitimate the US capitalist expansion of 
the post-war era. As I acknowledged above, Newman was an anarchist, and David Craven 
thus stresses that any such readings of Newman’s statements as active capitulations to 
imperialism miss the fact of Newman’s opposition to nation-states whatsoever (ACC: 47). 
Furthermore, Craven demonstrates that the American society which Newman projects was to 
be inclusive of all inhabitants of the continental landmass and ‘common hemispheric 
heritage’ of the Americas, which Craven notes was an ‘uncommonly progressive attitude’ to 
hold at the time (Ibid).27 Moreover, in the post-war era, Newman came to frame his praxis as 
conditioned by the ‘terror’ of scientistic rationalism’s nadir in Hiroshima, whose perpetration 
by ‘an American boy’ he notes (SWI: 169). Thus, unlike consciousnesses which after WWII 
Adorno writes ‘clung to allegedly primordial phenomena [...] in the illusion of being able to 
begin anew without the transformation of society’ (AT: 293), Newman maintained that the 
terror to which his work reacted was ‘the product of civilisation,’ and famously understood 
his praxis as prefiguring ‘the end of all state capitalism and totalitarianism’ (SWI: 169; 251).  
                                                          
27 To reinforce this point, Craven cites how, when in 1943/4, when Newman enumerated artists who 
provided ‘hope for American Art,’ among them were Rufino Tamayo of Mexico and Roberto Matta of Chile, 
an attitude which, incidentally, it appears was also held by a young Clement Greenberg, who in a letter to 
Harold Lazarus describes the Mexican Diego Rivera, in all capitals, as ‘THE FIRST GREAT NORTH 
AMERICAN ARTIST,’ affirming that he is not only superior to his fellow American artists, but also Matisse, 
Picasso, and Braque (2000: 57-60). Here, it might also be noted that, while I can find very few references 
to Rivera in Greenberg’s writing (although none derogatory), his prior passion for the artist surely further 
implies that Greenberg would have paid attention to Rivera’s cosigned ‘Towards a Free Revolutionary 
Art.’ 
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  Thus, while I showed above that Guilbaut adduces a 1943 catalogue essay by Newman to 
frame his affirmation of modernism as a depoliticisation of Trotsky’s art theory, we might 
argue that if Newman’s rejection of realist aesthetics was a development of Trotskyism, it 
was akin to the one made by Greenberg in ‘Kitsch’ as delineated in the previous chapter. That 
is, in so far as Trotsky’s rejection of administered realism under Stalin or Hitler, and 
investment of political significance in art which follows its ‘own laws,’ becomes the rejection 
of reified realism tout court, and the investment of political significance in art which is 
ostensibly autotelic. In the next chapter, I will return to Greenberg’s account, in order to show 
how his resultant championing of Abstract Expressionism did ostensibly become 
depoliticised. I will then in Chapter 4 show how, consequently, Greenberg’s positioning of 
Abstract Expressionism at the forefront of the European modernist lineage to which he 
previously attributed political subversion, might convincingly be shown to have been a 
determining factor in Abstract Expressionism’s deployment by US imperialism. However, I 
will then proceed to argue from Chapter 5 onwards that, nevertheless, understanding the 
movement in these very terms indicates how Abstract Expressionism, as Adorno writes of 
autonomous art, ‘decries domination […] and stands witness for what domination represses 
and disavows’ by ‘excluding through its language of form that remainder of affirmation 
maintained by social realism’ (AT: 49). 
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Chapter Three 
Determinate Negation Depoliticised 
 
  In a letter to Harold Lazarus written when he was nineteen, Greenberg proclaims that ‘art is 
for man’s sake not for art’s sake’ (2000: 2). This stands in stark contrast to his attitude sixty-
six years later, when he refutes an interviewer’s observation that ‘in [his] early writing [he 
gave] art a critical function’ (2003: 224). He claims that this had never been the case, as it 
had always been his conviction that ‘Art is there for its own sake,’ and decisively asserts that 
‘l’art pour l’art’ is his ‘theory’ (Ibid). Certainly, this did increasingly come to be Greenberg’s 
ostensible attitude. However, as I elaborated in Chapter 1, in ‘Kitsch,’ the essay in which he 
formulates the justification for this theory, he follows Trotsky in positing that art which 
progresses as according to inner-aesthetic laws is a threat to capitalism’s existence. Thus, we 
might say that for the Greenberg of ‘Kitsch,’ so long as it corrodes the society under whose 
aegis it is made possible, art-for-art’s sake is for humanity’s sake. Nevertheless, in ‘Kitsch,’ 
Greenberg does make clear that avant-garde art is not ‘inherently [...] more critical’ than 
kitsch, and the ill-defined threat he claims it poses to capitalism is premised more on the 
latter’s decline than avant-garde art’s corrosiveness (CEC1: 20). Indeed, by 1946, when the 
US economy was booming, while avant-garde art and socialism are still aligned for 
Greenberg, it is solely in terms of how avant-garde art needs socialism because the only way 
for it to be possible for the majority of people to have the requisite ‘security, leisure, and 
comfort indispensible to the cultivation of taste’ would be under socialism (CEC2: 64).28 He 
                                                          
28 The desire for such security leisure and comfort on the part of the lower middle-class Greenberg was 
likely the main impetus behind his commitment to socialism. A consistent motif in Greenberg’s youthful 
letters to Harold Lazarus is how the exigencies of wage labour inhibit his ability to engage in cultural 
pursuits, and conversely the notion that under socialism the latter would occupy all of his time. To take 
some examples:‘I don’t think that I’ll ever study law nor will I ever be a successful business man. My 
heart’s not in anything but enjoying myself and I can’t get enthusiastic about things that haven’t any 
pleasure in them [...]Civilisation becomes so far away between 9 and 5 [...] There’s nothing as shabby and 
mean as Beauty after working hours. [Upon having taken a job as a travelling necktie salesman he has] 
surrendered these days’ freedom [...] working is rotten, and for me who can outrotten pretty rotten 
things, compulsion for the sake of money is, of all, the rottenest [...] I take my job too seriously. The 
seriousness wears me out. I don’t even read on the subway anymore [...] Working for a living means not 
living [...] Only from the suburbs can you discover the agonies of the metropolis. It’s almost socialism, 
50 
 
asserts that while he ‘may be a Socialist [...] a work of art has its own ends, which it includes 
in itself and which have nothing to do with the fate of society’ (CEC2: 66). The notion that 
socialism needs avant-garde art because the latter was somehow corrosive to capitalism falls 
from view, and eventually the recourse to politics in his writing on art diminishes almost 
completely. Indeed, in 1992 Greenberg himself claims that after the war his ‘Marxism began 
to get diluted, then it faded and had nothing to do with art’ (Burstow 1994: 33). 
  The upshot of this ostensible dissociation of avant-garde art from politics on the part of 
Greenberg is often taken to be the hypostatisation the former as an end in-itself, and dismissal 
of the ways in which it is mediated and conditioned by the latter, an assessment which the 
philosopher Graham Harman has recently surmised is at the root of extant hostility towards 
Greenberg.29 This is not strictly the case. As is evident from a 1969 interview, Greenberg 
always conceded that ‘sociological and other extra-artistic reasons’ informed the 
development of art (CEC4: 304). However, whereas we might read ‘Kitsch’ as an attempt to 
figure art-for-art’s sake as ultimately in the interests of humanity, Greenberg came to 
explicitly disavow any such characterisation. As he claims in the 1969 interview: 
There are, of course, more important things than art: life itself, what actually happens 
to you. This may sound silly, but I have to say it, given what I’ve heard art-silly 
people say all my life: I say that if you have to choose between life and happiness or 
art, remember always to choose life and happiness. [...] Art shouldn’t be overrated. It 
started to be in the latter 18th century, and definitely was in the 19th. The Germans 
started the business of asserting the worth of a society by the quality of art it 
produced. But the quality of art in a society does not necessarily – or maybe seldom – 
reflect the well-being enjoyed by most of its members. And well-being comes first. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
except that the room gets a little too cold, but I’m wiling to stand it. Thirty bucks a month [...] About my 
review. Under socialism I could write it the way you want, which now hardly anyone would understand.’ 
(2000: 16; 27; 28; 84; 156; 170; 180; 196). Indeed, in an interview from the year he died, 1994, by which 
time he was asserting that ‘the avant-garde and so forth is unpolitical for the most part,’ he concedes that 
it originally appealed to him as ‘dissent from the bourgeois order [of] his father’s world’ (2003: 238-9). 
29 Harman chalks up the opposition he has faced when presenting papers about Greenberg to art-world 
audiences to critics simply ‘still resentful of Greenberg’s long-ago Modernist stranglehold on criticism’ 
which, for Harman, seals artworks ‘off from their socio-political surroundings’ (2013: 100; 2014: 251). 
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The weal and woe of human beings come first. I deplore the tendency to over-value 
art. (CEC4: 314) 
Here, then, Greenberg seems to be disclaiming any meaningful connection between art and 
the needs of humanity. Despite the fact that he had dedicated more attention to it than 
anything else over the preceding thirty years, it seems as if for Greenberg art is a 
circumscribed sphere of comparative irrelevance, separate from the needs of humanity, even 
if contiguous with and affected by society. 
  Indeed, surveying Greenberg’s criticism over the preceding decades, contemporaneous to 
Abstract Expressionism’s co-optation by US imperialism, while, as we will see in Chapter 7 
he occasionally suggests art serves as a relief from the exigencies of modern life, it becomes 
increasingly easy to understand Greenberg’s championing of Abstract Expressionism in this 
way. Nevertheless, as Caroline A. Jones notes, Greenberg’s ‘formerly Marxist dialectical 
mode’ informed his faith in ‘the fruitfulness of [determinate] negation’ (EA: 82). While he no 
longer claimed that the dynamic of determinate negation furthered culture in a manner 
corrosive to capitalism, it anchored his identification of Abstract Expressionism as the pre-
eminent US art movement in the 40’s through the 50’s. In the Abstract Expressionists, he 
found a group of artists whose radicalism was definitively not an abstract negation of prior 
styles. As the authors of Art Since 1900 note, ‘by the early forties, [the Abstract 
Expressionists had] accumulated a better first-hand knowledge of their immediate European 
predecessors than any other contemporary artists (and certainly better than anyone in 
Europe)’ (2007: 349), and rather than emulate these predecessors they – as Rothko described 
his praxis – quarrelled with them as ‘one quarrels with his father and mother, recognising the 
inevitability and function of [one’s] roots, but insistent upon [one’s] dissension (qtd. in Leja 
1993: 32).30 Irrespective of how the artists themselves characterised the result of this 
                                                          
30 As evidence for their claim the authors of Art Since 1900 enumerate ‘the opening in New York of 
collector A. E. Gallatin’s Museum of Living Art is 1926, that of the Museum of Modern Art in 1929, and that 
of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum (then called the Museum of Non-Objective Painting) in 1939,’ ‘the 
multiple touring exhibitions of the collection (selected by Marcel Duchamp) of Katherine Dreier’s Societe 
Anonyme in the twenties and thirties, and, last but not least, the militant activity of Peggy Guggengeim at 
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dynamic, aesthetically it manifested itself in an eschewal of the cultivation of illusory spaces. 
Greenberg thus claimed that the artists fulfilled the (now depoliticised) role of the avant-
garde which he had projected in ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon,’ to the extent that what they 
dissented from was that which in prior painting had impeded apprehension of artworks qua 
artworks. He contended that the Abstract Expressionists were, as he wrote of Baziotes in 
1944, ‘deflected by nothing extraneous to painting’ (CEC1: 240). This is evident in 
Greenberg’s reviews of these artists’ shows throughout the late ‘40s and into the ‘50s, 
particularly a 1948 review of an Arshile Gorky exhibition in which he claims that Gorky 
displays ‘the processes of painting for their own sake,’ surpassing his most proximate 
European antecedent, Miró, by ‘identifying his background more closely with the picture’s 
surface, the immediate, non-fictive plane on which the spots are placed’ (CEC2: 219-20). 
And in his 1955 essay ‘“American-Type” Painting,’ Greenberg provides a synthetic 
elucidation of the importance of this determinate negation to the Abstract Expressionists’ 
praxis. From the outset of the piece, Greenberg affirms that the ‘dismantling’ of convention 
by which he contends the ‘vitality of art’ is maintained ‘has its own continuity and tradition,’ 
and it is necessary to have digested ‘the major art of the preceding period, or periods’ to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
her “Art of This Century gallery, again in New York, from 1942 on’ (2007: 349). Indeed, Annie Cohen Solal 
claims that it was not until Pollock visited the September 1939 exhibition Picasso: 40 Years of His Art at 
MoMA that he was ‘dragged into the fully formed Picasso engine’ (2007: 212). Recently, one of the 
authors of Art Since 1900, Rosalind Krauss, has dedicated a whole book, Willem de Kooning nonstop 
(2016), to the way in which De Kooning’s work engages with questions of foreshortening and perspective 
inherited from the European tradition while negotiating the specificities of its medium, mainly in 
reference to the Women paitings, whose ‘brilliance and success’ Greenberg attributes to De Kooning 
continuing ‘Cubism without repeating it’ in these paintings (CEC3: 222), despite both Krauss and Clark 
claiming that Greenberg was dismissive of these works (Krauss, 2015: 40; Clark, 1999: 393). Certainly, 
there were those among the Abstract Expressionists who vociferously denied the notion that their work 
could be characterised in this way, most notably Still, who famously asserted that he had such ‘contempt 
for the intelligence of’ Greenberg that the latter was to be ‘categorically rejected’ (qtd. in Harris 2005: 8), 
and Newman, who proclaimed that ‘the respectability modern art [enjoyed] with museum directors and 
professional art lovers’ was due to the ‘shrewd popularization of the big lie, that modern art isn’t modern,’ 
but instead heir to a tradition of easel painting  (Newman qtd. Rosenberg, 1979: 27). However, in the 
latter’s converse claim that ‘we’ were ‘beginning from scratch,’ Rosenberg notes that by ‘we’ Newman 
seems to be referring not only to his fellow Abstract Expressionists, but to ‘the wide range of Modernist 
painters, from Cézanne and Matisse with their still lifes and nudes, to Picasso, Braque, and Gris with their 
Cubist musicians’ (ibid: 27-8). That is to say, as John Golding notes, when Newman ‘came to trace his line 
down the empty canvas with a view to creating a new “tabula rasa” for art, he did so with the advantage of 
insights gained from having cast his eye over three decades of highly sophisticated abstract art’ (187), 
and similarly Still claimed he had ‘worked his way through the Bauhaus, Dada, Surrealism and Cubism’ 
before alighting upon the style for which he became known (Golding 2000: 170). 
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produce such art (CEC3: 217-8). Upon establishing how the Abstract Expressionists were 
particularly well placed in this respect in the late ‘30s – having ‘digested Klee and Miró [...] 
ten years before either [...] became a serious influence in Paris’ and bearing one among their 
ranks, Hans Hofmann, who was keeping the example of Matisse alive in New York when 
painters abroad were failing to recognise him (CEC3: 218)31 – Greenberg elaborates that they 
developed its trajectory by freeing themselves from Picasso’s ‘strictly demarcated illusion of 
shallow depth’ and ‘faired, more or less simple lines and curves’ towards ‘new possibilities 
of expression for abstract and quasi-abstract painting’ which Greenberg asserts relied less and 
less upon extra-aesthetic, and more upon medium-specific, elements (CEC3: 219-220). 
Accordingly, Greenberg writes that, for instance, Pollock rejects a ‘late cubist manner’ in 
order to achieve a denser and more immediate impact which entailed negotiation of ‘an 
emphatic physical surface’ (CEC3: 225); Newman and Rothko ‘suppress value contrasts’ 
resulting in ‘the more emphatic flatness of their paintings’ (CEC3: 232); and Still makes 
‘contours [...] less conspicuous, and therefore less dangerous to the “integrity” of the flat 
surface’ (ibid: 233). It was due to this determinate negation that, for Greenberg, Abstract 
Expressionism transcended the ‘heightening or idiosyncratic twisting of ideas imported from 
Europe,’ of which Greenberg accused American painters who, prior to the emergence of the 
Abstract Expressionists, ‘accomplished more than a little’ and yet at most only ‘extended and 
refined various phases of French impressionism without [...] driving them towards the future’ 
                                                          
31 Here, it is interesting to note that of all the Abstract Expressionists aside from Barnett Newman (whose 
rhetorical disclamation of influences can only be considered determinate negation, as I observed in the 
above footnote), Hofmann, as far as I can discern, is the only artist to distinguish ‘the young French 
painters and the young American painters’ on the basis of the former approaching ‘things on the basis of 
cultural heritage,’ and the latter approaching ‘things without basis,’ despite educating so many of the 
latter in precisely that basis (MAIA: 12). Indeed, Hofmann is also the only Abstract Expressionist whose 
statements ever seem to align ideologically with the triumphalism of US imperialism. He, for example, 
claims that ‘it is the privilege of a democracy like ours that it expects the artist to be, through his art the 
personification of its fundamental principles in being the highest example of spiritual freedom in his 
performance of unconditioned, unrestricted creativeness’ (qtd. in Seitz 1983: 111) and ‘when America 
adds a developed culture to its economic richness it will be one of the happiest countries in the world. 
Providing leadership by teachers and support of developing artists is a national duty, an insurance of 
spiritual solidarity. What we do for art, we do for ourselves and for our children and the future’ (1967: 
58). Nevertheless, I will take recourse to both his accounts of his praxis and critical accounts of his work 
throughout this thesis in making the case that the experience of Abstract Expressionism contradicts such 
complacency with the status quo. 
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(CEC2: 160-1).32 In 1944, Greenberg was already claiming that ‘the future of American 
painting depends on what [Motherwell], Baziotes, Pollock, and only comparatively few 
others do from now on,’ (CEC1: 241). However, by the aforementioned 1948 Gorky review 
he was asserting that Gorky (who we can assume was one of the ‘others’ referred to in the 
above quote), was ‘among the very few contemporary American painters whose work is of 
more than national importance’ (CEC2: 219, my italics). And in 1949 Greenberg decisively 
identified an ‘American trend in contemporary art [...] that promises to become an original 
contribution to the mainstream and not merely a local inflection of something developed 
abroad’; hazarded that this trend, in which he enumerated Gorky, Pollock, de Kooning, 
Smith, Gottlieb and Motherwell, was ‘actually ahead of the French artists who are their 
contemporaries in age’; and proclaimed that Pollock was ‘one of the major painters of our 
time’ (CEC2: 287; 286).  
  Guilbaut implies that the artists shared and cultivated this sense that Abstract Expressionism 
was in a position of international pre-eminence (NY: 177). This is broadly demonstrably 
untrue.33 Furthermore, on Greenberg’s account this pre-eminence depended on the artists not 
                                                          
32 In this category of artists Greenberg enumerates Washington Allston, Thomas Cole, Winslow Homer, 
Thomas Eakins, Albert Pinkham Ryder, Ralph Albert Blakelock, Robert Newman and James McNeill 
Whistler in the nineteenth century, and John Sloan, George Bellows, William Glackens, Maurice 
Prendergast, Arnold Friedman and John Marin (CEC2: 160-1). In the case of the latter two, in keeping with 
the high opinion he maintained for both throughout his criticism, he qualifies this judgement, stating that 
they are ‘perhaps’ exceptions (CEC2: 161) 
  
33 This is clear even in a quote from Adolph Gottlieb to which Guilbaut refers in order to prove that 
notions that American art was the European tradition’s logical culmination were prevalent in post-war 
New York, shared by artists and critics alike. Guilbaut cites Gottlieb’s claim that the French heritage which 
lends French painters ‘the benefits of tradition [and therefore allow them to] produce a certain type of 
painting’ is shared by Americans ‘just as much’; that ‘it is just as difficult for an American as for a 
Frenchman’ to deviate from this tradition, and thus if American artists do so ‘it is out of knowledge, not 
innocence.’ (MAIA: 12). However, Gottlieb here does not affirm the superiority of US artists. His attitude is 
in no way triumphal in terms of America’s role in the European tradition. Far from posing Abstract 
Expressionism as unequivocally the most advanced art of this Modernist lineage, Gottlieb here argues that 
Americans might participate in this tradition just as much. Gottlieb is positing no superiority, and is 
instead attempting to counter patronising attitudes towards American art which would dismiss it as de 
facto naive, conceiving any idiosyncratic developments in its style not as the artists’ response to tradition, 
but product of their obliviousness of it. This is not to say that the Abstract Expressionists did not consider 
themselves as pioneering; indeed, to remain with Gottlieb, in a 1973 he interview recalls how they felt 
‘that they were in a vanguard and in the front line’ (qtd. in Craven, 49). However, not only did Gottlieb 
make this comment bemoaning the lack of (political) rebellion amongst then-contemporary young artists, 
whom he accused of being ‘young Republicans,’ there is ample first-hand anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that the majority of them did not feel this vanguard to be peculiarly American, as, for instance, Dore 
Ashton has argued. She writes that whenever there emerged any kind of acclaim linking their art to its 
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contriving to create the next instantiation of the modernist lineage by foregrounding 
painting’s medium-specificity. As he puts it in a 1978 postscript to ‘Modernist Painting’ 
(1960), possibly his most schematic account of modernism’s medium-specificity, despite 
identifying medium-specificity with quality, for Greenberg ‘flatness and the inclosing of 
flatness’ are not to be understood as ‘criteria of aesthetic quality in pictorial art’ in the sense 
that the further a work advances the self-definition of art, the better the work is bound to be’ 
(CEC4: 94). For Greenberg it was crucial that the artists ‘did not set out to be “advanced”; 
they set out to paint good pictures, and they “advanced” in pursuit of qualities analogous to 
those they admire in the art of the past’ (CEC3: 218). Indeed, when minimalism emerged in 
the late ‘50s and ‘60s and artists began to intentionally illustrate the ontological limits of the 
medium, Greenberg was dissmissive of their efforts. As Thierry de Duve notes, when faced 
with such art, which ‘so conveniently illustrated’ his teleology, Greenberg did not give it his 
‘stamp of approval,’ because these artists took the pursuit of medium-specificity to be 
‘prescriptive, even normative’ (1996a: 204).34 Below, the notion that, rather than illustrative 
of its medium-specificity, what Greenberg is indicating when he claims that the Abstract 
Expressionists’ praxis was medium-specific, is the fact that it was developed in immanent 
reciprocity with its materials, will become central to my thesis. However, suffice it here to 
acknowledge that, by the 1950s, Greenberg was claiming that the Abstract Expressionists 
were at the forefront of European art on that art’s own terms, and their artworks’ medium-
specificity was central to this supremacy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nation of origin ‘they winced’ (2007: 24). They did so, Ashton recounts, whether this acclaim was Irving 
Sandler’s book The Triumph of American Painting; Greenberg’s phrase “American-type Painting”; or just 
generally ‘critics [...] racking up the wins on the international front, going so far sometimes to make 
scorecards in which sacred figures such as Picasso and Miró and Matisse were demoted in favour of 
Pollock, De Kooning, and Kline’ (ibid). Thus, as Ashton asserts, ‘the triumphalism associated with the 
post-war florescense of artistic activity [...] did not derive from artists’ (2007: 25) 
 
34 The minimalists were avowedly concerned with medium specificity, as is evident from the statement 
written by one of them, Carl Andre, on the work of another, Frank Stella, in a 1959 catalogue for a group 
show in which the latter was showing. Andre writes that Stella is interested ‘in the necessities of painting’ 
(qtd. in de Duve, 1996a: 200). Thus, he affirms that ‘Stella’s painting is not symbolic’ and instead , the 
stripes on Stella’s canvases are ‘the paths of brush on canvas’ which ‘lead only to painting’ (Ibid: 200-1). 
However, to attempt to evade symbolism in this way is to invite interpretation as ‘illustrations, ideas 
about art rather than works of art in themselves,’ as Jed Perl has recently written of Stella (2016: 10). 
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  Indeed, as Caroline. A Jones notes, Greenberg shores up this position with selective 
‘historical parameters’ which are ‘avowedly Western,’ generally dismissing the Abstract 
Expressionists’ relationship to ‘art of the past’ when it comes to the demonstrably manifest 
influence upon the artists of ‘the influx of abstract images, systems, and shapes from non-
European sources’ (EA: 107).35 When Greenberg does concede that the Abstract 
Expressionists’ art was informed by non-Western influences, he tends to downplay either the 
significance of the influence, or the significance of the art in question. In terms of the former, 
in a review of a Gottlieb show he acknowledges that the artist is informed by Native 
American art, but for Greenberg this is simply a fortuitous tributary serving ‘to stimulate 
ambitious and serious painting’ (CEC2: 189). In terms of the latter, upon noting that Mark 
Tobey is ‘under the influence of Oriental art,’ he asserts that the painter has ‘turned out to be 
so narrow as to cease even being interesting’ (CEC2: 165-6). Yet Tobey is not judged in this 
way due to any putative saturation of his art in non-Western influence, but contrarily since his 
art is too parochial, too ‘differentiatedly American’ (Ibid). How Greenberg comes to the 
conclusion that a Western artist ‘under the influence’ of Eastern culture has created work 
which is at fault due to its autochthony, can be illuminated if we turn to Greenberg’s 1948 
essay entitled ‘The Necessity of the Old Masters.’ In this essay he argues that an easel painter 
cannot draw from a non-Western culture’s artistic tradition in a way which fundamentally 
affects their art:36 
Abstract art is still western European art; one still – even if only barely – paints easel 
pictures; one does not decorate Haida cloths or make sand drawings. An artist 
working in New York or Paris still cannot introduce Oriental, archaic, or barbaric 
elements into his work without modifying them radically to fit the terms of easel 
painting as established by a tradition that goes back to the Middle ages and is not yet 
                                                          
35 For accounts of non-Western influences on the Abstract Expressionists, see Fred Rushing’s ‘Ritual and 
Myth: Native American Culture and Abstract Expressionism’ (1986), and Chapter 4 in David Craven’s 
Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique (1999). 
 
36 This article was albeit written in reaction to modern painters’ indifference towards a show in New York 
of Old Masters from the Kaiser Friederich Museum. 
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dead. The greater the artist’s awareness of those terms, the greater is his power of 
self-criticism [...] Modern art has not in actual practice repudiated [the past art of our 
civilisation] as much as many of us think. It is still necessary to be very much aware 
of it, if only to overcome it. And in so far as we still paint easel pictures to hang on 
walls, we still have more in common with that past, down at bottom, than with the art 
of Africa or the South Seas (CEC2: 250). 
Below, I will recast Greenberg’s characterisation of the easel picture in terms of its 
detachment from ritualistic or utilitarian function as a commodity and consequent dialectical 
resistance to the logic of exchange. Suffice it here, however, to note that these implications 
were scarcely explicated by Greenberg, and thus his convictions, when hypostasised, served 
to reinforce his positioning of Abstract Expressionism as the triumphal telos of a narrowly 
European avant-garde tradition. In this sense, then, as Philip Fisher has argued, Greenberg 
seems to cultivate a selective linearity which purports to exhaust the significance of artworks, 
and thus defines a given Abstract Expressionist painting as coterminous with ‘its place in the 
sequence of art history which is itself seen as an explanation’ (1991: 170). Tom Huhn 
counters Fisher by claiming that, while Fisher is correct as to the restrictive sequential 
linearity of Greenberg’s account of art, ‘it is not thereby any more determinative of what is 
taken to be past than other constructions of history’ (2000: 13). However, in the next chapter 
I will elaborate how Greenberg’s criticism served the deployment of Abstract Expressionism 
in efforts of US imperialism precisely because, if hypostasised, the modernist lineage towards 
medium-specificity by which he established the style’s putative pre-eminence, mirrors the 
determinativeness of US imperialism’s construction of history. That is to say, one of the 
major reasons why Abstract Expressionism was adopted by US imperialism was because the 
notion that it represented the telos of European Modernism provided artistic corroboration for 
the United States’ claim as to its society’s superiority. Similarly to the way in which Shahn’s 
work was deployed to convince working class Europeans that the United States shared their 
values, Abstract Expressionism was instrumentalised in efforts to convince the middle classes 
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of Europe that the United States shared and had superseded their artistic culture on its own 
terms. Above, I noted that in 1969 Greenberg contrasted himself to German philosophers of 
the late 18th and 19th century when stressing that he posited no correlation between the worth 
of a society and the quality of its art, and Hegel surely numbers among these philosophers.37 
Yet, in the next chapter I will show that, in terms of how Greenberg’s criticism informed the 
adoption of Abstract Expressionism by the US establishment, we might draw a comparison 
between Greenberg’s genealogy of modernism and Hegel’s apologism for the status quo, at 
least on Adorno’s account. For Adorno, Hegel justifies or vindicates the point of view of 
historical victors by hypostasising dominant rationality independent of its supposed terminus 
ad quem in human beings, to whom its logic of equivalence actually does detriment (2006: 
41-2; ND: 10-11). Analogously, while the ultimate terminus ad quem of the avant-garde’s 
determinate negation in ‘Kitsch’ is the dissolution of capitalism, Greenberg’s account of such 
determinate negation in Abstract Expressionism, ostensibly shorn of any relation to 
humanity’s needs, served to justify the purported superiority and procrustean impositions of 
the United States’ capitalist democracy, which had emerged as the decided victor of WWII. 
However, upon showing how this was the case, I will proceed from Chapter 5 to elaborate 
how Greenberg’s account of this determinate negation has a rational kernel which attests to 
the way in which the experience of Abstract Expressionism undermines the capitalist 
triumphalism in the name of which it was deployed. 
  
                                                          
37 Whereas, as we saw above, Greenberg ostensibly claims that art is irrelevant to the weal and woe of 
human beings, for Hegel the role of art is precisely to bring an object before consciousness in which 
humanity recognises in sensuous form ‘the deepest interests of humanity, and the most comprehensive 
truths of the mind’ (2004: 9). Below, this dichotomy between Greenberg and Hegel will be called into 
question, in so far as central to the second half of my thesis will be the notion that what Greenberg finds 
compelling in Abstract Expressionism registers precisely the unmet needs of humanity. However, it is 
prima facie the case in much of Greenberg’s writing that, as Nicholas Calas notes, while we might trace 
back to Hegel the Greenbergian notion of art as ‘conscious of its own self, that is, of its spirit,’ for 
Greenberg, rather than manifesting the experience and historical development of human self-
consciousness, this self-consciousness is figured inner-aesthetically (qtd. in Foster 1975: 23). This leads 
the Hegel scholar Stephen Houlgate to belittle both Abstract Expressionism and Greenberg’s account of it, 
on the basis that the movement is founded on the assumption ‘that what is distinctive about painting is 
the material process of creating visual effects on an openly two-dimensional surface, rather than the 
process of rendering human subjectivity concretely visible through the illusion of three-dimensional 
space’ (2000: 74).  
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Chapter Four 
Extremely Impure Ends 
Many of the revisionist accounts work from the demonstrable premise that in the post-war 
period Abstract Expressionism was exhibited abroad by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) and the International Council at the MoMA (IC), because there was evident 
discrepancy between the United States’ manifest economic and military might, and its 
perceived cultural sophistication. The US had consolidated the former by the end of WWII, 
emerging with its territory untouched by war, but having enjoyed a booming stimulus from 
wartime production, its GNP doubling between 1938 and 1945. Accordingly, its ruling 
bourgeoisie – and specifically the then-recently dominant expansionist ‘business liberals’38 – 
set about organising the world so as to put into effect the resultant ‘prospect of planetary 
power,’ as Perry Anderson puts it (2013: 5). In their account of post-war American foreign 
policy, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko succinctly summarise the US objectives in this respect: 
Essentially, the United States’ aim was to restructure the world so that American 
business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere. On this there 
was absolute unanimity among the American leaders, and it was around this core that 
they elaborated their politics and programs [...] American business could operate only 
in a world composed of politically reliable and stable capitalist nations, and with free 
access to essential raw materials. Such a universal order precluded the Left from 
power and necessitated conservative, and ultimately subservient, political control 
throughout the globe. (1972: 2) 
Western Europe was crucial to these efforts, not least as a bulwark against the possible 
Westward expansion of the Soviet Union, whose very existence as ‘not just an alternative 
                                                          
38 Contra Noam Chomsky, who he quotes as claiming that the Cold War was a ‘marvellous device’ for 
‘mobilising the domestic population in support of the aggressive and interventionist policies of America’s 
ruling class,’ in his essay ‘Footnote One: The Idea of the Cold War’ (1993), Fred Orton delineates how in 
this effort, at least initially, the US ruling class was not so homogenous, and those who set out to 
reconstruct the world so that US business ‘could operate and profit without restriction wherever it 
needed to’ were specifically the East Coast ‘business liberals’ dedicated to international investment and 
trade, as opposed to the isolationist “old guard”’ (1993: 179-183). 
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form but a negation of capitalism, intending nothing less than its overthrow across the 
planet,’ could of course have been no more inimical to the aims of US imperialism (Anderson 
2013: 18). To the end of ensuring Western Europe’s co-operation, in 1948 the US 
government established an economic aid program, the Marshall Plan, which allocated 13 
billion dollars to governments for recovery. This was necessary to fend off threats to 
capitalism since a Western European economic collapse risked turning the region towards 
socialism. It was also imperative if Europe was to provide an expanded marketplace to absorb 
US overproduction, and thus allow the US to maintain wartime levels of production and 
avoid stagnation. As Walter Laferber reports, in 1945 ‘leading US business groups warned 
that if Americans hoped to avoid a terrible post-war depression, they had to double their 
merchandise exports to the then-unbelievable figure of $10 billion’ (1994: 479). However, by 
1947 Europe had a vast trade deficit with the United States. Thus, as Thomas J. McCormick 
notes, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), founded to implement the Marshall 
Plan, ‘often blocked efforts to use [funds] for social welfare purposes it viewed as 
inflationary and therefore counter to the goal of cost efficiency,’ forcing left-of-centre 
governments in Great Britain, France and Italy to ‘reduce foreign debts, balance budgets, and 
keep a lid on wages – that is, to deflate as a means of making Europe price-competitive and 
able to reduce its dollar trading deficit’ (1989: 78). Accordingly, as the Kolkos note, despite 
the Marshall Plan’s ostensible largesse, the Western European nations ‘treated the United 
States’ concept of internationalism with profound suspicion’ (1972: 329). The revisionist 
historians of Abstract Expressionism show that this suspicion was only compounded by the 
aforementioned widespread assumptions as to the United States’ cultural philistinism, and the 
exhibitions sent abroad by the United States Information Agency and the International 
Council at the MoMA were concerted efforts to change these views. 
  To take France as an example, Guilbaut cites the American ambassador in Paris, Jefferson 
Caffery, as denoting France as the ‘keystone of the European reconstruction’ (1990: 38-39), 
and in 1947 the American Congress allotted $150 million in interim aid to the country. 
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However, the prominent socialist and communist constituencies in France’s coalition 
governments were heavily critical of the Marshall Plan, and the French people retained 
disdain for American culture. The French considered those ‘to whom they [owed] their 
freedom, and to whom they [needed to] look for military protection as well as for economic 
recovery [...] intellectually [to be] their “inferiors,”’ as Guilbaut quotes writer Andre Visson 
in the 1948 book As Others See Us (ibid: 40). This contempt was shared by other European 
nations whose governments had significant leftist representation, notably Italy, and did not 
abate through the early to mid-1950s. Because of this, as Jachec delineates, ‘many Western 
European countries [which] had benefited from the European Recovery Act [...] were no 
closer to achieving the institutional outcomes hoped for by the State Department Policy 
Planning Staff’ (PPA: 174). Accordingly, the populations of Western Europe needed to be 
persuaded that US culture was part of the ‘same complex and cherished civilisation as the 
Europeans,’ and Abstract Expressionism was central to these endeavours (Guilbaut 1990: 
33). 
   Since the late 1940s, convincing the European people that ‘cultural freedom’ flourished in 
America had been a pressing concern for the State Department. Guilbaut points to an article 
published in 1948 in The New York Times Magazine by Stephen Spender, wherein Spender 
asserts that Europeans would be willing ‘to resign themselves to the loss of internal political 
sovereignty’ if they were convinced that this would not be to the detriment of culture (NY: 
173). The notion that, assured of this, the Western European nations would happily capitulate 
to US capitalist hegemony, informed the passing in the same year of The Smith-Mundt Act, 
which expanded the State Department’s Information and Cultural Program in order to present 
to the European people a positive image of US culture, and subsequently the establishment in 
1953 to the same end of the USIA, which would go on to collaborate with MoMA on its 
international programme. However, as Michael Kimmelman stresses in reference to the latter, 
up until 1958 these efforts had been pluralist, and while often featuring Abstract 
Expressionism, by no means privileged the movement (2000: 297-301). Yet the decision to 
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mount the touring shows Jackson Pollock 1912-1956 and The New American Painting in 
1958 and 1959 in collaboration with the International Council at MoMA was likely rooted in 
the observation that this pluralism was impeding these exhibitions’ propagandistic aims. 
European audiences were often unimpressed with elements of these exhibitions which did not 
emphasise American art’s affinity with European modernism, and Jachec adduces a number 
of events which evidence that the institutions disseminating exhibitions abroad were 
receptive to this fact. For example, the exhibition Modern Art in the United States, which 
featured the Abstract Expressionists among many other artists, featured a large section on 
‘design and the applied arts.’ Upon its opening in Paris, the critic Pierre Descargues wrote 
dismissively in the Communist weekly Lettres Francaises of how ‘An extensive section has 
been given over to saucepans, lemon-squeezers, can openers, and plastic chairs [...] Only a 
Cadillac, a jet plane, and an H-bomb are lacking but will undoubtedly be included another 
time’ (PPA: 187). When the show was exhibited elsewhere in Europe, this section was not 
included. Jachec also points to a special report from November 1953 which documented 
audience reactions to The Printmaker’s America, a display of materials up to 1890, and 
Beyond the Mississippi, a collection of George Catlin’s work in a pre-test in Washington. In 
the report, it is noted that Europeans’ criticism was focused on these shows’ ‘artistic quality,’ 
as they emphasised that it was necessary for the US to ‘dispel “scepticism” about the value of 
modern American art and to demonstrate to the world that the US possesses ‘spiritual 
values’”’ (PPA: 165). By 1958, then, Abstract Expressionism was deemed the best vehicle 
for these “spiritual values.” 
  Above, I acknowledged that the accounts forwarded by the revisionist historians as to how 
formal aspects of Abstract Expressionism coincide with, or were amenable to, dominant 
ideology vary. In some instances these accounts seem simply to be variants on the notion that 
the paintings straightforwardly represent ‘artistic free enterprise,’ as Barr, with no doubt 
some level of cynicism, claimed in a letter to Henry Luce, the publisher of Time, Life and 
Fortune, in an attempt to convince him to give more favourable coverage to the Abstract 
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Expressionists (qtd. in Stonor Saunders 1999: 267). However, since the impetus of 
exhibitions such as Jackson Pollock 1912-1956 and The New American Painting was to win 
over to US culture European citizens suspicious of US capitalism, framing the paintings as 
direct artistic analogues of the individual figured as homo economicus seems an unlikely 
stratagem. Instead, the more sophisticated of the revisionists’ analyses tend towards the idea 
that the paintings somehow aesthetically affirmed individual experience against the backdrop 
of its deracination under late capitalism. In these accounts, to which we will turn in earnest in 
Chapter 6, the former surrenders meaningful opposition and functions as a reified negative 
moment serving to further entrench the latter, while nevertheless implying that Americans 
were concerned with ‘spiritual values.’ Guilbaut, for instance, suggests that the intimations of 
anxiety found in the paintings were forwarded as ‘cruel tokens’ of the freedom afforded by 
capitalism (NY: 202). And Jachec’s central thesis is that the paintings were deployed to win 
over a mistrustful European left because they instantiated a ‘critical nonconformism’ which 
provided a counterweight to the massification of industrial society. Yet, it is also clear that 
exhibitions under the auspices of the State Department were informed by Greenberg’s 
modernist genealogy, which I showed in the previous chapter was increasingly focused solely 
upon inner-aesthetic qualities of paintings in relation to their antecedents. Ostensibly, in the 
catalogue essay for The New American Painting, Barr opposes an account of the artworks 
which places primacy upon their formal qualities. In keeping with both Guilbaut and Jachec’s 
readings, he stresses how the Abstract Expressionists’ ‘“anxiety,” their “commitment,” their 
“dreadful freedom” concern their work primarily,’ characterizing them as ‘defiantly’ 
rejecting ‘the conventional values of the society which surrounds them,’ and disavows the 
notion that the artworks’ significance lies in their ‘aesthetics of “plastic values,”’ at the 
expense of ‘the emotions of fear, gaiety, anger, violence, or tranquillity which these paintings 
transmit or suggest,’ even making disparaging reference to ‘some of their followers who had 
been inclined to make an orthodoxy of abstraction’ (10-13). Furthermore, Greenberg himself 
took a dim view of The New American Painting, claiming that it presented a distorted image 
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of Abstract Expressionism in its omission of Hofmann and ‘a number of highly questionable 
inclusions’ (CEC4: 67).39 However, in what follows, I will contend that, in so far as it chimed 
with the ideology which undergirded US imperialism during the Cold War, an account of 
Abstract Expressionism as the apex of European modernism’s unilateral progressive linearity, 
of which Greenberg was the most conspicuous proponent, always underwrote these 
exhibitions.  
  To first address the ideology guiding US expansionism and intervention during the Cold 
War, it was rooted in the notion that its capitalism marked the pinnacle of the 
Enlightenment’s progressive maturation; a conviction epitomised by Assistant Secretary of 
State Spruille Braden’s declaration in 1946 that the ‘selective processes of society’s evolution 
through the ages have proved that the institution of private property [is] a bulwark of 
civilisation’ (qtd. in Kolkos, 13). Certainly, the Marshall Plan and other measures such as the 
Truman Doctrine and the National Security Council Report 68 established and maintained US 
hegemony in Western Europe.40 Yet, this economic and military intervention was dictated by 
what Perry Anderson refers to as the United States’ ‘complexio oppositorium of 
exceptionalism and universalism’ (2013: 6),41 a dyad whose latter term is justified by its 
former: The world must be remade in the image of the United States, because the United 
                                                          
39 It can be assumed that, for Greenberg, these questionable inclusions were Grace Hartigan, who in all of 
Greenberg’s collected essays and criticism is not mentioned once; James Brooks, who is afforded only one 
cursory mention, in a sentence accounting for latecomers to Abstract Expressionism in a retrospective 
essay written in 1965 (CEC4: 214), and Theodoros Stamos, who is mentioned once, when Greenberg 
dismisses his painting Altar as ‘sickeningly sweet, inept, and utterly empty’ (CEC2: 266). 
 
40 The Truman Doctrine of 1947 afforded the US government the unilateral ‘right’ to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other countries - officially only Greece and Turkey at its inception, but subsequently 
informally extended to include any other nation – in an effort to prevent them from becoming part of the 
Eastern Bloc, and was celebrated as, to quote Perry Anderson, blowing ‘the bugle for a battle to defend 
free nations everywhere’ (2013: 24). The National Security Council Report 68 was a 58-page document 
drawn up by the United States Security Council in 1950 which expanded and reinforced these aims, 
commiting to defend the Western Hemisphere and provide aid to allies. 
 
41 Anderson roots this in ‘four ingredients’: On the one hand, The United States had an unparalleled 
advantage in terms of economy and geography, being a ‘settler economy free of any of the feudal residues 
or impediments of the Old World, and a continental territory protected by two oceans: producing the 
purest form of nascent capitalism, in the largest nation-state, anywhere on earth.’ On the other hand, its 
culture and politics were particularly suited to imperialism, with ‘the idea – derived from initial Puritan 
settlement –of a nation enjoying divine favour, imbued with a sacred calling; and the belief – derived from 
the War of Independence – that a republic endowed with a constitution of liberty for all time had arisen in 
the New World.’ 
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States is exceptional in having realised the end of history. While Fredric Jameson wrote in 
1990 that, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, ‘the ideals of [...] market freedom [were] 
everywhere being celebrated as more advanced values than the conceptions of economic 
equality that were in fact their historical sequel’ (1996: 235-236), this hierarchy was never in 
question for the ideology which undergirded US imperialism during the Cold War. The 
avowal that the United States’ ideals of market freedom were the most advanced values 
comparative to those of state socialism fuelled the insistence with which it sought to expunge 
all that was not identical with these values. This is why, as Simone de Beauvoir observed 
when visiting the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s, from the point of view 
of the US, imperialism was simply a case of ‘imposing on others that which is good’ (104). 
Indeed, Jessica T. Mathews, alumnus of both the State Department and National Security 
Council, recently made this clear when she favourably cited the wisdom that, since the 1940s, 
‘open trade and investment’ to the end of growing markets for the United States operating 
‘under a set of rules that [The United States wish] to live by’ has been for the mutual benefit 
of all nations (2017: 11).  
  In his account of the United States’ self-identification during the Cold War, Anders 
Stephanson summarises this dynamic well, delineating how ‘[w]hereas the Soviet Union, 
representing (it claimed) the penultimate stage of history, was locked in a dialectical struggle 
for the final liberation of humankind, the United States is that very liberation [...] it can have 
no equal, no dialectical Other’ (2011: 178). Faced with an opposing power which denied its 
status as thus, it was all the more urgent that the United States universalised its particularity. 
There could ‘be no difference between the United States [...] and what ought to be in the 
world at large’ because the United States embodied the ‘end of history as emancipated 
humankind’ (Ibid: 177). Whatever diverged from it was ‘only to be overcome and eradicated’ 
(Ibid: 176-7). As Adorno writes of dominant rationality more generally, the ‘demand for 
totality’ of the United States during the Cold War meant that which differentiated itself from 
it appeared ‘divergent, dissonant, negative’ (ND: 5-6). US imperialism during the Cold War, 
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then, found its legitimation in the notion that the United States marked the culmination of a 
universal history. As Adorno, following Walter Benjamin, asserts of universal history 
broadly, US imperialism was ‘based on the assumption that a particular idea [freedom] runs 
through history in its entirety and that the facts gradually come closer to it,’ an assumption 
which ‘justifies history from the standpoint of the victor’ but ignores the heterogeneity 
mutilated and discredited by its victory (2006: 87ff). In the next chapter, I will turn to the 
question of this subjugated nonidentity. Suffice it here, however, to note the prima facie 
homologousness between US imperialism’s historical justification, and Greenberg’s 
proclamations as to Abstract Expressionism’s supremacy. As detailed in the previous chapter, 
Greenberg’s championing of Abstract Expressionism often appears based on the assumption 
that particular perennials of the medium of painting run through history and the facts of 
Abstract Expressionism had come closer than any style before it to manifesting them. In this 
sense, Greenberg’s championing of Abstract Expressionism seems to depend upon the same 
‘linear concept of historical development’ as ‘the-West-is-best thesis,’ as David Craven 
observes (ACC: 124). It appears to be ‘a manifest attempt at writing history from the 
perspective of victorious interests,’ as Benjamin Buchloh notes (Buchloh et al 2007: 31), and 
accordingly served as an artistic correlate to the United States’ self-conception as having 
realised the form of society in which the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and liberty could 
most flourish. As Kozloff puts it in his early revisionist essay, ‘the belief that American art 
[was] the sole trustee of the avant-garde spirit’ chimed well with ‘the US government’s 
notion of itself as the lone guarantor of capitalist liberty’ (1985: 108-109). 
  The fact that the notion that Abstract Expressionism was at the forefront of European 
modernism was central to the exhibitions sent abroad by the International Council, is evident 
in the way that de Kooning was promoted in his retrospective alongside Shahn’s at the 1954 
Venice Biennale. Indeed, Pohl’s above-detailed account of Shahn’s co-optation is premised 
on the assumption that Shahn’s inclusion is puzzling in comparison with De Kooning's 
presence, which she contends can easily be explained ‘by the fact that he represented what 
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was seen in America at that time as the most advanced art movement in the modernist 
continuum,’ corroborating this by noting that in his catalogue essay, Barr points out de 
Kooning’s similarity to Boccioni (1981: 80; 91). It is clear from numerous articles written by 
American critics which were disseminated throughout Europe during the ‘50s to coincide 
with the exhibitions that the Abstract Expressionists’ European modernist pedigree was 
widely stressed in this way. For instance, as Jeremy Lewison notes in a recent essay, in the 
same year as New American Painting, the American art historian Robert Rosenblum wrote an 
essay published by Aujourd’hui in which he was ‘keen to stress the European origins of 
[Abstract Expressionism], linking Pollock to Monet, de Kooning to Picasso, Kline to 
Mondrian [...] and Motherwell to the “Lucidity” and “elegance” of the French tradition’ 
(2016: 69). Lewison also points out that in 1955, to coincide with 50 ans d’art aux Etats 
Unis, an exhibition featuring a number of Abstract Expressionists which proceeded to tour 
Europe as Modern Art in the United States, Soby wrote an article for Cahiers d’art 
emphasising Abstract Expressionism’s European heritage, ‘seeing Monet’s Nympheas 
reflected in the work of Rothko, stressing the Dutch origins of de Kooning and the 
importance of Hans Hofmann, who came from Germany, and the Chile-born artist Roberto 
Matta, who arrived from Paris’ (2016: 61).  
  Lewison surmises that this article by Soby was ‘perhaps an attempt to show that America 
was a fellow traveller [of Europe], neither a usurper nor an enemy, and that its values were 
European’ (2016: 61). However, as I have established more broadly, it is safe to assume that 
Lewison’s circumspection is misplaced. Indeed, Guilbaut quotes Soby explicitly asserting six 
years earlier that ‘today we are engaged in a vital struggle to [...] persuade [the peoples of 
Europe] that we and they are committed to the same basic ideals,’ and thus that it was 
necessary for the US to refute the notion that they were ‘a nation not deeply concerned with 
the arts’ with ‘every means of communication’ at their disposal (NY: 194). Moreover, the 
revisionist accounts show that, similarly to Greenberg’s criticism, these efforts did not simply 
strive to demonstrate that Abstract Expressionism occupied the same tradition as European 
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art, but that it had superseded this tradition on its own terms. They may not have been 
intended to represent US art as the usurper of European modernism. However, to maintain 
the metaphor of a ruling lineage, the revisionist accounts establish that they were clearly 
intended to establish that American art was ‘the natural continuation and heir of European 
and specifically Parisian Modernism,’ as Hardt and Negri put it in their broader account of 
how ‘American hegemony over Europe which was founded on financial, economic and 
military structures, was made to seem natural through a series of cultural and ideological 
operations’ (2000: 382). In Cockcroft’s brief foundational revisionist essay, she surmises that 
‘Abstract Expressionism constituted the ideal style for [...] propaganda activities’ because it 
could be characterised in this way, displaying ‘the United States as culturally up-to-date in 
competition with Paris’ (1985: 129), and Guilbaut and Jachec both affirm that, along with the 
aforementioned connotations which I will discuss in Chapter 6, the paintings were deployed 
in these terms; ‘associated with the modernist tradition (as defined by Greenberg),’ while 
responding to ‘modern anxieties’ (NY: 183). Guilbaut details how the ground was primed for 
the deployment of Abstract Expressionism as superseding the European modernist tradition 
on its own terms, by an exhibition organised by the French magazine Preuves, a mouthpiece 
for the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a nominally anti-Stalinist advocacy group 
which in practice was covertly funded by the CIA and worked to combat neutralism and anti-
Americanism in Western Europe. This exhibition, entitled Ouevres du Vingtieme Siecle, 
traced the major modern movements from Impressionism to Picasso, and was ‘specifically 
produced [...] to show that only free societies were able to create great art,’ demonstrating the 
United States’ commitment to that tradition, and tacitly paving the way, Guilbaut claims, for 
‘the American avant-garde [...] to play its role on the international stage’ as inheritor of this 
legacy (1990: 74). And Jachec claims that Abstract Expressionism was chosen to exhibit 
overseas because it constituted ‘the United States’ best bet for making notable innovations 
within European practices,’ adducing the fact that the International Council favourably 
registered in their reports that when in Modern Art in the United States was sent to Frankfurt 
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in 1956, ‘the show was generally perceived, according to the reports, as marking continuity 
with, and departure from, the European modernist tradition,’ with especial focus upon 
Abstract Expressionism among the many variants of US modern art which were exhibited, 
resulting in the two subsequent exhibitions solely dedicated to the style (PPA: 192). Crucial 
to the decision to export Abstract Expressionism in order to win over a recalcitrant Western 
Europe, then, was its Greenbergian characterisation as ‘the logical culmination of a long-
standing and inexorable tendency toward abstraction’ in the European tradition (NY: 177). 
  Above, I noted that Barr ostensibly rejects a formalist interpretation of Abstract 
Expressionism in the catalogue essay for The New American Painting. However, in his 
various positions at MoMA, Barr had done much to institutionalise the European modernist 
lineage towards abstraction of which ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon’ were politicised theoretical 
accounts.42 Indeed, when, eight years before, he was instrumental in exporting Abstract 
Expressionism, Barr claimed his curatorial choice to include Pollock, de Kooning and Gorky 
in the US pavilion for the 1950 Venice Biennale was due to their being members of a 
‘predominant vanguard’ (qtd. in Krauss, 2015: 4). And the catalogue for The New American 
Painting does not contest the trajectory which positioned them thusly. Reproduced in the 
catalogue is a review of Franz Kline in ARTnews by Thomas B. Hess, which traces Kline’s 
work in a lineage from Velasquez through Mondrian (44). Furthermore, Greenberg is the 
only critic Barr identifies by name when discussing Abstract Expressionism’s rise to 
                                                          
42 Citing Barr’s catalogue for the 1936 MoMA show Cubism and Abstract Art, W. J. T. Mitchell stresses how 
Barr had already well prepared the institutionalisation of abstract art before Greenberg published ‘Kitsch’ 
and ‘Laocoon,’ emblematically with his genealogical diagram tracing the lineage of then-contemporary 
non-geometrical and geometrical abstract art (1994: 230). That Barr’s modernist criticism, which was 
reflected in MoMA’s multidepartmental organisational structure, is adirect antecedent Greenberg’s 
formalism is stressed by Sybil Gordon Kantor in her intellectual biography of Barr. Kentor illustrates this 
by adducing how Barr had, before ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon,’ noted how Cézanne was revered ‘for his 
abandonment of deep space and emphatic modelling, for a compact composition in which foreground and 
background are fused into an angular, active curtain of colour,’ and his description of synthetic Cubism as 
placing ‘an emphasis not upon the reality of the represented objects but upon the reality of the painted 
surface’ (1993: 322-3). Indeed, in a 1983 interview with Charles Harrison, Greenberg in fact asserts that 
the vociferousness of his claims as to the Abstract Expressionists’ position in the forefront of this lineage 
in the early ‘50s, was proportional to a reluctance at MoMA to purchase and promote the work of the 
Abstract Expressionists (2000: 184). 
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prominence, and Barr’s denial that the paintings are preoccupied with form is not to dismiss 
the centrality of their medium-specificity:  
Their flatness is [...] a consequence of the artist’s concern with the actual painting 
process as his prime instrument of expression, a concern which also tends to eliminate 
imitative suggestion of the forms, textures, colours and spaces of the real world, since 
these might compete with the primary reality of paint on canvas (11). 
The importance to US imperialism of Abstract Expressionism’s position in the forefront of 
the European modernist tradition becomes all the more evident if we turn to the exhibitions of 
Abstract Expressionism exported by the State Department independently in the 1960s, for 
example the 1962 touring show Vanguard American Painting. In the 1960s, persuading left-
leaning Europeans as to the value of US art was less of a pressing concern since capitalism 
had generally been stabilised in Western Europe. As Ralph Milliband put it, these post-war 
years saw ‘the celebration of Western democracy, the free world, the welfare state, the 
affluent society, the end of ideology and pluralistic equilibrium’ (1973: 239). The communist 
and socialist parties either lost support – as in France – or converged rightwards to a social-
democratic economic norm – as in Italy and West Germany – and trade unionism constituted 
less an opposition to the interests of capital, and more a corporatist guarantor of stability.43 
Accordingly, exhibitions such as Vanguard American Painting, which featured all of the 
artists included in The New American Painting, with the addition of Hofmann, were more-or-
less unabashed efforts in displaying the artistic supremacy correlative to the political and 
military supremacy of the United States. While Greenberg actively lectured on behalf of the 
State Department during a travelling exhibition of American art in Japan and India in the 
mid-60s, he was not consulted in the curation of Vanguard American Painting. This is 
                                                          
43In terms of the former, ‘by about 1960 even ideological differences between the Socialist and 
Conservative parties appeared to lose their significance, hence the talk of a “Grand Coalition” between the 
two main parties in Germany [and] of a Christian Democratic “opening of the Left” in Italy’ (Young 1991: 
xv). In terms of the latter, as Ernest Mandel bemoaned in 1967, trade unionism had become ‘a guarantor 
of “social peace,” a guarantor to the employers of stability during a continuous and uninterrupted process 
of work and the reproduction of capital’ (1973: 73). 
. 
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evident in the selection of the younger artists Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg – about 
whose ‘neo-dadaism’ Greenberg was generally dismissive44 – rather than the second 
generation colour-field painters whom Greenberg was then championing, such as Kenneth 
Noland and Jules Olitski (although the inclusion of Hofmann is notable, considering 
Greenberg’s aforementioned criticism of his exclusion from The New American Painting). 
Nevertheless, in H. H. Arnason’s catalogue essay for that show, as in Barr’s essay for The 
New American Painting, only Greenberg is named with respect to critics whose influence was 
decisive over the rise of Abstract Expressionism, and, unlike Barr’s essay, Arnason does not 
emphasise how the artworks affirm the individual against reification. Instead, while 
conceding that ‘no artistic movement, and least of all abstract expressionism, can be 
understood simply as an accumulation of influences,’ he is primarily concerned with how 
Abstract Expressionism provides a culmination of the European tradition. He stresses how 
the catalyst for the movement was ‘the presence in New York of many great European artists 
as a result of the war,’ and establishes Abstract Expressionism’s position at the forefront of 
the European modernist lineage with recourse to its medium-specific ‘assertion of the brush-
stroke’ (n. pag.). 
 
     
  
                                                          
44 It should be noted that Greenberg has something of a higher opinion of Johns, remarking approvingly in 
1962 of how ‘the painterly paintedness of Johns picture sets off, and is set off by, the flatness of his 
number, letter, target, flag, and map images’ (CEC4: 127). However, as I noted in Chapter 3 is the case in 
terms of his attitude towards many artists of Johns’s generation, Greenberg caveats this approbation with 
the claim that the fact that ‘his art can be explained as has been explained here’ indicates the ‘narrowness’ 
of Johns’s work, and by 1969 he was claiming that ‘Johns is – rather was – a gifted and original artist, but 
the best of his paintings and bas-reliefs remain “easy” and certainly minor compared with the best of 
Abstract Expressionism’ (CEC4: 302). 
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Chapter Six 
Artistic Abstraction Contra Societal Abstraction 
 
  In the previous chapter, I acknowledged that Adorno indicts the model of universal history 
which undergirded US imperialism, whose isomorphy with the Greenbergian modernist 
lineage I argued informed the State Department’s deployment of Abstract Expressionism. 
Following Walter Benjamin, Adorno does so by pointing out that the progress narrated by 
such historiography, has always entailed the subjugation of that which is different and alien 
to the status quo ultimately legitimated by such historiography. For Benjamin, the linear 
progressivist historiography of the victors is thus to be rejected outright, as he famously 
illustrates with the image of the angel of history, who sees history’s chain of events as ‘one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage,’ but is prevented from 
making ‘whole what has been smashed’ by the storm of ‘progress,’ which irresistibly propels 
him forward (1999: 249). Adorno, however, ‘preferred an inverted historicism to Benjamin’s 
outright rejection of historicism’ (Rose 2014: 189), and in fact contends that Benjamin’s 
explicit rejection of historicism objectively implies this inverted historicism: the permanence 
of catastrophe which Benjamin describes - the perennial disruption of life caused by progress 
– should be conceived as the continuity of discontinuity, as a negative identity of history 
forged by acts of subjugation and submission (2006: 92f).45 Indeed, for Adorno, as will be 
crucial in subsequent chapters, the existence of progress (in the forces of production) and 
                                                          
45 Benjamin, however, did not conversely hypostasize discontinuity, and both his rejection of historicism 
and Adorno’s inverted historicism were in the name of the possibility of the same form of experience. 
Distinguishing between experience in the sense of Erfahrung - full, encompassing and comprehended 
experience - and Erlebnis – lived experience – Benjamin contends that late capitalism has rendered 
subjects incapable of integrating individual experiences into a historical continuum of memory, and thus 
experience remains at the level of Erlebnis. For Benjamin, it is the linearity of dominant historicism which 
prevents the equitable interrelation of cognitive, mnemic, physical, libidinal and affective faculties 
necessary for the continuum of Erfahrung, in so far as dominant historicism’s telling of events like beads 
on a rosary restricts these events to fixed significance in the interests of power, and disavows the 
multiplicity of linkages which might be drawn by cognition for which the past is not known solely in the 
epistemological terms of the victors. The secondary literature on Adorno and Benjamin’s relationship is of 
course vast, and the most comprehensive account remains Buck Morss’s The Origin of Negative Dialectics 
(1977) 
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consequent ‘possibility of worldwide freedom from want,’ is not to be denied (ND: 192). 
His is not a regressive philosophy of history, nor a transcendent critique of the status quo 
which progressive history legitimates. Rather, for Adorno thought must assimilate reflection 
on the ‘destructive side of progress’ so as to immanently critique the status quo in terms of 
the latter’s own ideals (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: xvi).46 Thereby, we must reorient our 
thoughts thus that cognition might ‘address itself to things [...] which fell by the wayside – 
what might be called [...] waste products and blind spots’ (2005: 151). That is, an inverted 
historicism traces that which is seemingly rendered irrelevant or obviated as ‘the systematic 
domination over nature has been asserted more and more decisively and has integrated all 
internal human characteristics’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 223); it recounts the obverse 
of ‘the unity of the control of nature, of progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over 
men’s inner nature’ (ND: 320).  
   As I detailed in the previous chapter, US imperialism during the Cold War was premised on 
the notion that the capitalist US had most fully realised the Enlightenment’s anti-feudalist 
trajectory. However, if that trajectory is given an axial turn, the dissolution of ‘the injustice of 
the old inequality of unmediated mastery,’ is revealed to perpetuate injustice ‘in universal 
mediation’ whereby objects and subjects alike are truncated (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 
8). Adorno denotes the cognition befitting such truncation ‘identity-thinking,’ and elaborates 
how it operates in terms of the logic of unequal conceptual exchange in the service of the 
exigencies of unequal economic exchange. In this, Adorno follows Georg Lukács’s account 
of reification in History and Class Consciousness, first published in 1923, wherein Lukács 
                                                          
46 With respect to this point, Simon Jarvis adduces the following revealing passage from Adorno’s 
discussions with Horkheimer when working towards Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
The meaning of Marx’s economics is much rather that he starts out from just that element in bourgeois 
political economy which is more than descriptive (fair exchange). And that he shows that the society 
which develops on the basis of such principles contradicts these principles, whilst the realization of these 
principles would sublate [aufheben] the form of society itself. Marx does not want to show, as it were, 
positivistically, according to which laws exchange is ‘now actually’ conditioned; rather he takes from 
bourgeois society the measures of legality which it has itself constituted, shows that bourgeois society 
cannot fulfil them, and retains this measure at the same time as a negative expression of a right 
constitution of society. This is just what we need to do with respect to bourgeois categories like that of the 
indivldual’ (qtd in Jarvis, 50) 
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details how ‘commodity exchange together with its structural consequences’ has come to 
‘influence the total outer and inner life of society’ (1971: 84). This concept of reification is 
premised on Marx’s distinction between use-value and exchange-value. As Marx shows in 
Capital Vol. 1, the owners of the means of production accrue surplus-value by way of the 
identification of commodities with their exchange-value as if the latter were a natural 
property, when in fact it is the quantitative expression of the socially necessary labour time it 
takes to produce a given commodity comparative to other commodities. Surplus-value is the 
difference between the exchange-value of labour-power, which workers are forced to sell to 
capitalists in order to survive, and the exchange-value of the commodities which this labour-
power produces. As Marx puts it, commodities not only have ‘sensuous’ qualities but they 
also, in so far as they are exchange-values, have ‘suprasensible’ qualities (1975: 165), and in 
a society geared towards production for profit, use-values are tendentially subsumed by 
exchange-value, and everyday life is fundamentally determined by the latter.  
  In this, then, identity-thinking is a kind of exchange, in so far as the substitution of 
exchange-value for use-value - and all other identifications necessary for the social processes 
by which the former dominate the latter - are instantiations of unequal exchange themselves, 
wherein an object is exchanged for a concept, and all particularities of the former which are 
not calculable in terms of the latter, including subjects’ experience, fall to the wayside:  
[I]n the process only this exchange relation of knowledge, that is, the effort, the 
exchange between the labour of thinking and the object which thought then 
appropriates, and the products of this process, namely the fact that the ideas work out 
– only this becomes the thing that endures, the lasting product’ (Adorno 2001: 27).  
This cognitive subsumption whereby objects are made identical with concepts, is conceptual 
fetishism as the correlate (and corollary) of commodity fetishism: As institutions and social 
processes created through human activity stand opposed to their producers as second nature 
under capitalism, the object mediated through conceptual labour confronts perception as the 
object itself. Objects are rendered intelligible only in terms of the status quo - as what a given 
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object ‘comes under, what it exemplifies or represents and what, accordingly, it is not itself’ 
(ND: 149) - and somatic, affective, and libidinal elements of subjects’ experience are 
delegitimized, suppressed or cathected, as these subjects ‘must mold themselves to the 
technical apparatus body and soul’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 23). Indeed, in spite of 
US affirmations as to the freedom of the individual, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko establish that 
the application of American power during the Cold War demanded subjection to reigning 
universals in this way. It was, they write, dictated by ‘structural imperatives and limits’ which 
had taken on ‘independent characteristics’ so that the officials who administered it functioned 
‘according to criteria established for them’ (19). Here, they may as well be paraphrasing 
Lukács when he describes reified consciousness as ‘the contemplative stance adopted 
towards a process mechanically conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of 
man’s consciousness and impervious to human intervention’ (1971: 89). 
  The cognition of an inverted historicism which is to do justice to waste products and blind 
spots, then, must contrarily ‘be guided by what exchange has not maimed or – since there is 
nothing left unmaimed anymore – by what is concealed within the exchange processes’ 
(1998a: 253), and thus refute the concept’s supposed identity with its object. Notoriously, 
Adorno’s work is wilfully unparaphraseable.47 However, if one were to summarise his 
lifelong central project, one could do little better than to define it as the effort to interrogate 
precisely that nonidentity. As he characterises his philosophy in his 1931 inaugural lecture to 
the University of Frankfurt, whose consistency with the oeuvre it preceded has often been 
commented upon (See, for instance, Buck-Morss, 1977: 24f; Jay, 1984b: 244; Jarvis, 1998: 
1), it ‘no longer believes reality to be grounded in the ratio, but instead assumes always and 
forever that the law-giving of autonomous reason [understood as the cognitive correlate to 
societal reification] pierces through a being which is not adequate to it’ (1977: 132). As we 
                                                          
47 This is the case to the extent that it is almost customary for the authors of even the most limpid guides 
to Adorno’s thought to preface them with disclaimers to this effect, see particularly Martin Jay’s Adorno 
(1984a), but also Jarvis’s claim that it is hard to explicate Adorno’s ‘body of work without doing some 
violence to it’ (1998: 3), and Zuidervaart’s insistence that his account can only be partial (1991: xvff). 
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will see throughout the rest of this thesis, for Adorno, such irreducibility of objects to 
dominant concepts is evident in the experience of artworks whose obstinate resistance of the 
reified facile discourse of communication allows them to do justice to repressed nature, 
understood as ‘the particular […] to which the course of history did violence’ (Buck-Morss, 
1977: 55). Thus, for Adorno authentic art is the ‘unconscious writing of history’ (AT: 192; 
259). In Chapter 1 I suggested a comparison between Adorno and the Trotskyist Greenberg 
of ‘Kitsch’ which implies that, while Greenberg does not elaborate avant-garde art’s 
opposition to ‘capitalism in decline’ in these terms, Greenberg’s account indicates that avant-
garde art might pose a challenge to identity-thinking, in that both stress that, conversely to 
mass culture, the then-avant-garde art’s autotelism had rendered it unamenable to prevalent 
modes of consumption. And in Chapter 2, I acknowledged that for many of the Abstract 
Expressionists, their renunciation of representation was certainly an attempt to escape 
complicity with the status quo in contradistinction with Social Realism’s doubling of the 
world reified in terms of dominant concepts.  
  However, I proceeded to show how Greenberg’s account of this renunciation on the part of 
Abstract Expressionism did much to invite its co-optation by US imperialism. I noted that 
even in ‘Kitsch’ Greenberg does not explicate a connection between the supposed challenge 
avant-garde art posed to ‘capitalism in decline’ which justifies his call for socialism to 
preserve avant-garde art, and avant-garde art’s intransigence in terms of dominant habits of 
consumption. I noted that the former was no doubt informed by Trotsky’s conviction that 
revolutionary art is created by the dedication to its ‘own laws,’ rather than by the abstract 
negation of preceding culture. And I acknowledged that he aligned the inception of the 
ostensible autotelism which lead to avant-garde art’s intransigence, with the Marxist rejection 
of society’s ‘prevailing standards.’ Yet, I showed that since he claims in ‘Kitsch’ that avant-
garde art is not necessarily critical of the status quo, its subversiveness for him in 1939 was 
presumably narrowly conjunctural, a notion corroborated by the fact that he did not attribute 
a seditious role to avant-garde art once capitalism was no longer in decline in the ‘40s. I 
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elaborated how Greenberg instead came to disclaim any correspondence between art and the 
‘weal and woe’ of human beings, and seemed to hypostasise the markers of Abstract 
Expressionism’s dedication to its ‘own laws’ in terms of hierarchical superiority, thus lending 
Abstract Expressionism to US imperialism’s imposition of capitalism. That is, rather than 
indicting with its dialectical underside the progressivist history which legitimated US 
imperialism, Abstract Expressionism served to corroborate this progressivist historiography 
in no small part because Greenberg conceived of Abstract Expressionism’s eschewal of 
figuration as the determinate negation of representational content. In so far as this negation 
affirmed the paintings’ medium-specificity, it represented New York’s triumphal 
supersession of Parisian modernism. To the extent that this was the case, the fact that 
Greenberg kept ‘his footing in the world of form’ and belittled ‘everything that seemed to 
deviate from this position’ – to take Dore Ashton’s articulation of the common 
characterisation of Greenberg (1973: 160) - buttressed US imperialism’s excoriation of 
anything which deviated from its position, as it remade the world in its interests. On this 
account, identifying Abstract Expressionist canvases in terms of their medium-specificity is 
an instance of identity-thinking serving to perpetuate injustice, by providing US culture’s 
claims to universal superiority with an artistic correlate. However, ever since his 1996 essay 
“The Death of Sensuous Particulars: Adorno and Abstract Expressionism,’ the philosopher 
J.M. Bernstein has been forwarding an Adornian case for Abstract Expressionism founded on 
the premise that to trace Greenberg’s genealogy of modernism’s medium-specificity - ‘its 
obsession with pigment and colour, line and shape, flatness and the delimitation of flatness’ 
(AVB: 17) – is precisely to trace a history of nonidentity. While Bernstein does not once 
acknowledge the revisionist historians, his case for Abstract Expressionism was originally 
leveled as an immanent critique of Clark’s account detailed in the introduction. As we saw, 
Clark identifies the artworks as manifesting the vulgar individualism of the post-war US petty 
bourgeoisie in an attempt to localize the movement in its historical moment, and thus free the 
art of the present from its hegemonic grip. For Bernstein, on the other hand, freedom from 
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Abstract Expressionism’s ‘long shadow’ is not a salutary prospect so long as we live under 
capitalism, since this ‘long shadow’ might be chalked up to the movement being ‘the last 
systematically successful project to sustain the claim of sensuous particularity against 
conceptual claiming’ (AVB: 120). 
  I acknowledged above that Greenberg always maintains that his is not an account of art’s 
inner-aesthetic development divorced from society, and Bernstein contends that Greenberg’s 
account of how this development is conditioned by social forces indicates how the former 
opposes the latter. In ‘Laocoon,’ Greenberg affirms that he is not contending that abstract art 
is not conditioned by society, claiming that it, ‘like every other cultural phenomenon reflects 
the social and other circumstances of the age in which its creators live, and that there is 
nothing inside art itself, disconnected from history, which compels it to go in one direction or 
another’ (CEC1: 23). While in ‘Laocoon’ Greenberg explicitly brackets an investigation into 
these ‘forces stemming from outside art’ (CEC1: 28), Bernstein alights upon Greenberg’s 
choice of the word ‘hunted’ in that essay to describe the avant-garde‘s limitation to medium-
specificity – ‘the arts [...] have been hunted back to their mediums, and there they have been 
isolated, concentrated and defined’ (CEC1: 32) – to posit that Greenberg signals that 
‘recourse to the medium, delimiting the boundaries of painting by hugging to the shoreline of 
the medium itself’ was a form of defence against ‘an operation of brutal harassment’ (AVB: 
232). This brutal harassment, Bernstein identifies as that of modernity’s ‘rational 
mindedness,’ which subsumes objects with concepts, and what Greenberg denotes as the 
isolation, concentration and definition of art, Bernstein asserts was an attempt to secure ‘an 
opacity’ against its reduction to concepts (AVB: 232-3). The lineage of such art, claims 
Bernstein, is the unconscious writing of history which ‘forms the core of Adorno’s aesthetic 
theory’: 
[T]he movement from representational painting [...] to modernist art [inscribes] a 
history [...] wherein different [...] arts and styles of art [...] become paradigmatic on 
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the basis of their [...] distance from or ability to resist the claims of determinate 
judgement and the social  practices which forward those claims’ (1992: 63).  
As we saw in Chapter 1, in ‘Kitsch,’ Greenberg certainly claims that the avant-garde’s 
dedication to medium-specificity is spurred by the dissolution of normative values, and 
indeed Bernstein cites Greenberg’s claim in ‘Kitsch’ that society was becoming ‘less and less 
able […] to justify the inevitability of its particular forms’ (1997a: 94). Yet, Greenberg is 
here referring to Marxism’s denaturalisation of capitalism and the ideological confusion and 
violence of revolution, rather than, as Bernstein would have it, the deracination of norms by 
capitalist rationalisation. However, Greenberg does stress how, having internalised 
revolutionary ideas and accordingly defined the bourgeoisie as that which they were not 
(even while attached to it by the umbilical cord of gold), the avant-garde’s dedication to 
medium-specificity was in opposition to the tendency of ‘a rationalist and scientifically-
minded city culture’ to exploit ‘the practical meaning of objects’ rather than ‘savoring their 
appearance’ (CEC1: 27). Accordingly conceiving of the determinate negation of Inhalt which 
Greenberg describes as the fulcrum of the European modernist lineage, as constituting a 
distancing from or resistance to determinate judgements, then, indicates that Abstract 
Expressionism might be understood as opposing those social practices with which I showed 
the movement was deployed in conjunction, in no small part because of Greenberg’s positing 
of Abstract Expressionism at the telos of the European modernist lineage due to its 
determinate negation of Inhalt.48 
  Indeed, on Bernstein’s Adornian account, it is precisely in so far as modernist painting’s 
progress mirrors and parallels the historical progress by which US imperialism was 
legitimated, that Abstract Expressionism serves to indict capitalist reification. As I 
established above, the supposed objectivism of post-war US capitalism was founded on the 
notion that it realised the promise of the Enlightenment as humanity’s maturation. As such, 
                                                          
48 To read Greenberg’s criticism in this way, is to problematise Ian McClean’s conclusion in his 
‘Modernism and Marxism, Greenberg and Adorno’ (1988) that, contrary to Adorno, there is no critique of 
the Enlightenment in Greenberg’s modernism since he does not share the account of reification which the 
former inherited from Lukács (1988: 105). 
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we might say that its identifications in the interests of capital were understood as having 
achieved the displacement of myth’s false animistic identifications, whose demythologisation 
and disenchantment as nothing but anthropomorphic projection the Enlightenment set in 
motion. Bernstein notes that the ‘abstraction’ of abstract painting is analogous, in so far as it 
dispenses with the anthropomorphic projections of figurative art in favour of the medium-
specific elements enumerated above. As Greenberg put it, ‘the best visual art of our time is 
that which [...] has least to do with illusions’ (CEC2: 170). Yet, the ‘abstraction’ of this 
painting has radically different consequences than the abstraction of identity-thinking. The 
latter reverts to myth by delegitimising the particularity of both subjects and objects in 
accordance with capitalism’s (irrational) identifications and macrostructual authority. On the 
other hand, the ‘abstraction’ of abstract painting, and especially its apotheosis in Abstract 
Expressionism, results in artworks which ‘remain obstinately particulars that are not 
subsumable under any universal’ (AVB: 152). Hence, Bernstein contends, Abstract 
Expressionist works demonstrate that particulars can be ‘hypnotic objects of attention, apart 
from and in defiance of any form of identifying mechanism other than the one their sheer 
presence insinuates’ (Ibid). That is to say, we are unable to abstract from Abstract 
Expressionist artworks, except with respect to what our inability to abstract from them might 
mean. For Bernstein, to abstract from Abstract Expressionist artworks with respect to what 
our inability to abstract from them means, is to understand them as vehicles for ‘the 
demonstration of what is more than and beyond exchange’ (2010a: 213). In so far as we 
cannot reduce them to concepts without remainder, and yet they are nevertheless undeniably 
cognitively compelling, Abstract Expressionist artworks reveal that identity-thinking’s 
exchange of objects for concepts does not tell the whole story. On this account, Abstract 
Expressionist artworks have political significance precisely in so far as they are not 
discursively political. They do not criticise capitalism’s symptoms in the manner whose 
recuperability qua criticism I discussed in relation to Social Realism in Chapter 2. Instead, 
and here we might recall Greenberg’s insistence on the lineage of the easel picture, they resist 
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capitalism’s abstract medium of exchange-value homeopathically, by way of the fetish 
character of the commodity. That is, in so far as it is as commodities, free from the demands 
of ecclesiastical or courtly patronage, that artworks might ‘insist fetishistically on their 
coherence’ and thus ‘implicitly criticise the debasement of a situation evolving in the 
direction of a total exchange society in which everything is heteronomously defined’ (AT: 
226-8).49  
 While he does not draw the attendant epistemological and political implications, the Abstract 
Expressionists’ development in these terms is traced in the chapters on Newman, Rothko and 
Still in John Golding’s Paths to the Absolute, the artist and art historian’s 2000 survey of 
abstraction in twentieth-century painting. In these chapters, Golding details how all three 
painters negated figuration towards expressive particularity. Newman’s praxis prior to the 
realisation of the first zip painting, Onement I, in 1947, is discussed as a ‘very rational 
scraping bare of the pictorial status quo,’ with Golding instancing the 1946 work The 
Command (1946), in which Newman quite literally scraped a layer of oil paint from a canvas 
with the surrealist technique of grattage (2000: 191) (figs. 1 and 2). Newman recounts that he 
ultimately produced Onement I due to the revelation that previously he ‘had been emptying 
space instead of filling it.’ However, if anything, Onement I fills space by emptying it further. 
Whereas the erosion of oil paint on the surface of The Command bears the connotations of the 
wooden surface upon which it was scraped, Onement I arrests the spectator’s gaze with 
nothing but an almost implacable field of Indian red divided by a febrile line of cadmium red. 
Still’s development is similarly traced by Golding in terms of reduction qua fecundity. He 
                                                          
49 For good accounts of this dynamic, see Zuidervaart’s discussion of how, for Adorno, autonomous 
artworks are ‘defetishising fetishises’ (1991: 88), and Stewart Martin’s essay ‘The Absolute Artwork 
Meets the Absolute Commodity’ (2007). I owe the term ‘homeopathic’ in describing this dynamic to Anita 
Chari in her recent book A Political Economy of the Senses (2015). On this point, it might also be noted that 
Bernstein concedes to Clark that, due to this necessary entanglement with commodity fetishism, Abstract 
Expressionism’s claims for particularity must ‘transpire within the frame of petty bourgeois vulgarity, 
through canvases unable to rid themselves of the “telltale blemish” [Clark’s phrase] of tackiness and 
kitsch’ (AVB: 163). However, I do not think that this necessarily follows from an Adornian reading of 
Abstract Expressionism. Indeed, in marshalling Adorno to make this point, Bernstein cites his claim that 
works of art are ‘in fact absolute commodities in that they are a social product that has rejected every 
semblance of existing for society, a semblance to which commodities otherwise urgently cling’ (AT: 236). 
As we will see in Chapter 7, rather than tackiness being the price that artworks pay for this rejection, it is 
precisely when this rejection is rendered false by reification that it appears as kitsch. 
82 
 
puts it well when he writes that the artist’s negation of imagery gives way ‘to the independent 
life of the canvas, a self-subsisting entity’ (Ibid: 184). This is particularly clear in terms of the 
patches of canvas which Still leaves bare. In works such as PH-150 (1958) or PH-1140 
(1957) (figs. 3 and 4), to take two paintings which I have recently encountered, these patches 
seem less like a renunciation than an enunciation. Indeed, Still claimed that he did not ‘intend 
to oversimplify’ and instead revelled ‘in the extra-complex’ (qtd. in Golding 2000: 218). In 
the case of Rothko, Golding again describes a shift from figuration to abstraction in terms of 
‘scraping bare,’ pointing to Rothko’s adoption of wet techniques such as watercolour and 
gouache, for which ‘the paint dries in such a way as to allow the luminosity of the ground or 
support to be always apparent’ in paintings such as the 1944 work Slow Swirl at the Edge of 
the Sea (1944) (fig. 5) (161). Such paintings still portray figures in space, albeit with an 
indistinctness wherein both appear to ‘partake of the same washed substance or ether’ (162). 
Yet, Rothko proceeded to abandon the use of watercolours for runny oils, and developed a 
style in which ‘recognisable imagery had been suppressed,’ typified by the (posthumously 
titled) painting series Multiforms, for instance Untitled (1948) (fig. 6). Again, however, this 
negation affirms particularity: Golding cites Rothko’s much reproduced 1947 essay entitled 
‘The Romantics Were Prompted,’ in which Rothko describes the shapes in the Multiforms 
paintings as ‘organisms with volition and a passion for self-assertion’ which ‘move with 
internal freedom’ without conforming to ‘any particular visual experience’ or ‘what is 
probable in the familiar world’ (Ibid). 
  Both Golding’s comparison of Still’s canvases to autonomous entities, and Rothko’s 
likening of his artworks to organisms while emphasising their lack of representational 
content, chime with the way in which Adorno marshals the Kantian analogy of art and nature 
to argue that art reveals the blind spots of identity-thinking through the determinate negation 
of Inhalt. A fuller account of Kant in relation to the central concerns of my thesis must be 
postponed until we address Greenberg’s Kantianism in Chapter 8. However, suffice it here to 
establish that Bernstein rightly contends that Kant’s grammar of aesthetics registers the 
83 
 
fundamental dynamics of the lineage of art’s resistance to reification traced by Adorno, in so 
far as Kant delineates how, unlike determinate judgements which subsume things under 
concepts, ‘aesthetic reflective judgements begin with the individual thing prior to 
(independent of) conceptualization and inquire into its intrinsic intelligibility’ (Bernstein 
2014: 1070). For Kant, if artworks are to escape saturation by ends to the extent that they are 
suitable for aesthetic appraisal in this sense, they must resemble nature. This is because, Kant 
claims, while natural things invite reflective judgements because they are free from 
conceptual determination, art is created through ‘a determinate intention to produce 
something’ (1987: 174). Accordingly, the latter need resemble the former if its standard is to 
be the reflective power of judgement. Thus, Adorno stresses that ‘the Kantian conception of a 
teleology of art modeled on that of organisms’ finds its truth in the way in which ‘artworks 
escape myth, the blind and abstractly dominating nexus of nature’ (AT: 140). Even in Kant, 
for whom there was no question of whether one could have an unmediated experience of 
natural beauty, it is unclear precisely what is meant when he asserts that ‘fine art must have 
the look of nature’ (1987: 174). However, as Rothko claims that the shapes in his Multiforms 
paintings do not represent the natural world as we know it, and yet are akin to the self-
organisation of natural things, Adorno contends that in the age of natural beauty’s total 
mediatedness – ‘its critical edge blunted and subsumed to the exchange relation such as is 
represented in the phrase “tourist industry”’ (AT: 68) – it is artworks which abjure the effort 
to recreate nature vis-à-vis Inhalt, which approach nature vis-à-vis Gehalt: 
The more strictly artworks abstain from rank natural growth and the replication of 
nature, the more the successful ones approach nature. Aesthetic objectivity, the 
reflection of the being-in-itself of nature, realizes the subjective teleological element 
of unity; exclusively thereby do artworks become comparable to nature. In contrast, 
all particular similarity of art to nature is accidental, inert, and for the most part 
foreign to art. (AT: 77) 
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For Adorno, in its ostensible autotelism, such art speaks ‘according to the model of a 
nonconceptual, nonrigidified significative language’ which he aligns with the ‘language that 
is inscribed in what the sentimental age gave the beautiful if threadbare name, “The Book of 
Nature”’ (AT: 67). By claiming autonomous art has a language and likening it to the archaic 
religious concept of “The Book of Nature” – which in the Latin Middle Ages referred to 
nature, as opposed to scripture, as a source of divine revelation50 – Adorno is positing that, 
unlike extra-aesthetic natural beauty, which is by now identified solely in terms that serve 
nature’s domination in reproducing the status quo, autonomous art provides an experience 
akin to natural beauty as it was theologically conceived: as the expression of something not 
made by humankind, which thus speaks a language that is undeniably significative but 
nevertheless cannot be subsumed by current concepts and detached from its particularity. 
  The Abstract Expressionists certainly often characterised their work as unparaphraseably 
linguistic. Hofmann, for example, claims that he speaks ‘through paint – not through words’ 
(1971: 84). Joan Mitchell asserts that it ‘seems very clear what [her painting] means’ in a way 
which she cannot iterate, but ‘the painting makes [...] clear’ (2012: 33). Motherwell claims 
that Abstract Expressionism is devoted to ‘a language of painting rather than the prevailing 
visions of man’ (1992: 81). And, while Kline repudiated the oft-made connection between his 
art and Japanese calligraphy,51 he was nevertheless reportedly influenced by his fellow 
Abstract Expressionist Bradley Walker Tomlin because the latter’s painting illuminated ‘how 
individual brush-strokes could come together to form powerful graphic signs without losing 
their character as painterly marks,’ informing his own compositions which he characterized 
as comprising of signs ‘you can’t read’ (Karmel 2007: 106; Kline qtd. in Anfam 2016: 46). 
Their critics and interlocutors, too, often alight upon this quality in their work. Harold 
Rosenberg, for instance, claims that Gottlieb’s paintings are separated from the (disenchanted 
                                                          
50 In his European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (1953), Ernst Robert Curtius gives a good précis of 
this concept, citing the occultist Paracelsus, who opposed nature to written books, as the book "which God 
himself promulgated, wrote, set forth, and composed." (2013: 232) 
 
51 In 1962, for instance, Kline stated ‘I don’t think of my work as calligraphic’ (qtd. in Lieberman 1981: 
64). 
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and reified) ‘universe of things’ by an ‘irreducible plus’ which is nonetheless inextricable 
from their ‘colour, texture, shape, and scale’ (1969: 192). And he characterises Newman’s 
aforementioned Onement I as ‘a pictorial statement that is absolute in itself, that is to say, that 
[...] is untranslateable into theoretical or associational references’ (1979: 49). In a series of 
paintings from 1946 to 1950 grouped as hieroglyphic which comprise tightly gridded 
characters, Lee Krasner almost thematises these dynamics, although not quite since these 
works are not reducible to illustration; still hold attention solely by virtue of their 
particularity. A work such as Untitled (1948) (fig. 7) is undeniably akin to ancient picture 
writing, and yet one cannot imagine its lines of white oil pant which snake across its surface, 
at once sinuous and rigid, standing for anything other than themselves, even while one cannot 
do justice to the painting by simply enumerating its material qualities. In her account of these 
paintings, Barbara Rose hits on the way in which they seem non-instrumentally significative 
when she asserts that ‘they hint at a dimension of metaphor’ but are ‘unquestionably non-
objective works,’ resembling ‘ancient script’ in a way which ‘can neither be confused with 
rebuses nor literally interpreted’ (1983: 58-61). 
  However, the idea that Greenberg’s valorisation of medium-specificity is in fact a defence 
of Abstract Expressionism’s significative but nonsignifying language, is not an impression 
one would receive from the way in which his ‘formalism’ is broadly understood. Greenberg’s 
project is often characterised as one of conceptual identification, which extirpates a work’s 
enigmaticalness through analysis of its properties, as typified by Boris Groys’s recent 
assertion that for Greenberg the ‘ideal spectator of avant-garde art is less interested in it as a 
source of aesthetic delectation than as the source of knowledge, of information about art 
production, its devices, its media and its techniques’ (2016: 108).52 Certainly, as we have 
                                                          
52 It might be noted that for Groys, this is a mode of reception befitting Abstract Expressionism. He 
acknowledges that the works seem to suggest ‘a silent message, a particular intention to say something’ 
(2012: 220). However, rather than understanding this silent message as confounding prevailing concepts, 
he asserts that to understand Abstract Expressionism as showing ‘above all the concealed material 
properties of its medium’ bears ‘in mind the picture’s desire to speak’ allowing modern painting ‘to 
convey messages – perhaps not the messages of the world outside, but in any case the messages of its 
own material medium’ (Ibid: 225-6). 
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seen, Greenberg continually proclaims the Abstract Expressionists’ superiority with recourse 
to the way in which their work makes evident the medium-specific elements of a painting. 
Yet, I have also acknowledged that for Greenberg this medium-specificity is not compelling 
to the extent that it is illustrative or programmatic. Contrarily, art generally seems to receive 
his praise in so far as it bears a distinct sense of meaning which nevertheless eludes the 
prevailing form of cognition – ‘resting on rationality but without permitting itself to be 
rationalised’ (CEC2: 168) – and he often formulates this precisely in terms of how artworks 
which renounce communication are comparable to language. As Bernstein notes, this is 
evident in Greenberg’s construal of Pollock’s Cathedral as a ‘baroque scrawl’ (AVB: 157). 
We might also point to how Greenberg refers to Motherwell’s painting as ‘handwriting’ 
(CEC2: 241); lauds David Smith for his ability to ‘say everything he has to say with the 
maximum of economy’ (CEC2: 141); chides Gottlieb for repeating ‘phrases of a single 
statement’ rather than taxing himself to ‘say more’ (Ibid: 189); and in 1962 claims that that 
the New York School’s turn towards abstraction occurred because the artists ‘could see no 
other way in which to go in order to say something [...] worth saying’ (CEC4: 121). Despite 
his rhetoric implying intentionality, it would be a mistake to understand Greenberg as 
conceiving of these enunciations as reducible to the painters’ autobiographical lyricism: For 
Greenberg, as for Adorno, the language of modernist art is akin to the language of nature as 
something which is not made by human beings: 
something valid solely on its own terms, in the way nature itself is valid, in the way a 
landscape – not its picture – is aesthetically valid, something given, increate, 
independent of meanings, similars or originals. (CEC1: 8)53 
Indeed, in 1947 Greenberg characterises Motherwell’s painting in precisely the same way in 
which I showed above Golding retrospectively characterises the development of Still, Rothko 
                                                          
53 See also his 1949 essay, ‘The Role of Nature in Modern Painting’ (CEC2: 271-275). Indeed, in a 1946 
review of a book by A. Philip McMahon entitled Preface to an American Philosophy of Art, Greenberg takes 
the author to task for misunderstanding Kant’s analogy between art and nature as legislating that art 
pictorially represent nature, rather than bearing its intrinsic purposiveness, writing that ‘art, although it 
must look as though it came from nature, does not have to resemble any of the content of nature, anything 
already present in it’ (CEC2: 66) 
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and Newman, when he writes that ‘Motherwell’s ambition, which is to simplify and to 
manipulate the results of the simplification into expression, is one that places him at the very 
centre of all that is serious and ambitious in contemporary painting’ (CEC2: 152). Following 
Bernstein, I contended above that we might understand this development as an extirpation of 
anthropomorphic projection in favour of particularity which counters identity-thinking’s 
extirpation of anthropomorphic projection in favour of reified value. However, I think that 
the linguistic quality of Abstract Expressionism’s particularity is perhaps best illustrated by 
anthropomorphically projecting onto Motherwell’s Wall Painting No. III (1953) (fig. 8) as 
follows: A black diamond shape at the far right of the canvas seems to be whispering 
something to the black vertical to its left, which in turn curves away from it, relaying the 
message to two other verticals, the second of which, voluminous with anticipation, finally 
delivers this message to an implacable black strip on the far left. As the final destination of 
the small diamond’s message, this strip seems pregnant with meaning, but this meaning 
appears as that which is not ‘interpolated human intention’ (AT: 78). This meaning may not 
be intelligible in terms of ‘current concepts and contexts,’ but because it nevertheless 
undeniably means, its unintelligibility serves to render the ‘usual intelligibility’ of these 
contexts and concepts ‘suspect as being shallow, habitual, reified’ (Adorno, 1992: 95). To 
understand Abstract Expressionist canvases as ‘syntactically articulated in themselves’ in this 
way (AT: 140), and thus, in spite of their discursive intransigence, ‘bindingly eloquent’ (AT: 
143), is to understand them as ‘at once completely enigmatic and totally evident’ (AT: 122). 
The fact that, when pressed by Barr to categorise themselves, three of the painters suggested 
the terms ‘“direct,” “concrete,” and “self-evident”’ does not mean that ‘these artists did not 
want to leave critics and historians any specific clues about the meaning of Abstract 
Expressionist painting,’ as Annette Cox claims (1). Instead, the enigmaticalness of the 
paintings’ unparaphrasable self-evidence – their semblance of being-in-itself in a world 
where everything is heteronomously defined – is the meaning of Abstract Expressionism. It is 
this which must be comprehended in what Adorno refers to as second reflection: 
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The truth of the new, as the truth of what is not already used up, is situated in the 
intentionless. This sets truth in opposition to reflection […] and raises reflection to a 
second order, to second reflection. It is the opposite of its usual philosophical concept, 
as it is used, for instance, in Schiller's doctrine of sentimental poetry, where reflection 
means burdening artworks down with intentions. Second reflection lays hold of the 
technical procedures, the language of the artwork in the broadest sense, but it aims at 
blindness. (AT: 27) 54 
Laying hold of technical procedures, then, is not a case of treating art as a source of 
information about art production, but rather of apprehending an artwork in its 
enigmaticalness. Because it is totally evident, this enigmaticalness cannot be dispelled by 
hermeneutical solution, ‘only its form can be deciphered’ (AT: 122). To decipher its form, is 
to understand it as an indictment of the reigning (real) abstractions according to which the 
status quo is reproduced in the interest of private profit irrespective of the cost for repressed 
nature. That is to say, second reflection gives ‘[i]nsight into the constitutive character of the 
nonconceptual in the concept’ and thus ends, if only in semblance, ‘the compulsive 
identification which the concept brings unless halted by such reflection’ (ND: 12). To 
conceive of Abstract Expressionism in this way is also to oppose the widespread cliché that 
the artworks’ taciturnity renders them ‘open to interpretation’ in the sense of being tabula 
rasae whose meanings await spectators’ projections, all of which are supposedly equally as 
valid.55 A variant of the latter assumption sometimes animates the revisionist historians, when 
they contend that the artworks’ ‘neutrality’ rendered them ‘peculiarly vulnerable to 
penetration by prevailing ideological trends’ (Fuller 1990: 176). The Shapiros, for example, 
claim that ‘[i]t is ironic [...] that an apolitical art that arose at least in part as a reaction to 
                                                          
54 Here, as will become important in Chapter 9, we might note a parallel with what Merleau-Ponty refers 
to as the ‘hyperreflection’ of painting, that is, ‘an interrogative mood that remains sensitive to the silence 
of what cannot be said’ (PP: 46). 
 
55 See Donald Kuspit’s essay ‘Symbolic Pregnance in Mark Rothko and Clyfford Still’ (1978)For the most 
sophisticated iteration of the notion that Abstract Expressionist canvases bear an ‘completely arbitrary 
power of suggestion’ (2005: 373). 
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didactic art, as an “art-for-art’s-sake” antidote to “art-as-a-weapon,” should have become the 
prime political weapon’ (1985: 148). And Guilbaut inconsistently makes this argument, at 
one point asserting that Abstract Expressionists’ avoidance of ‘direct political engagement’ 
allowed their art to be ‘re-worked, re-ideologised into the service of a cause not always in 
accord with their aspirations’ (1990: 36-37).56 Certainly, as Adorno writes of art which does 
not accommodate itself ‘to sedimented subjective modes of response,’ Abstract 
Expressionism’s emphatic resistance to paraphraseability means it ‘lays itself open to the 
universal objection of subjective arbitrariness’ (1992: 95). However, as Kirk Varndoe writes 
in reference to Pollock, Abstract Expressionist artworks are undeniably more than ‘the 
various fabulations’ which they spawned, and thus ‘no matter how daunting the store of 
verbiage on art, there is always – if the subject is indeed art – a great deal (sometimes the 
core) left over, and only learnable first hand’ (1998: 19; 77). That is, to conceive of the 
paintings’ ostensible opacity, and thus lack of political tendentiousness, as meaning in excess 
of conceptuality, is to stress cognition’s (reciprocal) dependence on its object, rather than the 
self-sufficiency of signification. As I have already established, the identifications by which 
Abstract Expressionism was deployed in the service of US imperialism were not arbitrary 
ascriptions; its co-optation was instead underwritten by figuring as progress the very 
determinate negation driving the artworks’ legitimation of particularity. Indeed, at one point 
in Arnason’s catalogue essay for Vanguard American Painting he praises Abstract 
Expressionism in terms akin to, if more inchoate than, the way I have delineated this 
legitimation thus far, extolling the artworks’ ‘sense of symbolic content achieved through 
dramatic statement of isolated and highly simplified elements,’ a ‘sense of “presence”’ which 
he asserts ‘could be described as an “image” in the context of an abstract symbol rather than 
as a reflection or imitation of anything in nature’ (n. pag.). However, in the following 
chapters I will show that, overwhelmingly, if Abstract Expressionism was promoted by US 
                                                          
56 As both Leja and Kimmelman note, throughout his work Guilbaut vacillates between claiming that 
Abstract Expressionist artworks were ideologically coterminous with the interests of the US ruling class, 
and claiming that their ‘sheer ambiguity’ lent them to co-optation by the same interests (Leja, 47; 
Kimmelman, 2000: 296). 
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imperialism in terms of its resistance to dominant rationality, it was in the sense of a 
‘spurious irrational enclave,’ which does not obviate the way in which it nevertheless 
provides ‘the truth of society insofar as in its most authentic products the irrationality of the 
rational world order is expressed’ (AT: 84).  In the next chapter, I will elaborate how Abstract 
Expressionism was deployed as such an irrational enclave via an immanent critique of David 
Craven’s critique of the revisionist historians. Craven suggests we might turn to the 
contemporaneous writing of Meyer Schapiro to recover Abstract Expressionism’s radicalism. 
However, I will show that Schapiro’s account of the works conceptually subsumes their 
irrationality in a way which was amenable to a US establishment eager to convince the 
people of Europe that freedom flourished under capitalist democracy. I will then in Chapter 7 
return to Greenberg in order to further elaborate how, conversely, his criticism indicates how 
the supposed irrationality of Abstract Expressionism, by way of its immanent rationality, 
reveals and points beyond the irrationality of the rational world order. 
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Chapter Seven 
Subjective Sovereignty and Social Democracy 
 
  That the Abstract Expressionists’ (often, as we saw in Chapter 2, politically motivated) 
determinate negation of representational content bears affinity with Adorno’s aesthetic theory 
is acknowledged in passing by David Craven as part of his truculent opposition to the 
revisionist historians’ account of the movement, when he asserts that ‘the fact that the work 
of [...] the Abstract Expressionists was often about negations’ means ‘Adorno’s concept of 
progressive art [...] was closer to the position of the Abstract Expressionists than was the [...] 
conception of modernism codified by Greenberg’ (ACC: 75). In the previous chapter, 
following Bernstein, I contended that Greenberg’s account of the role of negation in the 
artists’ praxis indicates how we might understand Abstract Expressionism as combating 
societal abstraction in an Adornian sense. However, Craven is utterly opposed to Greenberg’s 
conception of Abstract Expressionism, which he wholly assimilates with the interests of post-
war US capitalism. Despite claiming that he does not wish to ‘argue that we have nothing left 
to learn from […] orthodox formalists like Greenberg’ (1996: 30), Craven seems to find little 
to salvage from Greenberg’s theory. His antipathy towards Greenberg is premised not only on 
the way in which, as I explored in Chapter 4, Greenberg’s positioning of Abstract 
Expressionism at the pinnacle of European Modernism lent itself to US triumphalism, but 
also on the capitulation and adaptation to the status quo supposedly implied by Greenberg’s 
self-proclaimed ‘positivism.’ While a fuller consideration of the latter will concern us in 
Chapter 8, it will suffice here to establish that Craven contends that the fact that Greenberg 
founds his critical apparatus in ‘medium self-criticism,’ means that he frames Abstract 
Expressionist praxis in terms which utterly obviate its asymmetry with dominant ideology.57 
                                                          
57 It should be noted that Craven claims that he is not recovering this asymmetry in order to supplant the 
revisionists’ account, but to establish that ‘the signification of Abstract Expressionism involves an uneasy 
nexus of competing ideological values as well as aesthetic concerns, none of which enjoys absolute sway 
or unchecked sovereignty’ (ACC: 3). In this, then, he ostensibly converges with the revisionists when, as I 
noted in the previous chapter, they argue it is precisely the arbitrariness of Abstract Expressionism’s 
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  According to Craven, Greenberg understands Abstract Expressionist praxis as ‘the 
consequence of predetermined formal problems,’ and inherent to this ‘technocratic view of 
modernism’ is an ‘automatic, even doctrinal, political conformity’ (ACC: 147-8). Following 
Leo Steinberg and Casey Blake, Craven contends that Greenberg’s supposedly dogmatic 
injunctions for the production of art commanded adherence to artistic laws in a manner which 
is fundamentally akin to the way in which capitalism enforces conformism. Drawing parallels 
between what they see as the prescriptiveness of Greenberg’s medium-specificity and the 
dictates of the contemporaneous Taylorist workplace, these critics claim that ‘Greenberg 
redefined the relationships between critic and artist […] along lines parallel to the industrial 
division of labor between administrator and worker’ (Blake 1981: 42). For these critics, 
Greenberg took on the role of determining fixed criteria for the creation of art. Now, many of 
Greenberg’s (postmodern) critics of the ‘70s and ‘80s level similar accusations against 
Greenberg, in so far as his theory supposedly debarred or denigrated practices which could 
not ‘be discussed within the high-Modernist paradigm,’ as Craig Owens put it (1994: 299). 
However, because for such postmodern critics the practices which could be discussed with 
this paradigm are coterminous with it – for Owens, ‘Modernism had meant what Greenberg 
had said it meant’ (Ibid) – these critics are inclined to indict the artworks Greenberg 
championed as according to these dynamics. On the other hand, central to Craven’s project is 
of course the thesis that Abstract Expressionism is not selfsame with Greenberg’s account of 
it. That is, following Steinberg, Craven’s indictment ‘relates less to the pictures themselves 
than to the critical apparatus that deals with them,’ on the assumption that ‘there is obviously 
no affinity for industrialism in Pollock’ (Steinberg 1972: 79-80).58  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
arbitrary signification which allowed it to be co-opted. As Annika Marie puts it, Craven’s ‘methodological 
commitments to the dialogical nature of art, to the sign as polyvalent and paradoxical’ draws ‘near to an 
attitude of liberal inclusiveness by which the playfully unruly sign or artifact steps over into a 
meaningless plurality’ (2006: 19-20). However, despite Craven’s methodological claims, I think his 
argument itself betrays his partisanship in favour of the notion that Abstract Expressionism was 
politically subversive, and conviction that its co-optation entailed an ideological distortion of this 
significance. 
58 While Steinberg says the same of Morris Louis, he also claims that industrialisam characterises ‘an 
important aspect’ of Louis’s work, in so far as Louis’s stripe paintings ‘embody, beyond the subtlety of 
their color, principles of efficiency, speed, and machine-tooled precision which [...] tend to associate 
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  As a better conceptual framework for understanding the challenge posed to the status quo by 
Abstract Expressionism’s determinate negation, Craven suggests that of the, in his words, 
‘largely underappreciated’ art historian Meyer Schapiro (ACC: 8).59 Like Greenberg, 
Schapiro was personally close to many of the artists.60 Unlike Greenberg, though, while 
Schapiro’s practicable politics shifted from revolutionary to democratic socialism, Schapiro 
never denounced Marxism (see Wald 1987: 217), and Craven argues that the political horizon 
of communism persists in Schapiro’s account of Abstract Expressionism, in so far as it 
illuminates how the movement prefigured disalienation. Drawing mainly from Schapiro’s 
1957 essay ‘The Liberating Quality of Abstract Painting,’ which Craven identifies as 
‘probably the single most incisive assessment written about the New York School by anyone 
in this period,’ Craven posits that Schapiro shows how Abstract Expressionism served ‘as an 
immanent critique from within of the overall logic and attendant ideological values of the 
corporate capitalist mode of production’ (ACC: 34). On Craven’s account, Schapiro’s 
characterization of Abstract Expressionist artworks as hand-made manifestations of the 
artists’ interiorities aligns the artworks with the possibility of political self-determination 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
themelves with the output of industry more than of art’ (1972: 80). However, writers have argued that 
Pollock, also, bears direct affinity with Taylorism. Caroline A. Jones, for instance, claims that, rather than 
the genteel playfulness of Surrealist automatism – ‘stimulant to the invention of motifs that could then be 
transferred to cabinet pictures or personal poems’ – the repetitive automatism of Pollock ‘was closer to 
automation’ (EA: 232). For Jones, the ‘sweeping records’ of Pollock’s movements replicate ‘the internal 
discipline and external body techniques of an industrial line worker [...it is] a canvas produced by the 
large-motor labour of a body disciplined to repeat itself’ (EA: 233). Clark has also made this comparison, 
describing Pollock moving ‘up and down his canvas like a proletarian keeping pace with an assembly line’ 
(1999b: 29). This is a thesis interrogated extensively by the art historian Barbara Jaffee, who in her article 
‘Jackson Pollock’s Industrial Expressionism’ (2004) traces a genealogy of standardised art training from 
the Civil War to Benton’s ‘Mechanics,’ to argue that ‘produced under the standardizing imperative of 
industrialism, Pollock’s work is more like work-ordinary work-than art history has been able to 
acknowledge’ (79). 
 
59 Craven is not wrong to claim that Schapiro is underappreciated. Schapiro is often referenced for his 
part in a debate with Heidegger, and subsequently Derrida, concerning the former’s discussion of Van 
Gogh’s painting of a pair of peasant shoes. However, despite Craven going some way to rectifying the 
situation when he edited a 1994 issue of Oxford Art Journal dedicated to Schapiro, very little secondary 
literature has been written directly on Schapiro. Of what exists, a 2007 doctoral thesis on Schapiro by 
Cynthia L. Persinger entitled ‘The Politics of Style: Meyer Schapiro and the Crisis of Meaning in Art 
History’ provides a good bibliography. 
 
60 Craven draws attention to Schapiro’s conviviality with all first generation Abstract Expressionists, 
especially de Kooning, and role as teacher to Reinhardt in the ‘30s, and Mitchell, Hartigan and 
Frankenthaler in the ‘50s (ACC: 34). 
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through workers’ control,61 and thus ‘the unrealised potential inherent in capitalism’ (ACC: 
39). However, in what follows I want to argue that Schapiro’s account of Abstract 
Expressionist praxis as disalienated lends itself to the hypostasisation of the artworks as 
disengaged private expression, which, as I indicated in Chapter 4 and will explore further 
below, served their neutralization in the interests of dominant rationality. Moreover, in 
Chapter 7 I will contend that to oppose Greenberg’s model of Abstract Expressionist praxis 
with Schapiro’s on the basis that the latter deems Abstract Expressionist praxis to be wholly 
determined by the artist qua autonomous subject, while the former characterises the Abstract 
Expressionist artist (of ‘quality’) as bound by heteronomous dictates, is to miss the rational 
kernel in Greenberg’s account. That is, because these supposed dictates indicate how Abstract 
Expressionist praxis lends its materials binding expression as according to these materials’ 
immanent logic, rather than subordinating these materials to subjective expression. This, 
then, lodges a claim for particularity against dominant rationality by means of rationality, 
which in turn, as I will argue in following chapters, prefigures genuine autonomous life all 
the more, by returning experience emphatically to the subject. 
  Like Greenberg, Schapiro was a friend of Adorno during the latter’s time in America,62 and 
in ‘The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art,’ it is ostensibly in similar terms that he lauds 
the resistance to full discursivity of Abstract Expressionist artworks in the face of the total 
administration of ‘a world of social relationships that is impersonal, calculated and controlled 
in its elements’ (MA: 223). Schapiro writes that the ‘media of communication which include 
the newspaper, the magazine, the radio and TV’ aim ‘at a maximum efficiency through 
methods that ensure the attention of the listener or viewer by setting up the appropriate 
reproducible stimuli that will work for everyone and promote the acceptance of the message’ 
                                                          
61 In making this analogue, Craven repeatedly draws attention to Schapiro’s close acquaintance with the 
council communist Paul Mattick (ACC: 74; 167). 
62 Schapiro says in conversation with Craven, ‘Adorno and I were close [from 1938 to 1941]. I saw him 
constantly and he was very friendly with me’ (177). Adorno, for his part, in letters to Benjamin in 1938 
repeatedly urged his friend, who was at the time hoping to make his way to New York, to meet with 
Schapiro, stating that the latter was ‘in general [...] a well-informed and intellectually imaginative man’ 
and ‘at home in the same cultural climate’ as he and Benjamin were (2001: 271). 
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(Ibid). Abstract Expressionist artworks, on the other hand, rid themselves of communicative 
means in resistance of this all-powerful system of communication: 
[W]hat makes painting and sculpture so interesting in our time is their high degree of 
non-communication. You cannot extract a message from painting by ordinary means; 
the usual rules of communication do not hold here, there is no clear code or fixed 
vocabulary, no certainty of effect in a given time of transmission or exposure. 
Painting, by becoming abstract and giving up its representational function, has 
achieved a state in which communication seems to be deliberately prevented (Ibid). 
As I explored in Chapter 2 was certainly the case for many of the Abstract Expressionists, 
then, Schapiro’s account of Abstract Expressionism rests on the assumption that the artists’ 
determinate negation of Inhalt ‘implies a criticism of the accepted contents of the preceding 
representations as ideal values or life interests’ (MA: 217). In Chapters 3 and 4, I showed that 
this negation of representations, in positioning Abstract Expressionism as the latest 
instantiation of European Modernism, resulted in works which were co-opted to serve the 
worldwide imposition of norms favourable to US capital. However, in Chapter 5, following 
Bernstein’s Adornian account of Abstract Expressionism, I argued that the same negation of 
representations meant the artworks confound the identity-thinking attendant to these norms, 
objectivating the being-in-itself of nature in a world where all natural beauty is mediated by 
capital. For Schapiro, however, the Abstract Expressionists’ negation of nature in 
representation – ‘giving up landscape’ as he puts it – was simply its renunciation, signaling 
that the artists no longer believed ‘that nature can serve a model of harmony for man’ (MA: 
217). Instead, for Schapiro Abstract Expressionist artworks challenge identity-thinking by 
turning to ‘problems, situations and experience’ centred upon ‘the exploration of the self’ 
(Ibid). In this spirit, Schapiro champions Abstract Expressionism in its having ‘become more 
deeply personal, more intimate, more concerned with experience of a subtle kind’ (MA: 213). 
For Schapiro, ‘the intrinsic power’ of Abstract Expressionism’s forms, colours and lines is 
due to their being ‘feeling-charged’ (MA: 215). Abstract Expressionist artworks issue 
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‘entirely from the hands and mind’ of their artists, and thus, if the artworks ‘do not 
communicate they induce an attitude of communion and contemplation […] with the work of 
another human being, the sensing of another’s perfected feeling and imagination’ (MA: 224). 
As an active Trotskyist in the ‘30s, Schapiro was likely informed by Trotsky’s Partisan 
Review essays. We saw in Chapter 1 that, for the Trotsky of ‘Art and Politics in our Epoch’ 
and ‘Towards a Free Revolutionary Art,’ art is inherently on the side of revolution if it 
negates heteronomous dictates in dedication to its ‘own laws.’ I acknowledged that, for 
Trotsky, decisive for this is how such ostensible autotelism in art in fact concerns unmet 
human needs. While I will address this more fully in Chapter 9, suffice it here to note that for 
Schapiro this is the case in so far as modern art is ‘a liberator of human feeling from social 
and cultural repressions’ (Berman 1999: 225). Whereas in the previous chapter I sketched out 
the case that the power of Abstract Expressionist artworks’ nonfigurative forms lies precisely 
in the way that they appear as a language without semiosis, Gerardo Mosquera has referred to 
Schapiro’s ‘linkage of the non-figurative with [...] the interior world of the individual’ as ‘a 
semiology of the nonfigurative’ (1994: 78). For Schapiro, figurative content is not negated 
towards the affirmation of medium-specificity – however its significance is conceived – but 
the ‘affirmation of the self […] against devalued social norms,’ and Abstract Expressionist 
artworks are accordingly championed to the extent that, as ‘hand-made personal objects,’ 
they ‘represent’ their creator, in contrast with commodities produced by alienated labour 
(MA: 217). Referring readers to Pollock’s No. 26A: Black and White (1948), Schapiro writes 
that, whereas in industry ‘accident is that event which destroys an order, interrupts a regular 
process and must be eliminated,’ Pollock’s willingness to allow the ‘random or accidental’ to 
provide the germ of his paintings’ order manifests ‘a feeling of freedom’ (MA: 221). In the 
next chapter, I will elaborate how Pollock’s praxis thus entails a dialectic of construction and 
mimesis, its rationality developing in reciprocity with its materials. For Schapiro, however, 
this dynamic is to be interpreted as manifesting the artist’s ‘liberty in [a] striking way,’ in 
protest at ‘a culture […] increasingly organized through industry, economy and the state’ 
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(MA: 222). He contends that Abstract Expressionist artworks call up ‘more intensely than 
ever before the painter at work, his touch, his vitality and mood, the drama of decision in the 
ongoing process of art. Here the subject becomes tangible’ (MA: 229). 
  The contrast between Schapiro’s account of Abstract Expressionism and the Adornian 
approach sketched out in the previous chapter is clear if we compare the following two 
passages, from Adorno and Schapiro respectively: 
[T]he question of the meaning of life. […a]ll but inevitably […] will fetch the answer 
that life makes whatever sense the questioner gives it. Not even a Marxism debased to 
an official creed will say much else, as witness the late Lukács. But the answer is 
false. The concept of meaning involves an objectivity beyond all “making”: a sense 
that is “made” is already fictitious. It duplicates the subject, however collective, and 
defrauds it of what it seemingly granted. (ND: 376) 
 
What is a fact? According to most languages, it is a product of labour. Consider the 
word for fact in German, 'Tatsache' – which means 'thing done' – in French, 'fait' – 
which means 'made' – or even the Latin base for the English word 'fact' – which is the 
word 'factum' and is related to manufacture, which means 'made by hand' [...] What is 
the truth? The truth is what is made. (Schapiro qtd. in Craven, 1994: 43) 
Following Bernstein, I suggested that Greenberg’s supposed formalist judgements, are in fact 
indicative of the way in which Abstract Expressionism expresses meaning in the terms of 
Adorno’s above quote; as an objectivity beyond all ‘making,’ resisting full discursivity and 
thus negating dominant rationality’s negation of nonidentity. Schapiro, on the other hand, 
was frustrated by Greenberg’s criticism – in his words, the critic’s ‘dogmatic formalism […] 
his refusal to grant artistic intention […] any place in his analysis’ (ACC: 42) – precisely 
because for Schapiro Abstract Expressionism’s negation of the prevailing negation of 
nonidentity occurs very definitively by way of ‘making,’ as the artist supposedly duplicates 
their unreduced subjectivity through labour upon their object.  
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  Tellingly, whereas Craven aligns Schapiro with Engels’s claim that ‘[l]abour […] is the 
prime basic condition for all human existence’ (ACC: 67), Adorno often refers to Marx’s 
dictum in Critique of the Gotha Programme that ‘Labour is not the source of all wealth. 
Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth 
consists!) as labour’ (1960: 11).63 For Adorno, while labour is the substance of exchange-
value, art can only ‘stand in for […] stunted use-value’ if it gives that which is repressed by 
labour its due, and accordingly aligns itself with ‘[n]ature, no longer oppressed by spirit’ and 
freed ‘from the miserable nexus of rank second nature and subjective sovereignty’ (AT: 227; 
197). For Schapiro, on the other hand, it is precisely by way of nature’s subjugation to ‘the 
sovereignty of the artist’s mind […] in the capacity to impose new forms on nature […] 
corresponding to subtle states of mind’ that abstract art performs a similar role (MA: 196).64 
Indeed, Schapiro cautions that Abstract Expressionist paintings’ capacity to ‘bring us closer 
to the activity of the artist’ is what becomes eclipsed by exchange-value, as ‘[t]he enormous 
importance given to a work of art as a precious object which is advertised and known in 
connection with its price […] stamps the painting as an object of speculation, confusing the 
values of art’ (MA: 224). Of course, the subsumption of artworks’ particularity by exchange-
value is also of paramount concern for Adorno. He posits that the dominance of exchange-
value has caused a ‘regression’ in consumption, whereby attention is tendentiously blinded to 
artworks’ actual qualities, and instead fixates upon the pseudo-uniqueness of an artwork’s 
                                                          
63 In Negative Dialectics, for example, Adorno cites this claim by Marx in order to argue that labour cannot 
be ‘hypostatized in any form, neither in the form of diligent hands nor in that of mental production. Such 
hypostasis merely extends the illusion of the predominance of the productive principle’ (ND: 177-8). As 
Jay notes, in this Adorno is positing that vulgar Marxism ‘merely repeats the subject’s domination of the 
object’ (1984a: 68). Moreover, as Jarvis writes, Adorno is here reminding us that Marx does not offer us ‘a  
theory of how use values are produced,’ but rather an account of the systematic illusion that exchange-
values are inherent to commodities, the intention of which is to undo this illusion without recourse to an 
‘immediate and dogmatic ontology of nature’ (2004: 92). 
 
64 This claim was made not in ‘The Liberating Quality’ but in ‘The Nature of Abstract Art,’ an essay 
published in Marxist Quarterly in 1937 in which he prefigures many of the ideas he would elaborate in 
‘The Liberating Quality’ twenty years later. 
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‘exhibition-value,’ which Adorno terms ‘an imago of the exchange process’ (AT: 45).65 
However, he contends that this exhibition-value is often precisely the notion that the artwork 
brings us closer to the activity of the artist. Citing the examples of ‘films about Rembrandt 
[and] Toulouse-Lautrec,’ he asserts that the reduction of artworks to the psychology of the 
creative artist promotes ‘the neutralising transformation of cultural artifacts into 
commodities’ (1984: 154). Yet, ‘the feelings of the author’ which are thus ‘purportedly [...] to 
be [...] relived in the work,’ are ‘only a partial element in works and certainly not the decisive 
one’ (AT: 244), and the ‘person who stands behind the work’ back into whom ‘the objectivity 
of artworks’ is translated ‘is usually only the character mask of those who want to promote 
the work as an article of consumption’ (AT: 170). This dynamic is certainly true of Abstract 
Expressionist works, in whose popularisation as their artists’ personal expression Hans 
Namuth’s widely distributed 1950 documentary film of Pollock painting played a significant 
role. As Caroline A. Jones explores at length in the opening chapters of her Machine in the 
Studio (1996), the notion that Abstract Expressionist artworks represented their artists’ 
interiorities has been central in their circulation in the market and mass culture, ‘where the 
construction of authorship is crucial to commodity exchange’ (2ff). Or, as one of the Abstract 
Expressionist artists themselves, Elaine de Kooning, writes, the ‘trace of the personal’ in the 
artworks, which for her ‘invites false values,’ was ‘much prized by hucksters’ (1994: 203). 
That the concept of autobiographical lyricism is still central to Abstract Expressionism’s 
exhibition-value was particularly clear in the 2016 exhibition Abstract Expressionism at the 
Royal Academy of Arts in London, wherein not only Pollock’s paintings, but also Lee 
Krasner’s The Eye Is the First Circle (1960), were curatorially situated solely in reference to 
Pollock’s ‘energies.’ With respect to Krasner’s painting, rather than treated as a work in its 
own right, The Eye Is the First Circle was featured in the ‘Jackson Pollock’ section of the 
                                                          
65 For Adorno, as Stefan Brueur details, this is manifested ‘in the psychic organisation of the individual as 
replacement of object-libido by ego-libido’ (1985: 24). That is, the openness to experience typified by the 
former is foreclosed as affects and wishes are reified in terms of status and prestige. Indeed, at one point 
Guilbaut chalks up the rise in demand for ‘a more advanced, audacious, and modern art’ in the 1940s to 
the upper middle-class desire ‘to maintain a cultural distinction between themselves and this new middle 
class’ (NY: 95). 
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exhibition, and the exhibition guide framed it as the product of Krasner’s struggle with 
Pollock’s ‘formidable ghost,’ backhandedly acclaiming the work as ‘among the most 
memorable tributes to Pollock’s seismic achievement’ (Anonymous 2016: 6-7). 
  This is not to say, however, that most of the artists rejected characterisations of their art akin 
to Schapiro’s account. Indeed, decisive for Craven is the fact that the artists’ statements as to 
the significance of their art often seem to corroborate Schapiro’s account far more than 
Greenberg’s. Adducing, for instance, Motherwell’s claim that he does not ‘want a picture to 
look “made,” like an automobile or a loaf of bread in waxed paper’ and instead agrees with 
Renoir ‘who loved everything handmade’ (ACC: 146), and Pollock’s assertion that 
‘“[c]raftmanship is essential to the artist” for responding to “the aims of the age we’re living 
in”’ (ACC: 152), Craven avers that the artists shared Schapiro’s reading of Abstract 
Expressionism as ‘a way of producing art that was fundamentally at odds with the capitalist 
mode of production’ in so far as it ‘symbolised above all a profound degree of self-
realisation’ (ACC: 136). Thus, for Craven Schapiro’s account belies that of the revisionists, 
whom Craven accuses of simply reducing Abstract Expressionism to the ‘reflection in the 
superstructural realm of petit bourgeois ideology’ (ACC: 38). However, to oppose critics who 
accuse the style of complicity with dominant ideology by deploying Schapiro’s account of 
Abstract Expressionism as an indictment of reification in this way, is to sidestep the 
accusation that it was precisely the characterisation of Abstract Expressionist works as 
expressions of their artists’ disalienated ‘feeling’ that lent them to co-optation. It is to ignore 
the idea that, as Adorno writes of the notion that art bears an ‘edifying lack of cogency,’ it 
was such a characterisation which precipitated the way in which Abstract Expressionism was 
‘incorporated into and subordinated to bourgeois life as its antagonistic complement’ (1992: 
247). 
  It is a relative commonplace to claim that, as Grant H. Kester puts it, Abstract 
Expressionism’s attempt to cultivate an ‘organic and integrated expression of human 
creativity’ in protest against societal rationalisation resulted in a ‘disabling domesticity’ 
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(1998: 9). Indeed, Craven ultimately comes to similar conclusions, contending that the 
intransigent opposition to society of many of the artists was tantamount to abstract negation, 
resulting in a fetishisation of alienation and ‘consequently, the call of these artists for 
profound change was at least partially undermined by the nature of the change that they 
proposed – one that went from seeming unlikely to being undesired’ (ACC: 164). Yet, as I 
noted in Chapter 4, Jachec’s central thesis is that Abstract Expressionism’s characterization 
as a humanistic antidote to reification not only rendered it powerless to resist, but also 
amenable to, assimilation by a US State Department desperate to quell hostility towards US 
culture among the Western European left intelligentsia. And, while Craven published his 
study prior to Jachec’s, this notion was not foreign to the preceding revisionist accounts. 
Peter Fuller, for example, notes that in order to evade a ‘decisive comparison’ between the 
‘production of lies under rigorous control from above’ of Russia’s Socialist Realist art, and 
advertising in America, the ‘most perceptive apologists for corporate American capitalism’ 
gave cultural centrality to ‘the residual professional Fine Art tradition,’ which ostensibly toed 
no predetermined line in that it was ‘manifestly unregulated and imaginatively free,’ and 
thereby at liberty to express opposition (174). And Cockcroft contends that the Abstract 
Expressionists’ rejection of the ‘values of bourgeois society’ meant that its ‘dissent’ neatly 
fitted the CIA’s mission ‘to present a strong propaganda image of the United states as a 
“free” society as opposed to the “regimented” communist bloc’ (125-9).66  In fact, in the 
revisionist accounts Schapiro is often afforded a pivotal role in Abstract Expressionism’s co-
optation in this sense. Guilbaut alights upon ‘On the Aesthetic Attitude in Romanesque Art,’ 
an essay by the art historian from 1947 in which Schapiro asserts that ‘the expression of 
feeling’ in modern art renders it ‘strongly critical of contemporary life’ (1977: 1), and Jachec 
identifies the publication of ‘The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art’ in ARTnews in 
1957 as emblematic of critical discourse which was paramount in the choice to export 
                                                          
66 Cockcroft makes this point by attributing the clain that ‘dissenting opinions within the framework of 
agreement of cold-war fundamentals’ to an article entitled ‘I’m Glad the CIA are “Immoral” ’by Thomas W. 
Braden, an official of both MoMA and the CIA. However, upon consulting that article archived online I 
cannot find this quote (Braden 1967,  20 May). 
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Abstract Expressionism with the exhibitions Jackson Pollock 1912-1956 and The New 
American Painting in the following years (PPA: 181).  
  For Guilbaut, Schapiro’s essay is exemplary in terms of how Abstract Expressionism was 
conceived as providing a ‘last refuge’ for resistance by ‘leftist intellectuals who refused to 
reject Marxism’ (NY: 200-1). He contends that this dovetailed with ‘old-fashioned bourgeois 
individualism,’ at that time typified by the liberal intellectual Arthur M. Schlesinger’s The 
Vital Center (1949). On Guilbaut’s telling, while designed to ‘perpetuate the practice of 
painting without losing face, that is, without abandoning the vocabulary of radical politics’ 
(NY: 158), discourse which characterised Abstract Expressionism as disalienated in its 
affirmation of subjective expression converged with Schlesinger’s championing of the 
‘individualism and the willingness to take risks’ of subjects whose anxiety was the price paid 
for living in the free society of the United States (NY: 200-2). That is, in contrast with 
‘[a]uthoritarian regimes like Russia’ where the choice was made for the individual ‘who thus 
[traded their] freedom for tranquillity’ and was ‘planned and programmed and so [knew] 
nothing of the anxiety and alienation’ intrinsic to living in a democracy (NY: 202). This 
resemblance is certainly germane. However, Guilbaut caricatures Schlesinger’s position 
somewhat and thus misses the nuances of the way in which the account of Abstract 
Expressionism as individual expression in protest against reification was assimilated by the 
liberal ideology undergirding post-war US imperialism, of which I will show Jachec gives a 
better account. Certainly, in the Vital Center Schlesinger enthusiastically propounds that the 
the ‘crucial differences between the USA and the USSR [...] can be defined as basically the 
differences between free society and totalitarianism (1988: 7-8); champions the former, and, 
accordingly, while he vocally opposed McCarthyism, he might be argued to have supported 
its presuppositions in advocating vigilance against the ‘clear and present menace’ of 
Communism (Ibid: 218).67 But Schlesinger does not forward an account of vigorous 
                                                          
67 Indeed, responding to McCarthy’s accusation in 1952 that he was a communist, Schlesinger claims he 
fought Communism and fellow travellers in universities ‘long before McCarthy did,’ drawing attention to 
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individualism, or hypostasize the anxiety felt by American subjects as a marker of their 
freedom. Contrarily, his claim that ‘[a]gainst totalitarian certitude, free society can only offer 
modern man devoured by alienation and fallibility’ is an acknowledgement of how the ‘free 
society’ of ‘modern industrial economy [had] worn away [...] protective securities without 
creating new ones’ (Ibid: 55-7). Nevertheless, of the ‘imperfect alternatives’ provided by the 
Soviet Union and the United States, Schlesinger surmises that it was in the latter that 
democratic socialism still had a chance of being realised, precisely because discontent had 
not been forcibly quelled as it was in the former. 
  Thus, as was the case for much of the US erstwhile left intelligentsia, Schlesinger’s 
rapprochement with the US status quo was conditioned by his rejection of the totalitarianism 
of the Soviet Union, under which the authority of the individual subject was supposedly 
negated. In this, his argument often superficially resembles Adorno’s opposition to the 
institutionalisation of identity-thinking. For instance, as Adorno criticises Lukács for 
conceding that the Hungarian Communist Party ‘was in the right, even though his ideas and 
arguments were better than the party [...] because it embodied the objective state of history, 
while his own position, which was more advanced both in his view and in terms of the sheer 
logic of the ideas involved, lagged behind that objective state of affairs’ (2008: 17), 
Schlesinger claims that ‘a Communist teacher, who imported [their] party views into the 
classroom, would be an incompetent teacher’ since they would lack ‘the freedom [...] to teach 
[their] subject according to their most responsible understanding of it, and not according to 
the ukase of a [...] political party’ (1988: 207). Against such objectivism, Schlesinger projects 
a ‘democratic society, based on a genuine cultural pluralism’ (Ibid: 253). Yet, this pluralism 
is what Adorno refers to as the ‘alleged social relativity of views [obeying] the objective law 
of social production under private ownership of the means of production’ (ND: 37). That is to 
say, it is pluralism in the sense of ‘the ideology describing the centrifugal tendencies of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an article from 1946 in which he ‘exposed and indicted the Communist conspiracy in America at a time 
when McCarthy was accepting Communist help in his effort to defeat that great anti-Communist Bob 
FaFullette in Wisconsin’ (qtd. in Abrams 1952, 4 November). 
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society that threatens to disintegrate into unreconciled groups under the pressure of its own 
principles’ and is nevertheless ‘represented as if it were a state of reconciliation in which 
people lived together in harmony while in reality society is full of power struggles,’ as 
Adorno identified the notion in the social democratic corporatism 1960s West Germany, the 
amenability of which to the United States I noted in Chapter 4 (2006: 95). Indeed, 
Schlesinger effectively admits as much, For Schlesinger, the fate of the USSR was decisive 
proof that any attempt to abolish private property and collectivise resources would lead to a 
class system in which the ruling strata went unchecked. He thus concluded that the role of the 
state should be to administratively mediate inevitable conflict between classes:  
Economic conflict is essential if freedom is to be preserved, because it is the only 
barrier against class domination; yet economic conflict, pursued to excess, may well 
destroy the underlying fabric of common principle which sustains free society. I 
cannot imagine a free society which has eliminated conflict. So long as there is 
inequality in the distribution of property and variety in the nature of economic 
interests, so long will politics centre on economic issues; and so long the insurgency 
of the discontented will provide the best guarantee against the tyranny of the 
possessors. Yet this conflict must be kept within bounds, if freedom itself is to 
survive. (1988: 173) 
Schlesinger, then, did not, contrary to Guilbaut’s claims, advocate rugged individualism. On 
the contrary, for Schlesinger ‘[t]he individual requires a social context, not one imposed by 
coercion, but one freely emerging in response to his own needs and initiatives’ (Ibid: 248). 
However, he posits that this society organised from below to above might be achieved within 
the framework of a reformist capitalism in which the interests of workers were adequately 
represented, while the division of labour and priority of private profit remained axiomatic.  
  As I explored in Chapter 2, it was according to this very ideology that the United States 
exported the Social Realism of Ben Shahn. Yet, from Schlesinger’s references to art 
throughout The Vital Center, we might infer a defence of modernism akin to Schapiro’s, and 
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to a greater extent than Guilbaut’s loose homology indicates. Much like Trotsky and the 
Greenberg of ‘Kitsch,’ when discussing the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union, Schlesinger 
dedicates numerous pages to denouncing the prescription of Inhalt for art under Stalin (Ibid: 
78-83). Schlesinger surmises that the converse Stalinist opposition to modernism was 
premised on the notion that modernism expressed subjective states which belied the Soviet 
Union’s forced reconciliation between subjects and society, adducing Picasso as an example 
of an artist whose work reflects ‘anxieties which are incompatible with the monolithic 
character of “the Soviet person”’ (Ibid: 79). The parallels with Schapiro’s thesis as to how an 
Abstract Expressionist artwork manifests the unreduced subjectivity of its artist otherwise 
suppressed by capitalist rationalisation should here be clear. And indeed, when in the final 
chapter of The Vital Center Schlesinger brooches the question of art and culture in his 
projected social-democratic United States, he assigns it the role of generating ‘living 
emotional content, rich enough to overcome the anxieties incited by industrialism’ (Ibid: 
245). He opines that, while standardisation had ‘certainly raised levels not only of 
consumption but of culture,’ it had ‘reduced life to an anonymity of abundance which brings 
less personal fulfilment than people once got from labour in their own shop or garden’ (Ibid: 
252). As a remedy to this malaise, Schlesinger suggests creative ‘outlets for the variegated 
emotions of man’ in order to ‘restore meaning to democratic life’ (Ibid: 253). While 
Schlesinger proposes these outlets would take the form of nebulously defined ‘group 
activities,’ Jachec rightly contends that this then-prevalent idea that creative activity should 
serve as individualistic expression within the context of industrial capitalism, of which 
Schlesinger’s scholarship was a particularly conspicuous example, was adopted by the State 
Department in its enlistment of Abstract Expressionism in ‘the international cultural 
propaganda campaign of America-style democracy as the repository of socialist values’ 
(PPA: 130). 
  As I acknowledged above, Barr’s catalogue essay for The New American Painting defined 
Abstract Expressionism not only as the telos of European modernism, but also in terms of the 
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artworks manifesting the artists’ subjective interiorities, and Jachec identifies this notion as 
integral to the effort of winning over the European left intelligentsia. During the 1950s, due 
largely to revelations as to the extent of Stalin’s purges and acts perceived as imperialist 
aggression on the part of the USSR, particularly the quelling of the Hungarian revolution of 
1956, more and more of the European left were disaligning themselves from the Soviet 
Union, even in countries whose communist parties were strong such as France and Italy. 
Thus, there was a concerted effort made by the State Department’s Policy Planning 
Committee to capitalise on this disaffection and emphasise the freedom of the individual 
within the United States in the terms that Schlesinger had framed it. Jachec notes that this 
was evident even prior to the decisive privileging of Abstract Expressionism in exported 
exhibitions in the late 1950s. For example, the 1953-4 touring show Twelve Modern 
American Painters and Sculptors featured only Gorky, Smith and Pollock from among the 
Abstract Expressionists, and yet Andrew Carnduff Ritchie’s catalogue essay for the 
exhibition stressed how the formally divergent works were united by their shared ‘emphasis 
[...] on the artist as an individual’ (PPA: 184). However, Jachec shows that critical discourse, 
especially published in the magazine ARTnews, increasingly privileged Abstract 
Expressionism in these terms. In 1951, ARTnews published an editorial asserting that abstract 
artists had ‘joined statesmen and philosophers in affirming the supremacy of the private 
worlds of human freedom’ because ‘the typically modern concern with the ethics of human 
expression is also fundamental to the aesthetics of the abstractionists,’ and Jachec asserts that 
its publication of ‘The Liberating Quality’ six years later cemented the notion that among the 
variants of abstract art it was Abstract Expressionism which best gave voice to subjective 
interiority (PPA: 182). Accordingly, Jachec contends, the USIA and the IC circulated 
Jackson Pollock 1912-1956 and The New American Painting in Europe in 1958, and she 
adduces critical responses to show that the art was received by many on the continent 
precisely as intended. For instance, reviews in the French independent left and liberal press to 
Jackson Pollock 1912-1956 lauded Pollock on the basis that he, as was written in Le Monde, 
107 
 
revolted ‘against the oppression of mechanistic civilisation,’ and conversely, according to 
Combat, ‘went out to make all in his own feelings’ (PPA: 204). Thus, in reinforcing the 
notion that individual expression flourished within the context of US capitalism, Schapiro’s 
account of Abstract Expressionism as an enclave of disalienation chimed with the same 
ambitions of US imperialism to which I showed in Chapter 4 Greenberg’s account of the 
movement as European modernism’s telos was amenable. However, whereas I have argued in 
this chapter that Schapiro’s account served the artworks’ reification in terms of the 
exhibition-value of subjective interiority, in Chapter 5 I contended that Greenberg’s account 
bears witness to Abstract Expressionism’s resistance to such subsumption. In the next chapter 
I will return to Greenberg, in order to elaborate this further with recourse to his account of 
Abstract Expressionist praxis. 
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Chapter Seven 
Making Things Of Which We Know Not What They Are 
 
  As I acknowledged in Chapter Three, by the 1950s Greenberg had ostensibly entirely 
dissociated avant-garde art from radical politics in his criticism. Indeed, in his 1959 essay 
‘The case for Abstract Art,’ which Francis Frascina notes shares ‘common ground’ with 
Schapiro (2006: 25), Greenberg makes explicit that he is positing abstract art as an ‘antidote’ 
to the dominant rationality of capitalism (CEC4: 80). Accordingly, as Donald Kuspit asserts, 
it seems as if, for Greenberg, ‘artistic unity is not simply an end in itself’ because it ‘serves 
human life by affording a ready opportunity, in contrast to the opportunities nature and life 
afford, for aesthetic experience, which serves life by relieving it of the pressures on it’ (1979: 
37). As further evidence for this, we might point to Greenberg’s favourable citation 
elsewhere of Matisse’s assertion that ‘he wanted his art to be an armchair for the tired 
businessman’ as a pre-eminent demonstration of ‘the sincerity and penetration that go with 
the kind of greatness particular to twentieth-century painting’ (CEC2: 134). For Adorno, this 
trope of the ‘tired businessman’ is paradigmatic of the instrumental attitude which ‘uses [art] 
as a massage’ (AT: 265), diminishing art’s ‘protest against the claim of the discursive to 
totality,’ and contrarily rendering aesthetic experience as ‘the reproduction of labour power’ 
(AT: 98). Greenberg, then, appears to expound and champion the very implications of 
conceiving abstract art as – to quote Frascina’s summation of the essay’s affinity with 
Schapiro – ‘an implicit critique of capitalism's emphasis on automated production and mass 
consumer culture,’ upon which the revisionists alight to argue that Schapiro’s account served 
that very culture. However, whereas for Schapiro abstract art indicts such culture by 
affirming the preponderance of a subject over an object, for Greenberg abstract art provides 
compensation for instrumental reason by according precedence to the object. He writes that 
‘pictures and free-standing sculpture – solo works of art meant to be looked at for their own 
sake and with full attention, and not as the adjuncts, incidental aspects, or settings of things 
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other than themselves’ had emerged as ‘a relief’ in the US, whose society was ‘given over as 
no other society has been to purposeful activity and material production’ (CEC4: 77-80). That 
is, Greenberg focuses on the very aspects of abstract art which in Chapter 5 I showed allows 
us to read his account of medium-specificity through Adorno as indicative of how Abstract 
Expressionism exposes dominant rationality as irrational in its exclusions. 
 Indeed, it is of course not in the name of discursively political art that Adorno criticises the 
notion that art exists as an ersatz form of leisure serving solely to reproduce labour power. He 
in fact often takes recourse to the central dichotomy drawn by Greenberg in ‘The case for 
Abstract Art’ between aesthetic experience and the instrumental reason of the relations of 
production, in arguing for autonomous art’s challenge to the status quo. For Adorno, art ‘is 
more than praxis because by its aversion to praxis it simultaneously denounces the narrow 
untruth of the practical world’ (AT: 241); it is ‘a constant indictment of the workaday bustle 
and the practical individual’ (Ibid); it is ‘the critique of praxis as the rule of brutal self-
preservation at the heart of the status quo and in its service’ (AT: 12); it ‘gives the lie to 
production for production's sake and opts for a form of praxis beyond the spell of labor’ 
(Ibid). As should be clear from preceding chapters, however, decisive for Adorno is that art 
does not simply oppose instrumental reason by counterposing ‘feeling’ to it as its irrational 
other. As I have established, for Adorno the aconceptual and yet binding particularity of 
artworks exposes instrumental rationality’s irrationality by appearing undeniably rational, and 
he posits that this is because art praxis dominates its object no less than instrumental 
rationality, but does so in the service of its object’s particularity. For Adorno, art praxis 
‘carries out the correction of self-preserving reason, but not by simply setting itself in 
opposition to it; rather, the correction of reason is carried out by the reason immanent to 
artworks themselves’ (AT: 306). 
  As I delineated in Chapter 5, Adorno mounts his opposition to the status quo as immanent 
critique founded on the fact that the Enlightenment’s dissolution of myth – at the pinnacle of 
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which, pertinently for this thesis, the United States positioned itself during the Cold War – 
has resulted not in its aim of the liberation of human beings from subjugation to nature, but 
rather erected the second nature of capitalism, which represses not only outer nature, but also 
humans’ inner nature. For Adorno, the ‘evolution of the technical forces of production in 
toto’ was borne of ‘the material needs of human beings, of what they need for their 
preservation,’ and yet, in its indifference to particularity, it ‘dominates human labour 
processes as a method, as technical rationality’ (2006: 16). Thus, bourgeois society’s 
supposed ‘excess of rationality, about which the educated class complains and which it 
registers in concepts like mechanization, atomization, indeed even de-individualization,’ is in 
fact ‘a lack of rationality’ (1998a: 138). If it were truly rational, technical rationality would 
be ‘the ensemble of means for minimizing material necessity,’ but instead, ‘the ideal of full 
employment is substituted for that of the abolition of labor’ (AT: 319). In its technical 
procedures, art draws on this same rationality. However, as Peter Uwe Hohendahl notes, for 
Adorno it is ‘pure force of production [...] outside the fixed relations of production’ (2013: 
29). Unconstrained by the relations of production, in art this rationality is attuned to 
particularity, and thus rational. For Adorno ‘[o]ppressed nature expresses itself more purely 
in works […] which with regard to the level of the technical forces of production, go to the 
extreme, than it does in circumspect works whose parti pris for nature is as allied with the 
real domination of nature as is the nature lover with the hunt’ (AT: 209). Authentic art thus 
‘makes itself like what is free of domination by the limitless domination over its material’ 
(AT: 288). According to Adorno, as Robert Hullot-Kentor puts it, [t]he ideal that inheres in 
[authentic artworks] is a transformed subjectivity that, rather than dominating its object, gives 
it binding expression,’ by adhering to ‘the technical obligation of the critical eye and ear [to 
follow] word, note, or colour “where it wants to go”’ (2006: 76; 20). Yet, in order to oppose 
domination and give the nonidentical its due, art praxis assimilates itself to the comportment 
of domination: 
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Art, the afterimage of human repression of nature, simultaneously negates this 
repression through reflection and draws close to nature. The subjectively instituted 
totality of artworks does not remain the totality imposed on the other, but rather, by its 
distance from this other, becomes the imaginative restitution of the other. Neutralized 
aesthetically, the domination of nature renounces its violence. In the semblance of the 
restoration of the mutilated other to its own form, art becomes the model of the 
nonmutilated. Aesthetic totality is the antithesis of the untrue whole. If art, as Valéry 
once said, wants to be indebted only to itself, this is because art wants to make itself 
the likeness of an in-itself, of what is free of domination and disfigurement. Art is the 
spirit that negates itself by virtue of the constitution of its own proper realm (AT: 
288). 
In the previous chapter, I showed that David Craven accuses Greenberg of legislating for art 
praxis and interpretation in a manner homologous with the technical rationality of capitalism, 
and suggests Meyer Schapiro’s account as better suited to illuminating how Abstract 
Expressionism prefigures disalienation. I argued, however, that, in framing Abstract 
Expressionism as a refuge for irrational human feeling amidst capitalist rationalisation, and 
thus aligning it with precisely the complaints of the educated class enumerated by Adorno 
above, Schapiro’s reading of Abstract Expressionism contributed to the movement’s co-
optation no less than Greenberg’s. Moreover, I contended that Schapiro’s subjectivism does 
so by paradoxically recapitulating identity-thinking, inviting the artworks’ conceptual 
subsumption by exhibition-value. In what follows, I will argue that, on the other hand, 
Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionist praxis as interrogation of medium-specificity, 
in spite of its ossification, indicates far better how Abstract Expressionism, as Lambert 
Zuidervaart paraphrases Adorno, ‘provides models of reconciled labour’ by contributing ‘to 
the requisite shift in the subject-object dialectic’ (1991: 120). 
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  Adorno wrote very little on painting. However, in 1965 he published an essay, ‘On Some 
Relationships Between Music and Painting,’ in which, in a parallel with the former art-form, 
to which Adorno was more dedicated than any other, he elaborates in reference to painting 
the dialectic of spiritual construction and mimetic expression by which he contends authentic 
artworks take on the character of a nonconceptual, nonrigidified language. In this essay, in 
marked affinity with Greenberg, he argues that each medium does so ‘only where each 
pursues its immanent principle in a pure way’ (1995: 67). Yet, whereas commentators on 
Greenberg tend to interpret his approbation of ‘purity’ in terms of the foregrounding of a 
given medium’s technical aspects, as typified by Groys’s characterisation cited in Chapter 5, 
for Adorno it is clear in ‘On Some Relationships’ that to pursue a medium’s ‘immanent 
principle,’ is to pursue the nonconceptual, and objectivate it in semblance. He claims that, at 
the time of writing ‘On Some Relationships,’ various media were converging in so far as they 
were emerging as language through the determinate negation of Inhalt. That is, their 
linguistic character is ‘the opposite of [a language] of music or painting’ if we understand 
language in terms of ‘telling a story,’ but rather a language ‘by virtue of the way they are 
constructed’ (71). As I have elaborated, for Adorno this construction entails domination of 
materials which nevertheless does not express ‘the old synthesizing I, behaving as if it were 
in unbroken command of the material’ (Ibid: 73). Instead, he writes, this domination works 
‘toward a changed form of the expressive’ which echoes ‘early mimetic behaviours’ (Ibid). 
To understand what Adorno means by ‘early mimetic behaviours,’ it is necessary to take 
recourse to the speculative anthropology he delineates with Max Horkheimer in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. For the authors, mimesis preceded identity-thinking. In its first phase, it took 
the form of the adaptation by vulnerable humans to overpowering nature, whereby the latter’s 
imposing severity was mimicked in reciprocal rigidity. This archaic mode of mimesis, 
Adorno and Horkheimer contend, developed into magic, as shamans warded ‘off […] danger 
with its likeness’ (2002: 12). Whereas in archaic mimesis, humans were dominated by 
daunting forces of nature and mimicked them in resistance, in this magical phase, mimicry 
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was not purely defensive but an attempt to ameliorate the threat of these forces. However, 
while in these processes the mimicked object retained its particularity, such rituals gave way 
to instrumental methods by which the object could be controlled. The ‘manifold affinities 
between existing things’ was ‘supplanted by the single relationship between the subject 
who confers meaning and the meaningless object’ (Ibid: 10-11), the reification of which 
meanings as second nature under capitalism must, as I have discussed, be adapted to in much 
the same way as overpowering first nature formerly was.68 
  For Adorno, then, art praxis recovers something of the mimetic behavior which preceded the 
polarity of subject and object, and whether we accept his speculative anthropology, it is 
undeniable that the production of art often seems to enjoin nonsubsumptive comportment; an 
absorption in making to the extent that one is ‘not reflexively aware, but still able to feel that 
what is happening makes sense,’ as Andrew Bowie notes, following Martin Seel (2013: 152). 
However, for Adorno the aforementioned role of domination in such praxis means it cannot 
be understood as romantic yearning for a prelapsarian return to ‘meaningful times’ (ND: 
191). Instead, Adorno contends that artistic production ‘is neither immediately mimesis nor 
its repression’ (AT: 331). Rather, the nonconceptual, nonrigidified language of artworks is 
the result of ‘tension between objectivating technique and the mimetic essence of artworks 
[…] fought out in the effort to save the fleeting, the ephemeral, the transitory in a form that is 
immune to reification and yet akin to it in being permanent’ (AT: 219). That is, artworks 
‘register and objectivate levels of experience that are fundamental to the relation to reality yet 
are almost always concealed by reification’ (AT: 310). As Adorno continues in ‘On Some 
Relationships,’ authentic artworks are thus ‘[g]raven characters’ which express mimetic 
impulses ‘without surrendering them to the seemingly objective rationality of the prevailing 
signs,’ and yet this ‘return of an undistorted mimetic moment’ is ‘in thrall’ to rationality, 
which Adorno contends in turn abandons itself to the mimetic impulse ‘by dint of its 
sovereign control over the natural material’ (1995: 73). In this, the authentic artwork is a 
                                                          
68 For this lucid breakdown of mimesis into archaic, magical and industrial stages, I am indebted to Simon 
Mussell’s ‘Mimesis Reconsidered: Adorno and Tarkovsky contra Habermas’ (2013: 212-5). 
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‘whole [which] exists only for the sake of its parts’ (AT: 187). This is a notion echoed by 
Merleau-Ponty, to whom we will turn in following chapters, when he claims in his 1952 
essay ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ that ‘the meaning of the painting’ is 
‘capable of demanding this colour and this object in preference to any other and [...] 
commands the arrangement of the picture just as imperiously as a syntax or a logic’ (PP: 92). 
Following Hegel, Adorno refers to the mediation of an artwork’s materials by artistic 
construction as ‘spiritualisation.’ For Hegel, however, this entails the harmonisation of an 
artwork’s sensory form with meaning by which ‘sensuous shapes and sounds present 
themselves not simply for their own sake and for that of their immediate structure’ (2004: 
44). Hegel argues that a work of art  
is a work of art only in as far as, being the offspring of mind, it continues to belong to 
the realm of mind, has received the baptism of the spiritual, and only represents that 
which has been moulded in harmony with the mind. (Ibid: 33)  
For Adorno, conversely, spiritualisation is the mediation by which an artwork’s 
meaningfulness emerges from its particularity: 
In artworks, spirit has become their principle of construction, although it fulfills its 
telos only when it emerges from what is to be constructed, from the mimetic impulses, 
by shaping itself to them rather than allowing itself to be imposed on them by 
sovereign rule. Form objectivates the particular impulses only when it follows them 
where they want to go of their own accord. (AT: 118) 
Adorno, then, contends that authentic art praxis is paratactic rather than hypotactic. It entails 
the constructive synthesis of an expressive manifold which, unlike the extra-aesthetic 
synthesis of capitalist ratiocination, does not curtail the irreducible particularity of the 
manifold’s elements, and yet in its rationality renders them objectively binding. 
  Greenberg, on the other hand, is often accused of privileging the constructive axis over the 
expressive. I detailed in the previous chapter how Craven, following Casey Blake and Leo 
Steinberg, accuses the critic of complicity with the status quo due to his purportedly 
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autocratic imposition of rules for the production of art. As we saw, Craven argues that this is 
because Greenberg’s notional prescriptions of medium-specificity are inimical to the artistic 
self-management wherein lies Abstract Expressionism’s radicalism, fundamentally 
antithetical as it is to the total lack of self-management afforded to workers under Taylorism. 
For different reasons, Guilbaut, also, points to Greenberg’s privileging of art’s constructive 
element as important in Abstract Expressionism’s co-optation. He adduces a 1947 essay by 
Greenberg entitled ‘The Present Prospects of American Painting and Sculpture’ as 
characteristic of the critic’s effort to position post-war US art as, in Guilbaut’s paraphrase, 
‘the continuation of the modernist tradition’ by calling for a ‘balanced, antiexpressionistic 
art’ which ‘must be blasé and detached in order to be controlled and composed, fully 
developed on the canvas,’ so as it might counter America’s reputation for barbarism, and 
prove that ‘American art was the logical consequence and extension of Parisian art, which 
had lost its sharp edge’ (NY: 162).  
  Certainly, as I explored at length in Chapter 4, Greenberg’s positioning of Abstract 
Expressionism as the latest instantiation of the modernist tradition served its deployment by 
US imperialism. And indeed, in ‘The Present Prospects’ Greenberg articulates his exhortation 
for the Apollonian in terms which ostensibly obviate the nonidentical, proposing that such art 
should bear ‘contempt for nature in all its particularity’ (CEC2: 168). However, if such 
hyperbole is understood in context, it attests less to formalist autocracy than the same 
dialectical dynamics which Adorno deems central to the production of authentic art. 
Greenberg makes his appeal in ‘The Present Prospects’ amidst a reiteration of the diagnosis 
of US culture developed in ‘Kitsch.’ While now conceding that ‘the very fact of’ America’s 
‘experiment in mass cultivation’ rendered it ‘in several respects the most historically 
advanced country on earth’ – with a pointed invidious comparison to Soviet Russia’s 
supposed backwardness – Greenberg bemoans the way that the ratiocination that this 
cultivation entailed, contrived as it was ‘in the direction of profit,’ had been to the detriment 
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of avant-garde art (CEC2: 163).69 As I have established, by 1947 Greenberg had abandoned 
the notion that avant-garde art undermined capitalism. Instead, in ‘The Present Prospects’ he 
affords avant-garde art the ameliorative role of founding ‘our sensibilities,’ and thus 
remunerating ‘us for those particular and necessary frustrations that ensue from living at the 
present moment in the history of western civilisation’ (CEC2: 168). I will return to the 
political implications of this in the next chapter. At this point, however, I want to note that in 
terms of art praxis Greenberg explicitly ascribes art this task as a corrective to art which 
serves as ‘an escape in transcendent exceptions and aberrated states’ (CEC2: 164).  
  Above, I elaborated how Adorno argues that, in a world where the forces of production 
could eliminate privation and yet are stymied by the relations of production, art challenges 
prevailing instrumental rationality by assimilating rather than counterposing itself to it. 
Similarly, in ‘The Present Prospects’ Greenberg asserts that ‘substantial art requires balance 
and enough thought to put it in accord with the most advanced view of the world’ obtaining 
at a time when humanity had ‘in theory solved the great public and private questions’ and the 
failure to solve these questions in practice had ‘become more problematical than ever’ 
(CEC2: 167). This is admittedly rather abstruse. Yet, it certainly implies that, contrary to 
Craven’s characterisation of him, for Greenberg the rationality of modernism is not selfsame 
with dominant rationality, but rather corrects it, and indeed in a 1950 essay entitled ‘Our 
Period Style,’ while appearing rather sanguine in the hope that social equilibrium could be 
technocratically achieved under capitalism, he claims that the art of the age was typified by 
an artistic rationalisation which, in refusing to ‘serve ends outside itself,’ modelled what the 
‘frightening idea’ of ‘[r]ationalisation in the industrial sense’ could be were its ends and 
                                                          
69 While Greenberg certainly no longer supported revolutionary socialism in the late ‘40s and ‘50s, the 
extent to which he conversely became an apologist for industrial capitalism has been overstated. For 
instance, in the introduction to Volume 3 of Greenberg’s Collected Essays John O’Brian cites another 
essay,  1953’s ‘The Plight of Our Culture,’ as typifying ‘an about-face’ in Greenberg’s thinking, as 
Greenberg appears to be making an optimistic reassessment of industrial capitalism (xxix). This is a 
reading which Sheila Christofides has recently disputed in her essay ‘Beyond Revisionism,’ in which she 
contends that, instead, and especially in its republication in Art & Culture, the essay remains true to the 
Marxist hope that the social relations of production might be reorganised so as the forces of production 
minimise labour for all, which may have been remote but for which liberalism was still nevertheless to be 
considered a ‘holding action’ (2015: 48-9). 
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means synchronised (CEC2: 326). Like Adorno, Greenberg is critical of ‘wild’ art which 
lends itself to reification as dominant rationality’s other. His advocacy of ‘balance, largeness, 
precision, enlightenment’ is accordingly a counteractive which would allow for ‘a much 
greater infusion of consciousness than heretofore into what we call the creative’ (CEC2: 168). 
For Adorno, as I have delineated, it is effectively such an infusion which allows art to stake a 
binding claim for particularity, insofar as art praxis enlists the kind of domination which 
holds sway extra-aesthetically in the service of the materials which it dominates. Craven 
contends that, contrary to Greenberg, Schapiro’s account of art praxis ‘did not necessarily 
entail a neo-Luddite rejection of technology per se but rather a critical appraisal of 
technology as not being an end in itself’ (ACC: 149). However, as I noted above, for Adorno 
this is precisely the task carried out by authentic art praxis, and I will now explore how 
Greenberg consistently characterised art praxis which he favoured in similar terms. 
  In 1960 Adorno posits his account of art praxis as a dialectic of spiritual construction and 
mimetic expression as opposed to ‘a widely accepted view of contemporary art: that the 
constructive tendencies – in Cubist painting and its derivates – and the subjective-expressive 
tendencies – Expressionism and Surrealism – are mere opposites’ (1992: 106). However, 
Greenberg had effectively been arguing for this reciprocity since the late ‘30s. In ‘Laocoon,’ 
Greenberg makes clear that the construction of art which emphasises ‘the medium and its 
difficulties’ cannot be hypotactic, contending that this emphasis is hampered when the 
medium is overpowered ‘to the point where all sense of its resistance disappears’ (CEC1: 34). 
For Greenberg, the ‘gauge of achievement is not only the degree of unity or perfection of 
form – any piece of kitsch has that – but also the resistance of the material unified’ (CEC1: 
115-6), and at one point he goes so far as to criticise Mondrian’s New York Boogie Woogie 
for falling slightly short of this gauge with a surfeit of construction (CEC1: 153).70 Even in 
‘Modernist Painting,’ Greenberg’s most schematic account of modernism’s medium-
                                                          
70 He writes that the ‘simplest way almost of accounting for a great work of art is to say that it is a thing 
possessing simultaneously the maximum of diversity and the maximum unity possible to the diversity. 
For lack of the first [New York Boogie Woogie by Mondrian] is, for all its sudden originality, something a 
little less than a masterpiece.’ (CEC1: 153) 
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specificity, the critic seems to characterise the formalist impulse of construction as 
dialectically reversing into expression. Shortly after he has asserted that risks are taken with a 
medium’s norms ‘not only in the interests of expression but also in order to exhibit them 
more clearly as norms,’ he claims that artists carry out this process ‘simply because the way 
to stronger, more expressive art lies through them’ (CEC4: 89-91). While this is ostensibly 
contradictory, I think we might read it in terms of a distinction between conceptual and 
mimetic expression. That is, whereas ‘the interests of expression’ in the first quote refers to 
expression in the sense of instrumentalising artistic materials in the service of expressing 
something which these materials are not themselves, ‘expressive art’ in the second refers to 
the capacity of an artwork to command attention on the basis of its particularity.71 Thus, the 
subordination of materials necessary for the former gives way to the paratactical expression 
of the latter. Indeed, in his contribution to a 1953 symposium in the pages of Art Digest on 
the question ‘Is the French Avant-Garde Overrated?,’ Greenberg declares the superiority of 
the US painterly abstraction of the New York School to the French Taschisme on the basis 
that its production is paratactical in this way, when he writes that for the Abstract 
Expressionists the ‘canvas is treated less as a given receptacle than as an open field whose 
unity must be permitted to emerge without being forced or imposed in prescribed terms’ 
(CEC3: 156). 
  The fact that Greenberg deploys this claim to the end of propounding the pre-eminence of 
US art should not detract from the stark parallels between this analysis and Adorno’s of the 
paratactical nature of art praxis surveyed above. In what is little more than an aside, Thierry 
de Duve acknowledges this when he asserts that both Greenberg and Adorno have ‘the same 
deeply rooted intuition of the avant-garde as working in a materiality that Greenberg calls 
respect for the medium and Adorno, the progress of the material’ (1996b: 43). De Duve does 
                                                          
71 Greenberg  delineates a similar distinction over a decade earlier, in reference to the work of Rufino 
Tamayo, whom he claims illustrates emotion, rather than expressing it in a manner inextricable from the 
embodiment of the work (CEC2: 133) 
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not elaborate upon this observation, but it is the case in so far as both thinkers trace the 
process by which, as I detailed in Chapter 5, modernist art takes on the task of resisting the 
determinate judgements of capital by countering exchange-value with its fetish character, as 
entailing mimetic comportment on the part of artists who are nevertheless in control of their 
materials. As Adorno characterises artists as working ‘in a kind of active receptivity, to that 
to which the materials are striving on their own’ (2002b: 125), on Greenberg’s view, as 
Charles Harrison puts it, ‘it is through the evidence of feedback from the work in process that 
[demands of a specific medium] are understood by the artist’ (1999: xvii). Thus, figured 
aright, the supposed formalist dictates by which Greenberg contends modernist artists work 
may be heteronomous to the artists who follow them, but they are not so in a manner 
homologous with the technocratic impositions of the post-war American workplace, but 
rather in a sense akin to what Adorno refers to as ‘the element of self-alienness that occurs 
under the constraint of the material’ (AT: 170). That is to say, the mode of artistic production 
which Greenberg describes is one for which the artist is guided by ‘consciousness of the 
nonidentical object [...] that which is open and as such familiar, that which is no longer 
dressed and prepared and thereby alienated’ (Adorno, 1992: 146).72 
  This is also clear if we turn to the way in which both Adorno and Greenberg contend art 
praxis fails in this respect. Adorno posits that ‘[t]he more expression has been constrained by 
the semiotic system of aesthetics, in the form of conventions, the more profoundly art’s 
mimetic aspect is falsified. Kitsch is nothing but mimesis rendered false by reification’ (1995: 
                                                          
72 In this, then, I contend that Greenberg is speaking in good faith when he insists that he did not ‘lay 
down conditions for quality’ and that it would be ‘illegitimate to believe in, advocate, and prescribe’ such 
conditions (CEC4: 267). Nevertheless, if his criticism is ultimately not authoritarian in terms of imposing 
categorical standards of medium-specificity to which artists must adapt their praxis, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that, as his influence grew, he did become notorious in handing out edicts to painters whose 
work he felt was not, to adopt the Adornian terms in which I have framed his criticism, in the service of 
the non-identical. As Caroline A. Jones notes, Greenberg is reported ‘to have directed paint, suggested 
crop marks, or even determined the orientation of artists’ abstract canvases’ (EA: 5). As Naifeh and Smith 
recount, by 1952 artists had ‘had enough of [Greenberg] visiting their studios and “telling them what to 
paint”’ (1989: 173). The writers draw upon an anecdote from Milton Resnick, in which the painter 
describes how once in the Cedar Tavern he overheard Greenberg bragging ‘that he juried a show and gave 
somebody a prize on the condition that he turn the picture upside down because it looked better that 
way.’ He left the table, telling Greenberg he would never sit with him again; the other painters left with 
him, and ‘everyone who heard the story applauded’ (Ibid). 
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73). The obvious parallel here is with Greenberg’s claim in ‘Kitsch’ that ‘when enough time 
has elapsed,’ kitsch loots avant-garde art ‘for new “twists,” which are then watered down’ 
(CEC1: 12). Yet, he perhaps elucidates the obverse implications for avant-garde praxis most 
explicitly in a 1964 essay entitled ‘The “Crisis” of Abstract Art.’ This essay was again 
written as part of a symposium on the state of painterly abstraction, this time in the French 
magazine Preuves. In it, Greenberg, who by then was championing the second-generation of 
colour-field painters, argues that painterly abstraction had been superseded. This judgement, 
however, is not founded on the premise that elements of painterly abstraction which impeded 
emphasis upon medium-specificity had been negated by the “post-painterly” abstraction of 
Louis, Olitski and Noland, towards a further sharpening of focus on the ontological limits of 
painting. Contrarily, Greenberg derides the adoption of medium-specificity as a formula by 
artists, claiming that even a ‘young chimpanzee’ could by then create ‘recognisable pictorial 
form as he paints by showing that he acknowledges the shape of the flat support’ (CEC4: 
180). Rather, for Greenberg in 1964 painterly abstraction was in crisis because it ‘had turned 
by and large into an assortment of ready-made effects’ with ‘its second generation 
[producing] mannered, imitative, uninspired and repetitious art,’ and thus painterliness was 
no longer ‘at least for the time being [...] a means of releasing spontaneity for expressive ends 
in abstract art’ (CEC4: 179-80). Greenberg contends, then, that by 1964 painterly abstraction 
no longer objectivated mimetic expression, having become a reified semiotic system, whose 
ossification he dates at 1955.73 I will not at this point address the question of painterly 
                                                          
73 In asserting this, Greenberg might be percieved as contradicting his earlier position on the matter of 
artistic forms’ progressive redundancy when defending Abstract Expressionism in its nascence. Writing 
in reference to the Second Viennese School, Adorno asserts that ‘[w]hoever [...] claims that the new art is 
as beautiful as the traditional one, does it a real disservice; he praises in it what this music rejects so long 
as it unflinchingly follows its own impulse’ (2002b: 181). Greenberg, on the other hand, appears to take a 
diametrically opposed tack. In a 1944 a review of a Baziotes show, for instance, he reassures his 
readership that ‘[t]wo or three of his larger oils may become masterpieces in several years, once they stop 
disturbing us by their nervousness, by their unexampled colour – off-shades in the intervals between red 
and blue, red and yellow, yellow and green, all depth, involution, and glow – and by their very originality’ 
(CEC1: 240). And in a 1946 review of a Pollock show, he affirms that ‘what is thought to be Pollock’s bad 
taste is in reality simply his willingness to be ugly in terms of contemporary taste,’ anticipating that ‘[i]n 
the course of time this ugliness will become a new standard of beauty’ (CEC2: 74). However, to 
understand such assertions as setting Greenberg apart from Adorno is to presuppose that Greenberg 
conceives of prevailing ‘standards of beauty’ as authoritative, rather than the conventional, reified form of 
what was once vital. 
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abstraction’s obsolescence, suffice to have established that the determinate negation of 
representational content for which Greenberg celebrated Abstract Expressionism in the ‘40s 
through to the mid ‘50s was never significant in so far as it served to define the elements 
which are essential to a medium, despite his claims to that effect. Rather, Greenberg was 
accounting for the rational cultivation of art’s mimetic aspect.74 Indeed, in ‘“American-Type” 
Painting’ he claims that the mid-50s work of Still and Newman was compelling in ways 
which, contrarily to more finely determining the ontological fundaments of the medium of 
painting, threatened to outgrow it. He speculated that ‘[t]he easel picture [would] hardly 
survive [...] Newman’s huge, calmly and evenly burning canvases,’ whose style amounted ‘to 
the most direct attack upon it so far,’ and not because it was ruthless in its systematic 
dispensation of painting’s conventions, but rather because it uncompromisingly followed its 
materials in a manner which was ‘deep and honest, and [carried] a feeling for colour without 
like in recent painting’ (CEC3: 232). As I will now explore, such rational cultivation of art’s 
mimetic aspect was indeed precisely how the Abstract Expressionists appear to have worked.  
  In the case of Pollock, critics have often been quick to point to his constructive rigour to 
correct the notion that his work is reducible to contingent expressiveness. MoMA director 
William Rubin’s exhaustive tracing of Pollock’s modernist antecedents in his four-part series 
of Artforum articles in 1967 was undertaken in explicit opposition to the notion that Pollock 
‘surrendered decision making to mindless kinetic activity’ (1999: 118). And Ellen G. Landau 
has made this argument in more recent decades. In her 1989 monograph on the artist she 
celebrates Blue Poles (1952) for the ‘brilliantly conceived and executed overstructure’ of 
eight angled rods which, for her, dominate the ‘less coherent underlayers of the painting’ and 
                                                          
74 To understanding Greenberg in this way is to oppose Peter Osborne’s distinction between Adorno and 
Greenberg, wherein the latter is differentiated from the former precisely because, Osborne claims, 
Greenberg does not recognise that the dialectic of modernism is driven by ‘the progressive, socially 
determined redundancy of particular forms of artistic material [...] as a consequence of their 
neutralisation by the history of the reception of previous works’ (1989: 44). Instead, Osborne 
characterises Greenberg as ‘essentially a structuralist of mediums’ (2013: 80). Thus, he claims for 
Greenberg ‘the question of autonomy is essentially a question of the degree to which a work has 
“purified” itself of any aesthetic content extrogenous to the formal properties of its particular physical 
medium’ and thus denies ‘any constitutive role to the “social” within the “aesthetic”’ (1989: 41). 
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thus ‘triumphantly exert’ Pollock’s authority (1989: 222). And in 2014 she denigrated Ed 
Harris’s fictionalised film biography of the artist, Pollock (2000), for giving the impression 
that Pollock had ‘[n]o need to contend with fine craftsmanship, figuration, and other 
traditional [...] expectations of easel painting,’ and instead ‘simply [followed his] instincts’ 
(2014: 8). Furthermore, James Coddington, MoMA’s chief conservator, has x-rayed 
Pollock’s Full Fathom Five (1947) to corroborate the argument that the artist ‘understood 
much about traditional methods of painting, and incorporated this into his style’ (1999: 101). 
He posits that legible under the visible paint is a ‘rough figure’ built from piled impasto, in 
reference to which many elements of the work are structured, for instance, ‘the nails, tacks, 
buttons, key, etc [...] are placed in direct response to and elaboration of this shape [...] and the 
final paint application, of white and orange in the upper right corner, follow a similar logic’ 
(Ibid: 103).  
  However, such accounts tend to understate the extent to which Pollock’s ‘authority’ is 
mediated through a mimetic relationship with his materials. When making a similar point 
about Mozart as those surveyed above about Pollock, Adorno claims that while Mozart 
‘played the role of the divinely gifted, capering prodigy,’ he was in fact ‘incomparably more 
reflexive than the popular profile of him lets on’ (AT: 337). Yet, Adorno affirms that Mozart 
was reflexive ‘not in the sense of a freely hovering abstract intelligence but in the 
compositional material itself’ (Ibid). The same was true of Pollock, as he himself expresses 
well in his 1947 artist’s statement featured in the sole issue of Possibilities, a magazine 
founded by Motherwell and Rosenberg, in which Rothko also published his above-discussed 
statement. In this statement, Pollock asserts that, rather than forcing his will upon his 
materials, he lets a painting’s ‘life of its own [...] come through’ and ‘it is only when [he 
loses] contact with the painting that the result is a mess’ (1947: 79). That is to say, if he 
disposes over his work with authority, it is authority which conforms to mimetic impulses. As 
Kirk Varndoe writes, Pollock’s praxis ‘required a disciplined focus on what the materials told 
him as he worked’ (1998: 54). And this bears out to the extent to which, as Thomas Crow 
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writes, the ‘new techniques’ accordingly invented by Pollock were not erratic but betray 
understanding of his materials’ ‘behaviour and durability’ to the extent ‘that his paintings 
have lost almost none of their original articulation,’ as Crow notes Coddington also 
acknowledged upon conducting a comprehensive examination of Pollock’s paintings 
coincident with a MoMA retrospective of 1999 (1999: 94). 
  The other Abstract Expressionists seem to have worked similarly. Hofmann claims that 
‘[p]ictorial homogeneity of the composition – plastic unity – is developed by lawfully 
governed inner necessities’ (1967: 58). As Greenberg writes, Hofmann addresses ‘the picture 
surface consciously as a responsive rather than inert object’ (CEC4: 72). Hedda Sterne claims 
her paintings are ‘[p]reconceived only partly. Because as [she goes] the painting begins to 
function by rules of its own, often preventing [her] from achieving her original vision’ (qtd. 
in Seitz 1983: 96). Frankenthaler claims that while she is painting there is ‘a moment when 
all frequencies are right and it hits’ which she then follows ‘with a whole aesthetic 
vocabulary’ produced by the moment, hoping ‘to have the ability to let that moment guide 
[her] from there’ (qtd. in Belz 2003: 154). Motherwell asserts that ‘painting and sculpture are 
not skills that can be taught in reference to pre-established criteria’ but instead entail ‘a 
process, whose content is found, subtle, and deeply felt’ and describes this process of one of 
mimetic assimilation, as ‘a painter, in working a canvas, sensing it all over, watching it shift 
and change and slowly emerge’ (1992: 80; 66). De Kooning often gives the impression that 
his praxis is driven entirely by contingency, claiming for instance that he is opposed to 
‘order’ because it ‘can only come from above. Order [...] is to be ordered about and that is a 
limitation’ (qtd. in Shiff 2011a: 247), and that he knows he has finished a painting when he 
‘just stop[s]’ and ‘sometimes find[s] a terrific picture’ (1990: 228). However, 
notwithstanding his own statements, De Kooning’s praxis was certainly one of order from 
below. De Kooning’s opposition to order should be understood in the sense that Adorno 
writes that he has ‘never understood the so-called need for order [...] based on known 
systems’ because the ‘immanent, transparent laws that spring from freedom and the 
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capitulation to an invoked order are mutually incompatible’ (1998b: 291-2). As Ben Watson 
writes of Adorno’s argument here, De Kooning’s opposition to order is not conversely a 
commitment to chaos, but instead models the ‘informed and conscious elimination of all 
inherited hierarchies’ which a genuinely rational society would achieve (2011: 20-1). John 
Elderfield and Terry Winters have elaborated how the notion that De Kooning’s praxis entails 
‘willed de-skilling’ is belied by the evidence of the paintings, whose marks are ‘both willed 
and last-minute’ (2011: 332). While De Kooning’s control over his material is never in 
question, his facility is subordinated to ‘the qualities of the material itself,’ in so far as he 
resists convention in active reciprocity with the material. Elderfield and Winters exemplify 
this with the 1948 piece Painting (1948), upon which the ‘paint was applied as treacle, which 
flattened out,’ a development to which De Kooning accordingly adapted his technique (Ibid).  
  Of all the Abstract Expressionists, though, these dynamics common to each of the artists’ 
praxes – the dialectic of construction and mimesis in the service of paratactical articulation – 
are perhaps typified best by Joan Mitchell, and especially her painting Mandres (1961-2). As 
Linda Nochlin notes, the expressiveness of Mitchell’s painting (which Nochlin aligns with 
‘the notion of a feminine other – energetic, angry, excessive, spilling over the boundaries of 
the formless, the victimised, the gentle, and the passive’), would be nothing ‘[w]ithout 
Mitchell’s unerring sense of formal rectitude’ (2015: 268-9). Furthermore, the fact that this 
formal rectitude was developed in mimetic receptivity to an artwork as Mitchell worked it is 
acknowledged by Klaus Kertess, when he characterises her praxis as ‘paint, step back, paint, 
step back deliberations’ (1997: 20).75 Nevertheless, Joan Mitchell’s art is ostensibly an 
unlikely candidate for an Adornian reading. For Adorno, ‘[r]adical art [...] is synonymous 
                                                          
75Kertess claims this disqualifies Mitchell from ‘the ranks of Rosenberg’s macho warriors armed with 
gesture’ (20). However, if in Rosenberg’s most famous essay ‘American Action Painters,’ he appears to 
extol an account of Abstract Expressionist artworks as exercises in the artist’s authority to decide ‘to 
paint...just TO PAINT’ (1962: 30), he elsewhere gives a more nuanced account of Abstract Expressionist 
praxis akin to the one detailed in this chapter. For example, he writes the following of Newman’s working 
method: ‘[A]n original image or format begins to appear, becomes unmistakeable, and is affirmed through 
conscious emphasis on its peculiar features and through elimination of incidentals [...] his identifying 
format arose out of a “genetic moment” (to apply the title of one of his early paintings) in his activity of 
painting. He did not “figure out” his format; it appeared, and he recognised it. (1979: 44) 
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with dark art; its primary colour is black,’ because art which, conversely, ‘childishly delights 
in colour’ simply serves as consolation so long as the status quo reproduces itself on the back 
of senseless and preventable suffering (AT: 39). But Mitchell’s paintings are often defined by 
their lively use of colour – their ‘vibrant, thickly daubed surfaces [which] don’t ever seem to 
settle or set’ (Peiffer 2015: 203). As Michael Kimmelman writes in a 2002 review of a 
Mitchell retrospective at the Whitney Museum in New York, these surfaces can be ‘so 
immediately intoxicating that a natural reaction is to distrust the art’ on the basis that 
‘[p]aintings this suave and sure-footed must be glib and manipulative’ (2002 5 July). 
However, I do not think Adorno’s prohibition of colourful art should necessarily be taken à la 
lettre. He writes that ‘the ideal of blackness with regard to content [inhaltlich76] is one of the 
deepest impulses of abstraction’ (AT: 39). That is, he appears to be describing as tenebrous 
the determinate negation of affirmative content. Indeed, elsewhere he uses the metaphor of 
colour to make the same point, claiming that ‘[w]hat art, notably the art decried as nihilistic, 
says in refraining from judgements is that everything is not just nothing […] Indelible from 
the resistance to the fungible world of exchange is the resistance of the eye that does not want 
the colors of the world to fade’ (ND: 404-405). As I have shown, this is precisely the 
dynamic of the Abstract Expressionists’ binding of objectivity to particularity, and Mitchell’s 
paintings were demonstrably composed in this spirit. She explicitly details her praxis in terms 
of the determinate negation of reified elements when she claims ‘I do not condense things. I 
try to eliminate clichés, extraneous material. I try to make it exact’ (qtd in Nelson, 2007: 
15).77 Indeed, in his review Kimmelman proceeds to repudiate his prima facie judgement, 
                                                          
76 Hullot-Kentor at this point does not include the original German in translating inhaltlich into ‘with 
regard to content,’ as he does when the distinction between content in terms of Inhalt or Gehalt is less 
clear. However, it is of course important to my argument that ‘blackness with regard to content,’ is here 
understood as negation of affirmative subject-matter. In the original we find ‘Das Ideal des Schwarzen ist 
inhaltlich einer der tiefsten Impulse von Abstraktion’ (66). 
 
77 Moreoever, she shared a thoroughgoing artistic affinity with Samuel Beckett, whose work was 
emblematic of the synonymy of radical with dark art for Adorno, and to whom he intended to dedicate 
Aesthetic Theory. Mitchell and Beckett are reported to have regularly talked ‘bleakness and gloom’ (Albers 
2001: 269), and in 1959, the latter invited Mitchell to contribute watercolours to accompany his play 
Embers, a collaboration which was ultimately never completed, not due to incommensurability between 
the chromaticity of Mitchell’s painting and the asceticism of Beckett’s theatre, but because Mitchell 
126 
 
expounding that Mitchell’s paintings bear a discursively inexplicable profundity. And 
Maggie Nelson identifies ‘the blazing particularity of Michell’s colours’ as the ‘celebration of 
the specific’ (2007: 31). This is certainly the case with Mandres. Recently, on the occasion of 
the 2016 Abstract Expressionism show at London’s Royal Academy of Arts, Peter de Bolla 
wrote the following of the painting, which was inconspicuously located in a section of the 
exhibition entitled ‘Gesture as Colour’ 
Joan Mitchell created an astonishing summation of the various answers that had been 
proposed to the question of what the hell to paint. This is Abstract Expressionism’s 
greatest late work. Form, structure and content are interrogated and transformed by so 
vast a repertoire of techniques of pigment application that you lose count: look up 
close and you will see paint squeezed, trowelled, flicked, smoothed. Mitchell uses and 
invests with absolute conviction the swirl, smudge, scrub, swipe, smear, swish, 
scribble, drip, drag, dribble, scrim, splatter, splash, squiggle, wash, wipe, blot, dab, 
stab. There’s no painting I know like it. I doubt there ever could be one. (2016: 13)  
In this, I contend that de Bolla hits upon what makes Mandres formally compelling, if not the 
significance of this fascination. It is surely striking to witness all the elements de Bolla 
enumerates seeming to jostle for pre-eminence and yet at the same time finding their precise 
place in an arrangement which appears to be determined by both centripetal and centrifugal 
forces while lacking an orientational axis; which utterly eschews both overall uniformity and 
a vanishing point or discernible proportion and yet is certainly not inchoate. However, rather 
than taken as a taxonomical exposition of Abstract Expressionist technique, that all these 
elements co-exist in the painting should be understood as indicative of the degree to which 
Mandres is a whole which exists for the sake of authorising its parts, lending the semblance 
of insistent bindingness to the claims of indigent particulars.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concluded that the Gehalt of the former was present in the latter without her illustration, ‘deciding that 
the play was already visual enough “without a single visual description in it”’ (Nelson 2007: 24). 
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  Maggie Nelson speculates that Mitchell’s purported ‘scepticism about innovation’ may be 
founded in the fact that, as a woman, she does not share her fellow male Abstract 
Expressionists’ (Greenbergian) ‘commitment to innovation qua innovation’ (2007: 19). For 
Nelson, such investment in lineage presupposes ‘a feeling that one’s work will somehow 
matter in the scheme of things, that it will have a significant part to play in the course of art 
or literary history,’ and she surmises that reticence on the part of Mitchell to take on this 
position might be chalked up to ‘the historical fact of women’s presumed irrelevance to those 
histories’ (Ibid). Indeed, Mitchell had her first solo show in 1952, not long before 1955, the 
year in which Greenberg proclaimed painterly abstraction had been exhausted, and Mandres 
was completed seven years later. Accordingly, Mitchell was generally underrated and 
unmentioned by Greenberg, like so many other women painters, including Greenberg’s 
acolyte and once (abused78) lover Frankenthaler. Regardless, I have argued that Mitchell’s 
work is quintessential with respect to the dynamics of Greenberg’s medium-specificity, and, 
while I established in the Chapter 4 that the notion of Abstract Expressionism’s modernist 
innovation qua innovation certainly facilitated its co-optation in the worldwide maintenance 
and imposition of capitalism, I have been arguing in this chapter that it is precisely those 
elements of Abstract Expressionism which Greenberg stressed as positioning the movement 
at the forefront of the European modernist lineage, which align it with all that has been 
presumed irrelevant to the history which legitimates capitalism. Whereas the latter is 
buttressed by determinate judgements according to concepts which subsume, truncate and 
reify particularity, Abstract Expressionism commands attention on the basis of particularity 
which resists determinate judgements. 
  In Chapter 6, I argued that approbation of Abstract Expressionist artworks as bulwarks 
against capitalist rationalisation on the basis that they supposedly articulate their artists’ 
subjective interiorities, accords to the same logic by which the artworks were deployed in the 
                                                          
78 Caroline A. Jones recounts, upon their breaking up, Greenberg ‘“punching out” Frankenthaler’s new 
lover(s), socking those who rubbed it in, and finally hauling off and slugging Helen herself’ (425). 
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name of capitalist democracy. In this chapter, by reading Greenberg’s account of Abstract 
Expressionist praxis through Adorno, I elaborated how, rather than subjugating materials in 
the service of expression, Abstract Expressionists praxis is a process of dialectical reciprocity 
which renders its materials bindingly eloquent. In the remainder of this thesis, I will argue 
that, if Abstract Expressionism concerns intense subjectivity, it is in terms of how this 
emphatic particularity necessarily leaves the spectator with recourse to nothing but their 
perceptual experience; their individual subjectivity. As Bernstein writes, to account for the 
artworks’ bindingness in terms of the artists’ lyrical expression conflates ‘the issue of 
particularity [...] with the equation of art and lyric’ (AVB: 153), and is ultimately an attempt 
to reduce to subjective projection a power which inheres precisely in the negation of ‘all 
those elements that might with some justification be regarded as projections of the human on 
to the inanimate’ (1997b: 205). We might understand Allan Kaprow’s influential description 
of the experience of a Pollock canvas, detailed in his essay ‘The Legacy of Jackson Pollock’ 
(1958), as an oscillation between submission to the artwork’s objectivity and identification 
with Pollock in the act of painting, to be symptomatic of this recourse to this category of the 
artist’s subjectivity in an attempt to conceptually subsume this intensely subjective perceptual 
experience which eludes such subsumption and yet is nonetheless binding. As Bernstein puts 
it, the experience of Abstract Expressionism is an experience whereby ‘in being beyond 
command perceptual experience is returned to the subject,’ and thus the thought of Abstract 
Expressionism as the record of their makers’ personal expression can only be ‘crude and 
misdirected’ (AVB: 153; 276-277, my italics). In the following chapters, I will argue that, 
conceived mimetically in this way, the intense subjectivity elicited by Abstract 
Expressionism is inimical to the so-called democratic pluralism of capitalism. Instead, it 
indicts the latter by engaging the somatic and affective elements of experience which it 
delegitimates and inhibits, and prefigures the self-conscious global subject whose emergence 
is necessary to transcend it.  
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Chapter Eight 
Greenberg’s Kantianism contra Greenberg’s Positivism 
  Bernstein claims that his account of Abstract Expressionism establishes that, had Adorno 
turned his attention to painting, ‘he would have, could have, only deployed the resources of 
Abstract Expressionism for his purposes’ (AVB: 146). However, I have already 
acknowledged that Adorno did address painting, if as a secondary concern, and neither is it 
strictly true that Adorno never turned his attention to Abstract Expressionism, at least in 
terms of its characterisation by Harold Rosenberg as ‘action painting.’ There are two 
passages in Aesthetic Theory which refer to ‘action painting,’ about which Adorno is 
ambivalent: 
If even as late as 1930 experimentation referred to efforts filtered through critical 
consciousness in opposition to the continuation of unreflected aesthetic practices, in 
the meantime the concept has acquired the stipulation that a work should have 
contents that are not foreseeable in the process of production, that, subjectively, the 
artist should be surprised by the work that results. [...] The risk is that of aesthetic 
regression. Artistic spirit raises itself above what merely exists at the point where the 
imagination does not capitulate to the mere existence of materials and techniques. 
Since the emancipation if the subject, the mediation of the work through it is not to be 
renounced without its reversion to the status of a thing [...] On the other hand, only 
stubbornness could deny the productive function of many “surprise” elements in 
much modern art, in action painting and aleatoric art, that did not result from being 
passed through the imagination. [...] In the experiment, the ego-alien must be 
respected as well as subjectively mastered (AT: 38). 
 
Resignation vis-a-vis time and space gave ground to the crisis of nominalistic form 
until it was reduced to a mere point, effectively inert. Action painting, l’art informelle, 
and aleatoric works may have carried the element of resignation to its extreme: The 
130 
 
aesthetic subject exempts itself of the burden of giving form to the contingent material 
it encounters, despairs the possibility of undergirding it, and instead shifts the 
responsibility for its organisation back to the contingent material itself. The gain here 
is, however, dubious. Form purportedly distilled from the contingent and the 
heterogeneous itself remains heterogeneous and, for the artwork, arbitrary; in its 
literalness it is alien to art [...] This situation holds embedded in itself the figure of its 
own critique [...] The extremely objective critique of semblance incorporates an 
illusory element that is perhaps as irrevocable as the aesthetic semblance of all 
artworks. Often in artistic products of chance a necessity is sensed to subordinate 
these works to, effectively, a stylizing procedure of selection. Corriger la fortune: 
This is the fateful writing on the wall of the nominalistic artwork (AT: 220). 
We saw in Chapter 5 that Rosenberg observes how Abstract Expressionist artworks bear an 
‘irreducible plus’ by which they are separated from ‘the universe of things’ in a manner 
which chimes with Adorno’s claim that authentic artworks take on the character of a 
nonconceptual, nonrigidified language, and thus, as particulars unsubsumable under any 
universal, lodge a claim for repressed nature. As I elaborated in Chapter 7, for Adorno this 
character is realised through a praxial dialectic of construction and mimesis, whereby the 
subject who executes the artwork is guided by that which is not the subject, determinately 
negating ossified conventions in mimetic receptiveness with their materials. Thus, what 
appears ‘as the specific, unique, and  nonsubstitutable quality of each individual work’ is 
always necessarily ‘a deviation from [a] genre’ which takes its orders from the artwork’s 
materials (AT: 204). However, as the quotes above make clear, while Adorno concedes that 
certain elements of ‘action painting’ instantiate the productiveness of that which is not the 
subject, he ultimately contends that the artist of ‘action painting’ eschews the effort of 
subjectively mastering that which is not the subject, and thus runs the risk of complicity with 
reification by regressing ‘to the barbaric literalness of what is aesthetically the case’ (AT: 
103). That is, the artist renounces the dialectic of construction and mimesis and attempts to 
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valorise particularity by abstractly negating construction and leaving the artwork ‘blindly to 
itself,’ and what results is a ‘literal facticity’ which is ‘irreconcilable with art’ (AT: 220). As 
will become increasingly important in the following chapters, for Adorno ‘nothing counts in 
artworks that does not originate in the configuration of their sensual elements’ (AT: 87). 
Nevertheless, ‘the sensual in artworks is artistic only if it is itself mediated by spirit’ (Ibid). 
When this is not the case, the ‘difference between artworks and merely sensual qualities’ is 
negated and the artwork is ‘an empirical entity, nothing more than – in American argot – a 
battery of tests’ (AT: 264). Thus, Adorno contends such art is undifferentiated from the total 
mediation which reigns extra-aesthetically, where ‘everything experienced in primary terms 
is culturally preformed’ (1973: 131). 
  Now, I argued in Chapter 7 that Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionism makes clear 
that this was definitively not the case in terms of Abstract Expressionist praxis. Indeed, it is 
on similar grounds to Adorno’s critique of ‘action painting’ that in 1962 Greenberg wrote 
‘How Art Writing Earns its Bad Name,’ a broadside against Rosenberg, whose account of 
Abstract Expressionism as ‘action painting,’ first articulated in his essay ‘The American 
Action Painters,’ had proven increasingly influential over the preceding decade. In ‘How Art 
Writing Earns its Bad Name,’ whether or not coloured by ressentiment – as Herbert Read 
would have it79 – Greenberg decries Rosenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionism for 
rendering Abstract Expressionist artworks no different from the world of things. He bemoans 
the fact that Rosenberg’s concept of Abstract Expressionism had, especially in England, been 
so prevalently taken to be adequate to the object of the artworks that ‘most English art critics 
                                                          
79 In a letter to the editor upon the republication of Greenberg’s article in Encounter, reprinted alongside 
the article in the fourth volume of Greenberg’s collected works, Herbert Read opens with the sentence, 
‘[i]t is often difficult [...] to define the ressentiment that causes a critic to indulge in baseless attacks on his 
colleagues,’ although in the next sentence he makes clear that he thinks he has defined it, stating that the 
attack was because Rosenberg had ‘of late challenged Mr. Greenberg’s supremacy’ in the field of art 
writing (CEC4: 145). Indeed, Greenberg and Rosenberg had been engaged in a combative rivalry for 
decades prior to the publication of ‘How Art Writing Earns its Bad Name.’ This is evident as early as 
Greenberg’s letters to Harold Lazarus from the late ‘30s, in which Greenberg derides Rosenberg’s ‘desire 
always to be right,’ and claims that ‘this is why these guys, brilliant, don’t amount to anything in the end,’ 
and, upon the publication of ‘Kitsch,’ complains that Rosenberg had Dwight Macdonald ‘he liked [Avant 
Garde and Kitsch], with reservations, but won’t say a word about it in the postcards he sends me. What an 
egoism that can’t afford to give me the little salve of a compliment’ (184, 212). In her biography of 
Greenberg, Clement Greenberg: A Life (1997) Florence Rubenfeld provides a good overview of the two 
critics’ rivalry, see especially 165-71. 
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[reacted] to Mr. Rosenberg’s explanation of the new American painting rather than to the 
painting itself’ (CEC4: 139). According to Greenberg, in contradistinction with his own  
recognition of Abstract Expressionism’s inheritance of the European tradition, Rosenberg’s 
criticism renders Abstract Expressionist artworks ‘the by-product of acts of sheer self-
expression ungoverned by the norms of any discipline’ in his contention that the ‘covered 
canvas was left over as the unmeaning aftermath of an “event”’ (CEC4: 136). Thus, 
Greenberg protests that Rosenberg’s account conceives Abstract Expressionist artworks as 
more akin to extra-aesthetic objects and events than with works of art. Nevertheless, 
Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionism is often understood as coterminous with the 
same ‘positivism’ of the status quo to which Adorno argues aleatoric art lends itself, not least 
because Greenberg claimed the term for himself. In what follows, I will first briefly outline 
Adorno’s criticism of positivism, in so far as it legitimates the macrostructural determinants 
of everyday life to which the experience of individual subjects are subordinated. I will then 
show how Greenberg’s self-declared positivistic account of Abstract Expressionism has been 
characterised similarly, not in terms of how Abstract Expressionism’s supposed arbitrariness 
encourages passive acceptance of the status quo, but in terms of how it supposedly overrides 
subjective experience of the works with recourse to invariant criteria for the apprehension of 
art. I will then, however, proceed to argue with recourse to Greenberg’s references to Kant 
that, in fact, that which Greenberg’s supposed positivism registers in Abstract Expressionism 
runs counter to such capitulation. 
  The critique of positivism was integral to the way in which the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School staked out the difference between their critical theory and what 
Horkheimer, the institute’s director, termed ‘traditional theory.’ As Raymond Geuss puts it, 
in this distinction ‘a “positivist” is a person who holds (a) that an empiricist account of 
natural science is adequate, and (b) that all cognition must have essentially the same 
cognitive structure as natural science’ (1981: 2). That is to say, for the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School, positivism is the application of the disembodied gaze of the natural 
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scientist to social phenomena. Accordingly, the latter are reified as second nature. The notion 
that they could be otherwise than mediated by capital, and meaningful interrogation of this 
mediation, is discounted, and phenomena are simply apprehended in terms of appearance. 
Equally, however, mediation by the empirical subject is dismissed as “only subjective,” as the 
latter contracts to a point of neutrality, which Adorno describes as ‘the reified apperception of 
the hypostatized’ (1976: 76).80 As Simon Jarvis puts it, Adorno criticises positivism ‘not 
because it pays too much attention to experience, but because it is not attentive enough’ 
(1998: 88). I detailed in Chapter 5 that Adorno shows how the regression of enlightenment 
into myth entails the delegitimation of particularity. Sensory experience is thus denuded of 
authority in terms of fundamental societal determinants, which legislate for everyday life in 
the interests of capital. As Bernstein perspicuously summarises Adorno’s position: 
As a context of guilt, the world inhabited is purchased through vice, albeit not 
explicitly moral vice, but the generalised vice of acting in accordance with principles 
and norms of reasoning that are themselves incommensurable with a proper regard for 
the sensuous particulars composing anthropomorphic nature to the extreme in which 
that nature has been lost to sight, and life reduced to having a contemplative stance 
toward it even when it is most vigorously pursued. (2001: 228) 
For Adorno, then, the subject of positivism subserves the prevailing relations of production 
and sees them as no more revocable than a businessman who ‘calculates his options and takes 
his decisions [...] guided not by his character, but by calculations, his balance sheet, his 
budget and his plan for the next business cycle in which the objective elements of the 
situation are concentrated’ (2006: 70). As should be clear from this chapter thus far, Adorno 
argues that aleatoric art invites precisely this positivistic mode of reception. Adorno contends 
that, if artists surrender control over their materials, the ‘postulate of the particular has the 
negative aspect of serving the reduction of aesthetic distance and thereby joining forces with 
                                                          
80 Adorno’s elucidates his criticism of positivism most clearly in the pieces ‘Sociology and Empirical 
Research’ and ‘On the Logic of the Social Sciences,’ both published in The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology (1976). 
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the status quo’ (AT: 204). He writes that, instead of forming an artwork with lability in regard 
to that which is formed, to defer to contingency is simply to accept ‘materials which have 
been preformed by history’ as ‘realities in themselves’ (1998b: 286). Rather than eliciting 
consciousness of nonidentity, it limits us to things as they are reified under capitalism. As 
Ben Watson summarises Adorno’s criticism of aleatoric art, Adorno contends that aleatoric 
art’s presuppositions are those of ‘a philosophy summed up in the adage “wake up and smell 
the coffee,” with all its positivist implications of refusing to imagine where coffee comes 
from and the life-iniquities imposed on the coffee trade’ (2011: 30).81  
  For Adorno, then, if artists abdicate to chance, they run the risk of creating work which 
simply displays ‘outwardly what cannot become art – canvas and mere tones (AT: 103). Art 
thereby becomes ‘its own enemy, the direct and false continuation of purposeful rationality,’ 
and thus ‘immediacy of aesthetic comportment’ converges with positivism as ‘an immediate 
relationship to the universally mediated’ (AT: 219). Similarly, Greenberg characterizes 
Abstract Expressionism as ‘positivist’ in so far as it ‘thrusts a sheet of pigment at you with an 
immediate force proper only to the realm of material sensations’ (CEC2: 250). However, for 
him ‘positivism’ is wholly a term of approbation. In 1944 Greenberg claimed that ‘[t]he taste 
most closely attuned to contemporary art [had] become positivist, even as the best 
philosophical and political intelligence of the time’ (CEC1: 203). He defined his usage of the 
term in his criticism in a 1991 interview with Peter Fuller in terms of how he ‘didn’t allow for 
anything but the thing, the res’ which for Greenberg was ‘what Modernism since Manet came 
down to, regardless of what the artists themselves held to’ (Saunders 1991: 20). As I noted in 
the previous chapter, in the late ‘40s, once he had renounced the notion that avant-garde art 
posed a threat to the status quo, Greenberg posited that avant-garde art might ‘found’ the 
sensibilities of modern subjects and accordingly ‘remunerate’ them for the necessary 
frustrations of life in industrial capitalism. In the previous chapter, I proceeded to contend 
                                                          
81 While Watson does not cite it, instead attributing the observation to the artist Gerry Fialka, this bears 
striking similarity to Marx’s assertion in Capital Vol. 1 that ‘the taste of porridge does not tell us who grew 
the oats’ (290). 
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that, in terms of the art praxis he favoured, this entailed a constructive corrective to ‘wild’ art 
readily reified as dominant rationality’s other. Bracketing this, however, it is easy to 
understand how it might be interpreted as a capitulation to the status quo when Greenberg 
claims in 1947 that Pollock had come closest to achieving such an art which ‘founds’ 
sensibility because the artist’s work constituted ‘an attempt to cope with urban life; it dwells 
entirely in the lonely jungle of immediate sensations, impulses and notions, therefore is 
positivist’ (CEC2: 166). That is, whereas Adorno argues that Abstract Expressionism figured 
as aleatoric in Rosenberg’s terms invites a positivistic mode of reception which capitulates to 
the status quo because its materials are unmediated, commentators have contended that 
Greenberg prescribes a positivistic mode of reception which actively accommodates itself to 
the status quo. That is, in the same way as we saw in Chapter 6 Greenberg’s supposedly fixed 
criteria for the creation of art are accused of selfsameness with Taylorism, Greenberg’s edicts 
for the reception of art are said to attune perception for the exigencies of capitalism. 
  This is the central thesis of the most comprehensive study of Greenberg’s thought in recent 
years, Caroline A. Jones’s Eyesight Alone (2005), in which she argues that Greenberg’s 
criticism mapped ‘the conditions of possibility for the seen,’ thus bringing empirical subjects 
in line with the orders of a reified transcendental subject which ‘subsumes the I and forgets 
the body that frames its every view’ (EA: 9). For Caroline A. Jones, this project is rooted in 
the Marxist ambition for art to create ‘not only an object for the individual, but also an 
individual for the object,’ as Marx affirms is the object of art in one of his many scattered 
comments on aesthetics (EA: 81). To trace this influence on Greenberg, Jones takes recourse 
to the The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx by Mikhail Lifshitz, the ideas from which were 
likely familiar to Greenberg since it was translated from the Russian and published by the 
New York Critics Group in 1938 (EA: 82-3). However, while I will not return directly to 
Trotsky’s influence upon Greenberg at this point, for Jones’s purposes she might have 
directed attention to certain of the former’s exhortations in the optimistic years following the 
October revolution: 
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What is man? He is by no means a finished or harmonious being. No, he is still a 
highly awkward creature. Man, as an animal, has not evolved by plan but 
spontaneously, and has accumulated many contradictions. The question of how to 
educate and regulate, of how to improve and complete the physical and spiritual 
construction of man, is a colossal problem which can only be understood on the basis 
of socialism. [...] To produce a new, “improved version” of man – that is the future 
task of communism. And for that we first have to find out everything about man, his 
anatomy, his physiology and that part of his physiology which is called his 
psychology. Man must look at himself and see himself as a raw material, or at best a 
semi-manufactured product, and say: “At last, my dear homo sapiens, I will work on 
you.” (Trotsky, qtd. in Figes, 447) 
Jones contends that Greenbergian positivism served no less to ‘improve and complete’ the 
‘construction of man.’ However, rather than creating subjects for the object of a future 
communist society, on Jones’s account the positivistic mode of reception which Greenberg 
contended Abstract Expressionist artworks necessitated ‘cleansed and reordered’ subjects so 
as they might function ‘“efficiently” within the bureaucratic urban industrial scene’ (EA: 
82).82 As Jones writes, rather than the Soviet ‘new man,’ this subject ‘was the bureaucratic 
professional of a democratic, industrial, positivist, technocratic state’ (EA: 117). For Jones, as 
per the Frankfurt school account of positivism, Greenberg’s positivism places an artwork’s 
spectator in the position of the natural scientist. Indeed, while Jones does not cite it 
specifically, Greenberg himself claimed in the aforementioned interview with Peter Fuller 
that by positivism in art criticism, he meant that the discipline should share ‘something with 
the best scientific experts’ in ‘being uncompromising, rigorous’ (Saunders 1991: 20), and 
                                                          
82 While I will return to the question of continuities between Trotsky’s and Greenberg’s accounts of avant-
garde artworks’ mode of address, it might here be acknowledged that, in practice, ‘actually existing 
socialism’ eagerly enforced the disciplinary project of post-war US capitalism with which Jones identifies 
Greenberg’s criticism. As Hardt and Negri write, ‘Lenin’s renowned enthusiasm for Taylorism was later 
outdone by Mao’s modernization projects. The official socialist recipe for decolonization also followed the 
essential logic dictated by the capitalist transnationals and the international agencies: each postcolonial 
government had to create a labour force adequate to the disciplinary regime’ (2000: 248). 
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Jones details such uncompromising rigour on the part of Greenberg in terms of how the 
viewer of Abstract Expressionist artworks was to function as a ‘“disinterested” objective 
observer [measuring] sense-data against testable criteria’ (EA: 105). In the previous three 
chapters, I argued that the determinate negation of representational content which Greenberg 
champions in Abstract Expressionism entailed the negation of identity-thinking’s negation of 
nonidentity. However, rather than because it marks the artworks’ resistance to the claims of 
capitalist ratiocination, Jones argues that the significance Greenberg accords to the 
determinate negation of representational content is due to the fact that it proffers ‘concrete 
material facts (flatness, the framing edge, and so forth) that an educated mass audience could 
use to tune their apparatus’ in a manner amenable to the status quo (EA: 134). Jones contends 
that ‘the conventions of modernism [...] carved out from the conventions of illusionist 
painting, as negations’ provided the criteria against which sense-data was to be tested, and 
accordingly dismissed if nonidentical with it (EA: 125). Recently, Jacques Ranciere has 
forwarded a variant of the argument that Greenberg quashed ‘politically committed art of the 
New Deal’ in his promotion of Abstract Expressionism, contending that, contrary to the 
latter’s focus ‘on its own materials and procedures,’ the former transcribed ‘feats of labour 
and the struggle of the oppressed’ by ‘matching the accelerated rhythms of industry, society, 
and urban life, and [...] giving infinite resonance to the most ordinary minutes of everyday 
life’ (2013: 262).83 As is evident from Greenberg’s claims for Pollock’s positivism quoted 
above, Ranciere is wrong in asserting that Greenberg conceives Abstract Expressionism and 
the mode of reception it elicits as holding itself aloof from urban life. However, on Jones’s 
telling, this parallel between Greenberg’s positivism and urban life is in terms of the latter’s 
officiated topography, and thus in the service of demoting the affect of the ‘ordinary minutes 
of everyday life.’ That is to say, she argues that, with recourse to criteria of medium-
                                                          
83 Ranciere thus, it should be noted, overlooks the fact that certain of the Abstract Expressionists 
described their art as precisely attuned to the urban life in this way, for instance Gottlieb who claims that 
‘there is a tempo in the life of New York which is exhilarating and I feel that this gets into one’s paintings 
[...] I’m not involved with the external appearance of the city; it’s the vibrations’ (1990: 269). 
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specificity, Greenberg sifted ‘hard observable facts’ from ‘misty, subjective preferences,’ and 
did so in a manner which was ‘pedagogically compact,’ inviting others to undertake the 
attendant ‘sensory training’ (EA: 78; 141). She thus contends that for Greenberg ‘[t]he 
mechanism of the eye [...] brought the body into sensory awareness, but only by restricting 
sensual flow’ (EA: 42). Jones posits that this primed subjects, not least erstwhile 
revolutionary socialists like Greenberg, to ‘make peace with the capitalist status quo’ (EA: 
226). For Jones, Greenberg elucidates how, contrary to political art which rouses its 
spectators with ‘stirring narratives,’ the post-war work of the Abstract Expressionists 
provided ‘mute materiality’ to be ‘processed by detached perceptual schemes’ (Ibid). Thus, 
instead of addressing collectives, Abstract Expressionist artworks cultivated ‘the internally 
organised unit of the individual’ (Ibid). Above, I addressed the notion that Abstract 
Expressionists’ shift towards an individualistic art lead to their work’s complicity with the 
status quo. This was in terms of how the artworks supposedly manifest the subjective 
interiority of the artists, and thus provided a hypostasised counterweight of non-conformism 
to the administered society of post-war US capitalism. Jones, on the other hand, argues that 
the positivistic mode of reception attuned to Abstract Expressionism which Greenberg 
advocated, whips the sensorium into conformity with that society. 
  Generally, Jones supposes that (her reconstruction of) Greenberg’s concepts exhaust the 
artworks they conceive. To the extent that the Abstract Expressionists ‘adapted their work to 
the new values (abstraction, flatness, all-overness)’ codified by Greenberg, she claims that 
their paintings came to embody these values (EA: 67). She argues that Pollock became 
disciplined ‘even in the innermost recesses of his pictorial imagination [...] so internalised 
were the linguistic and visual orders of (Greenberg’s) cubist project’ (EA: 390). However, 
other critics over the past few decades who similarly accuse Greenberg’s positivism of 
complicity with the macrostructural determinants of the status quo – notably Rosalind 
Krauss, Briony Fer and Amelia Jones – have attempted to recover an Abstract Expressionism 
nonidentical with (this reading of) Greenberg’s account, by focusing upon the way in which 
139 
 
Abstract Expressionist artworks, particularly Pollock’s drip paintings, engage the body that 
frames the spectator’s every view, which Greenberg supposedly systematically excludes. As 
Michael Fried has characterised this trend, these writers deprecate Greenberg for his 
‘supposed failure to deal adequately with the works themselves’ (1999: 97), in so far as they 
contend his criticism occludes the somatic appeal of Pollock’s work. Possibly the most 
influential of these accounts – cited by Caroline A. Jones, Fer and Amelia Jones – is that of 
Greenberg’s former acolyte Krauss. In an argument which she has iterated numerous times 
since first making it in The Optical Unconscious (1993),84 Krauss contends that Greenberg 
adopts ‘positivist science’s [...] neutral observation’ in contextualising Pollock’s drip 
paintings in relation ‘to tradition, to culture, to convention,’ and that this entails a sublimation 
of these works which diverts them ‘from the material, the tactile’ which for Krauss is their 
proper domain (1993: 244-7).85 While Greenberg’s criticism presupposes the vertical posture 
of the viewing subject, Krauss argues that decisive for the paintings’ engagement of 
otherwise culturally delegitimated bodily experience is the way in which Pollock’s negation 
of the figurative in these works entailed a reorientation from verticality to horizontality, 
attested to by their puddles and evidently thrown fluid lines of paint, along with errant 
                                                          
84 See also the entries on Pollock in her catalogue Formless: A User’s Guide (1997), written with Yves Alain 
Bois, and her essay ‘The Crisis of the Easel Picture’ (1999). 
 
85 It should here be noted that, while Krauss conversely accuses Frankenthaler of complicity with what 
she conceives of as Greenberg’s sublimation of Pollock’s works, contending that Frankenthaler’s adoption 
of Pollock’s soaked line in so-called landscape works ‘“righted” Pollock’s painting, declaring that the 
spumes and furls and sprays had all along been verticals’ (1993: 290), Caroline A. Jones dedicates a 
chapter in Eyesight Alone to interpreting Frankenthaler’s paintings as unruly towards Greenberg’s 
notional dictums in soliciting somatic reception. Jones argues that ‘the embodied trace of the body in 
[Frankenthaler’s] work opposed itself to the discourse of disembodiment in [Greenberg’s]’ work (EA: 
307). As she does with Abstract Expressionism in general, Jones understands Frankenthaler’s paintings as 
adhering to the Modernist paradigm laid down by Greenberg. However, she claims that Frankenthaler’s 
works are ‘intermittently resistant to his rules,’ in so far as ‘the body that had been banished from visual 
representation [appears] as altogether evident in some of Frankenthaler’s pictures’ (EA: 306-307). For 
Jones, the majority of Frankenthaler’s work cannot ‘be the basis for a properly detached and disembodied 
Apollonian regime,’ because ‘at least one strain of [it] crossed [the] bridge [into] terrain [...] Greenberg 
[was unwilling] to map’ (EA: 328). In elaborating this, however, despite positing her account as ‘self-
consciously embodied’ (EA: 337), she frames Frankenthaler’s paintings as mobilising ‘visual arguments 
about embodiment and the gaze’ which decisively marshal conceptual subsumption (EA: 334): Jones 
contends that the splat of red paint which overlays Frankenthaler’s Scene with Nude (1952) unifies 
‘female flow and masculine action’ (EA: 328), and that Frankenthaler’s Two Live as One on a Crocodile Isle 
(1959) is a ‘a dance of equals constructed now as warmly contiguous but turning to “focus” elsewhere 
under the benevolent gaze of a tropical sun’ (EA: 337).  
 
140 
 
elements such as the handprints in Number 1A, 1948 or the miscellaneous items dropped onto 
Full Fathom Five. She thus contends that Greenberg’s verticality effaces the paintings’ 
radicalism by adopting the orientation of the distanced gaze of domination.86 Briony Fer 
explicitly follows Krauss in her account, which centres on Pollock’s Out of the Web (1949), 
one of Pollock’s ‘cut out’ pieces, whereby the artist sliced segments from apparently finished 
drip paintings to reveal the masonite canvas underneath. Fer details how ‘tangible touch’ is 
thus palpable in Out of the Web’s ‘hacked, remaindered surfaces where the paint has been cut 
away’ (1997: 106), and for Fer, this means that the work defies what she sees as Greenberg’s 
attempt to transcend Abstract Expressionism’s corporeality in mastering the visual field. 
Amelia Jones, similarly, counters Greenberg’s supposedly disembodied gaze by arguing for 
the somatic appeal of Pollock’s work. As with Krauss and Fer, this appeal for Jones is down 
to the way in which the drip paintings serve to index their processes of production. Jones 
argues that the paintings, particularly in the context of Hans Namuth’s photographs, are 
inescapably the work of a particularised subject, and accordingly engage the spectator as a 
particularised subject. In this, Jones recasts Pollock as a precursor to performative art 
practices which in some way involve an enactment of the artist’s body and thus instantiate 
‘the dislocation or decentering of the Cartesian subject of modernism’ (1998: 1). Understood 
in this way, Jones contends, Pollock’s drip paintings problematise Greenberg’s judgements of 
Abstract Expressionism ‘as the triumphant climax of great European modernist painting’ 
which she purports are founded in ‘denial of the body, of subjectivity, of sensuality’ (1998: 
74). 
                                                          
86 Prior to The Optical Unconscious, in her The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths 
(1985), Krauss makes the case that a different reading of Pollock, that of art historian E. A. Carmean, 
falsified ‘Pollock’s working methods and [miscast] the meaning of the works’ (224). Carmean interprets 
Pollock’s black-and-white pictures as marking the decisive re-emergence of figuration into Pollok’s 
practice. However, Krauss contends that, contrarily, Pollock’s painting operates through a structure of 
oppositions, including ‘the binary opposition of figure/nonfigure,’ in order to generate the provisional 
identity of these oppositions, and thus, Krauss argues, ‘nonspecific figuration’ was a part of ‘the linear 
matrix of even the allover paintings’ (239). I will not concern myself with this characterisation of Pollock’s 
paintings as rehearsing a Hegelian (by way of Mondrian) image of reconciliation, suffice to say that, while 
Krauss seems to have abandoned this account of Pollock in favour of reading his paintings as the 
repressed corporeal nonidentity of culture, in the proceeding sections I will develop an account of 
Abstract Expressionism for which it is precisely in so far as Abstract Expressionism rescues such 
nonidentity, which means it prefigures reconciliation. 
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  For these critics, then, as for Caroline A. Jones, Greenberg’s criticism delegitimates errant 
subjective experience. The return of repressed sensuousness in Pollock’s art is read in 
abstract opposition to dominant rationality, and Greenberg’s account of his artworks is 
understood as an effort on the part of dominant rationality to batten down the hatches and 
neutralise this sensuousness. As Diarmud Costello has noted, albeit from a position critical of 
Greenberg, such rejections of Greenberg have often indicted his ‘Kantianism’ (2007: 221-
222). This is certainly true of Amelia Jones. Without citing any of Greenberg’s specific 
references to Kant, Jones claims the stakes of Greenberg’s disembodiment are set out in 
Kant’s distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable by which aesthetic judgements 
involving a subject’s desire for an object are distinguished from disinterested aesthetic 
reflective judgements. For Jones, this marks a Cartesian disavowal of the sensate body and an 
imposition of a ‘mode of logic through which “man” exerts control over the uncodifiable, 
asserting himself as one whose particular knowledge privileges him as a higher class of 
being, fit to enlighten the masses’ (76). Jones thus asserts that, in following Kant, Greenberg 
occludes his embodiment ‘precisely in order to veil [his] particularities, biases, and 
investments’ in order that he might appear as ‘an unquestioned arbiter of universal meanings’ 
(76-77). However, in the remainder of this chapter, I want to contend that criticism such as 
Jones’s attacks Greenberg as if his account of Abstract Expressionism were modelled on the 
cognitive judgements of Kant’s first Critique — the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) — rather 
than the aesthetic reflective judgements of the third Critique  —  the Critique of Judgement  
(1790) — and that reading Greenberg’s debt to Kant in terms of the latter, in fact indicates 
how Abstract Expressionism engages spectators in a manner which repudiates precisely the 
arbitration of meaning divorced from particular experience. 
  Possibly the most cited reference to Kant in Greenberg’s work, is the analogy which 
Greenberg draws in ‘Modernist Painting’ between the ‘self-criticism’ which he identifies in 
the medium-specificity of modernist art, and the ‘self-criticism’ of Kant’s epistemology: 
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I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of [the] self-
critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant [...] The essence of Modernism 
lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticise the 
discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its 
area of competence. Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he 
withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left all the more secure in what 
there remained to it [...] Modernism criticises from the inside, through the procedures 
themselves of that which is being criticized [...] Modernism used art to call attention 
to art. The limitations that constitute the medium of painting – the flat surface, the 
shape of the support, the properties of the pigment [...] came to be regarded as 
positive factors, and were acknowledged openly. (CEC4: 85-6) 
Rather than aesthetic reflective judgements which for Kant do not have recourse to a 
determinate concept, in this analogy Greenberg appears to be assimilating modernist art with 
cognitive judgements which do have determinate concepts. That is, as Robert Clewis writes, 
‘[t]he claim that Modern art reveals and criticises the conditions of its production constitutes 
a plainly cognitive, not aesthetic, judgement’ (2008: 7). Understood in this way, if 
Greenberg’s criticism is Kantian, then it is in terms of Kant’s assertion in the first Critique 
that ‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (2007: 86). 
By ‘intuitions,’ Kant does not mean instinctual insights, but rather ‘that through which 
[knowledge] refers to [objects] immediately’ in sense perception (2007: 59). Conversely, for 
Kant concepts are representations under which these intuitions are subsumed by the 
categories of the understanding, via the recognition of that which objects share with other 
objects. The first Critique constitutes Kant’s effort to delimit the transcendental principles by 
which concepts and intuitions are reciprocally determined, which have held for all, and will 
hold for all future, human cognition, enclosed ‘by nature itself within limits that can never be 
altered’ (2007: 251). However, the permanence of these limits for Kant means he in fact 
figures the supposedly reciprocal concepts and intuitions in an asymmetrical and ‘deeply 
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hierarchical relationship, with the conceptual lording it over the empirical and the 
experiential in order to preserve the universality and necessity of thought,’ as Michael Wayne 
writes (2014: 28). This dichotomous subordination of perception to pre-given forms is 
evident even in Kant’s elaboration of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time by which 
the faculty of the understanding is provided with content. While Kant affirms that ‘[a]ll 
intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections,’ that is, the capacity for an empirical embodied 
subject to be affected (2007: 97), he nonetheless claims that the principles of pure intuition 
‘instruct us prior to experience, not by means of experience’ (2007: 67). Empirical intuitions 
are thus structured by pure a priori intuitions, even before their subsumption under the 
categories of the understanding by which these intuitions gain cognitive significance. For 
Kant, without these transcendental operations, ‘experience would not be knowledge, but only 
a rhapsody of perceptions’ (2007: 188). It seems, then, that the empirical, sensible intuitions 
apprehended by embodied subjects gain their authority entirely by being filtered through pre-
given categories. As Chris Thornhill notes, because of this ‘purificatory impoverishment of 
reason,’ Kant has, since the contemporaneous critique of Johann Georg Hamann, consistently 
been criticised for his ‘exclusion of all vital, natural and particular historical experience from 
reason’ (2006: 100). Following the readings of his elder interlocutors Ernst Bloch, Siegfried 
Kracauer and Lukács, Adorno understands this exclusion as symptomatic of capitalist 
reification, which of course was in its ascendancy as Kant wrote in the late eighteenth 
century.87 The homology between Kant’s epistemology and Adorno’s account of identity-
thinking is particularly clear in the following passage from the First Critique: 
                                                          
87 Of the three, in History and Class Consciousness Lukács delivers the most systematic account of the 
parallels between Kantian epistemology and the capitalist reification of consciousness in so far as for both 
‘the attempt to eliminate every element of content and of the irrational,’ does an injustice not only to ‘the 
object but also [...] the subject,’ as the latter is transformed ‘into a pure and purely formal subject’ (128). 
However, Adorno attributes great influence to both Bloch and Kracauer on his reading of the first Critique. 
In reference to the former, Adorno accredits him with the insight, which we will see is crucial to Adorno’s 
account of Kant, that the barrier Kant erects against transcendence is in fact ‘the expression of bourgeois 
society’s acquiescence in the reified world it has fabricated, the world of commodities, the world for the 
bourgeois,’ and thus historically contingent (1980: 55). As for Kracauer, the teenage Adorno read the first 
Critique regularly with him on Saturday afternoons, and claimed that he owed more to these sessions 
than to his academic teachers precisely because Kracauer taught him to understand the work not as a 
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In subsuming an object under a concept, the representation of the former must always 
be homogeneous with the latter, that is, the concept must contain what is represented 
in the object to be subsumed under it. For this is the meaning of the expression that an 
object is contained under a concept. Thus, for instance, the empirical concept of a 
plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, whereby the 
roundness thought in the first can be intuited in the latter. (2007: 176) 
As I delineated in Chapter 5, Adorno contends that the second nature of capitalism demands a 
similar snugness of fit between objects and concepts, and thus all elements of the former not 
present in the latter are ignored or delegitimated. Accordingly, for Adorno, ‘the abstraction 
characteristic of [the Kantian] transcendental subject is nothing but the internalised and 
hypostatised form of man’s domination of nature,’ which always ‘comes into being through 
the elimination of qualities, through the reduction of qualitative distinctions to quantitative 
forms’ (2001: 172-3). Adorno argues that Kant’s epistemology thereby corresponds to the 
‘essential antinomy of bourgeois society in general,’ in so far as for both the effort to 
rationalise the world in relation to human beings resulted in the establishment of fixed 
regulative determinants estranged from human beings, to which human beings must adapt 
(2001: 115-6). As Susan Buck-Morss puts it, on Adorno’s account ‘[t]he universality of the 
transcendental subject ignored historical particularity and implied the interchangeability of 
every subject’ (1977: 83). Thus, for Adorno, ‘[t]he surplus of the transcendental subject is the 
deficit of the utterly reduced empirical subject’ (ND: 178). 
  Now, in the passage from ‘Modernist Painting’ above, Greenberg does not reference Kant in 
order to draw an analogy between Kantian epistemology and his own criticism. Instead, the 
parallel is between Kant’s delimitation of the former and the praxis of modernist art. 
However, in his explication of this parallel, Greenberg appears to imply that cognition 
befitting modernist art takes the form of Kant’s account of determinate knowledge and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conclusive analysis of epistemology, but rather ‘as a kind of coded text from which the historical situation 
of spirit could be read’ (1992: 58-9). 
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experience. As Kuspit writes in his eponymous monograph on Greenberg, citing Kant’s 
assertion as to the reciprocity of concepts and intuitions, in identifying the affirmation of 
medium-specificity as the fulcrum of modernist painting, it seems as if Greenberg is engaged 
in ‘the effort to reconcile general [concepts] about art[‘s medium-specificity] with particular 
intuitions of works of art’ (1979: 9). Indeed, as Joseph Masheck notes (2011: 120), the 
assumption that Greenberg’s methodology is Kantian in this sense is apparently reinforced by 
an earlier reference to Kant made by Greenberg, when he claims that  
[i]n order to act as an agent and stir up good writing there must be some kind of 
positive notion [...] a bias in a particular direction, as to what this good writing of the 
future will be like. As Kant says, you only find what you look for’ (CEC1: 46).  
While Greenberg caveats this claim with the assurance that he does not ‘mean by this that it 
is necessary to be dogmatic and to have fixed ideas against which everything is to be 
measured,’ we have seen in this chapter that, similarly to Adorno’s critique of Kant’s 
transcendental subject, it is in terms of how Greenberg supposedly subsumes intuitions of art 
under pre-given concepts – and thus only finds what he is looking for – that critics have 
argued Greenberg, as Kuspit puts it subsequently in his book, ‘seems to confirm 
preconceptions rather than to convey freshness or vitality of perception’ allowing ‘only for 
certain kinds of perceptions and certain kinds of statements’ (1979: 173-4), and thus 
delegitimizing errant affective reception of Abstract Expressionism in a manner amenable to 
the status quo.88 
  Certainly, in chapters 3 and 4 I have shown how, in so far as medium-specificity was 
hypostasised in terms of hierarchical superiority, Abstract Expressionism served US 
imperialism in its isomorphy with the United States’ self-conception as the culmination of 
                                                          
88 For further critiques of Greenberg’s identification of his aesthetics as Kantian along these lines, see 
Ingrid Stadler ‘The Idea of Art and Its Criticism: A Rational Reconstruction of a Kantian Doctrine’ (1982) 
in which she accuses Greenberg’s work of ‘vacously formal […] bloodless abstractions’ (1982: 195) and 
Dean W. Curtin, ‘Varieties of Aesthetic Formalism’ (1988), in which he contends that ‘[o]ften in reading 
Greenberg's work, one gets the impression that his analysis of taste owes more to the first Critique than 
to the third’ (1988: 323). 
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universal history, by which the worldwide imposition of its economic norms was justified. 
However, central to chapters 5 through 7 was the argument that Greenberg’s focus upon 
medium-specificity in Abstract Expressionism is in fact a focus upon particularity whose 
bindingness is delegitimated when life is fundamentally determined in the interest of capital 
accumulation. In this, I briefly discussed Adorno’s claim that Kant’s account in the third 
Critique of aesthetic reflective judgement for which there is no subordinating concept 
indicates how autonomous artworks escape the abstractly dominating nexus of second nature. 
Now, to return to Amelia Jones’s accusations as to Greenberg’s Kantianism, it is certainly the 
case that Kant claims that aesthetic reflective judgements of the beautiful, in lacking 
subordinating concepts, thereby do without recourse to all interests which delimit what 
knowing is, including sensual interests. Instead, Kant asserts that ‘beautiful is what we like in 
merely judging it (rather than either in sensation proper or through a concept)’ (1987: 174). 
However, as Adorno points out, ‘there is no liking without a living person who would enjoy 
it’ (AT: 11). Accordingly, he contends, while the subsumption of objects under the universal 
transcendental laws of determinant judgements entails the reduction of the empirical subject, 
when addressing aesthetic reflective judgements ‘Kant is compelled to consider the existing 
individual, the ontic element, more than is compatible with the idea of the transcendental 
subject’ (AT: 11). 
  Already in his reading of the first Critique, Adorno understands Kant’s refusal to do away 
with the notion of noumenal (as opposed to phenomenal) things in themselves which 
transcend the supposedly transhistorical circumscription of possible experience, as evidence 
against the transhistoricality of this circumscription, because it implies that our concepts are 
dependent upon objects which these concepts do not exhaust. Kant puts his account of 
noumena succinctly in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, first published in 1783, 
between the first and second editions of the first Critique: 
[I]t would be an absurdity to hope to know more of any object than belongs to 
possible experience of it […] But it would be an even greater absurdity on the other 
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hand to admit no things in themselves, or to declare out experience to be the only 
possible way of knowing things, our intuition in space and time the only possible 
intuition, our discursive understanding the archetype of every possible understanding, 
and to have the principles of the possibility of experience taken for universal 
conditions of things in themselves. (1953: 116-117) 
That for Adorno the second absurdity outweighs the first should be clear from my summary 
of his reading of the first Critique above. If Kant’s circumscription of ‘possible experience’ is 
in fact the historically contingent elaboration and legitimation of capitalist reification, then 
these other ‘possible ways of knowing things’ may not be blocked under changed historical 
circumstances.89 For Adorno, then, it is crucial that Kant ‘stubbornly defended the 
transcendent thing-in-itself’ (ND: 184). This defence distinguishes Kant’s epistemology from 
the positivism that currently holds sway, which of course disavows all notions of 
transcendence. Adorno claims that, in contrast with positivism and its injunction to ‘stick to 
the “positive” facts, to the given realities [because] nothing further lies behind them,’ the 
block on transcendence in the first Critique is a tacit admission that ‘we have a situation in 
which knowledge is illusory because the closer it comes to its object, the more it shapes it in 
its own image and thus drives it further and further away’ (2001: 176). For Adorno, the 
acknowledgement of things in themselves which are nonetheless unknowable is ‘a kind of 
metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory of what is best, of something that we must not 
forget, but that we are nevertheless compelled to forget,’ and thus an acknowledgement of 
those elements of the object which we have driven away (Ibid). As I detailed in the previous 
                                                          
89 Albrecht Wellmer evocatively summarises Adorno’s account when he writes that ‘this thought opened a 
narrow crack in the door, through which a feeble glimmer of salvation fell upon the benighted world, 
enough to question Kant’s claim to metaphysical agnosticism as the final word. “We cannot know it” is 
replaced by “we do not know it yet”’ (1998: 190). Unfortunately, Wellmer proceeds to dismiss the notion, 
arguing that Adorno’s conviction that ‘the Absolute as reconciliation [...] could become a historical reality’ 
is naive because ‘we can already know now that we cannot anticipate as real that which we cannot even 
consistently conceive as real’ (Ibid: 212). However, Zuidervaart ably counters Wellmer’s argument by 
pointing out that Wellmer here ‘assigns a constant and unchanging validity to “our” forms of 
consciousness’ (2007: 139). Thus, unless Wellmer rejects the thesis that knowledge is ineluctably 
historically mediated, which he does not, his case against Adorno is untenable. 
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chapter, Adorno argues that the praxis of authentic art is precisely an effort in rationally 
salvaging something of the mimetic comportment which preceded humanity’s shaping of the 
world in its own (reified) image. Indeed, when discussing such artworks’ claim for repressed 
nature, Adorno asserts that what becomes perceptible in the experience of such artworks ‘no 
more coincides with empirical reality than does – according to Kant’s grandly paradoxical 
conception – the thing itself with the world of “phenomena,” the categorially constituted 
objects’ (AT: 66).  
  For Adorno, then, the ‘disinterestedness’ of the aesthetic reflective judgement of authentic 
art, in making sense of a thing as it appears rather than in accordance with the categories of 
the understanding, engages ontic elements of experience extra-aesthetically truncated by 
transcendental interests, whose contingency he claims Kant registers with the notion of things 
in themselves. Similarly, when Greenberg adduces arguments from the third Critique in his 
criticism, it is in order to elucidate the experience of modernist art as the experience of 
intuitions as cognitively binding without the mediation of extant determinate concepts. In 
‘Laocoon,’ Greenberg claims that when experiencing avant-garde art one is disinterested in 
the sense that ‘there is nothing to identify, connect, or think about,’ and yet, precisely due to 
this bracketing, there is ‘everything to feel’ (CEC1: 34). For Caroline A. Jones, that ‘desire 
“to feel”’ should be consigned to Greenberg’s early essays, prior to the critic’s capitulation to 
the status quo, and accordant suppression or regulation of such ‘feeling’ (EA: 114). However, 
Greenberg’s references to Kant after he abandoned his commitment to radical politics seem 
to approximate precisely this feeling. In 1943, Greenberg cites Kant’s account of the 
beautiful to describe how ‘the work of art that exposes to full view its inner workings, its 
means of effectuation’ is compelling not because it thus lends itself to subsumption under 
determinate concepts of medium-specificity, but because its ‘emphatic physical presence’ 
invites one to ‘linger on [...] it because it keeps arresting our attention’ (CEC1: 161). In 1945, 
he asserts that Kant has ‘shown how unamenable the methods of art [...] are to logical 
analysis’ (CEC2: 28). In a 1947 review of a book by Philip Wylie he writes that ‘according to 
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Kant (and this reviewer agrees with him) art gives one the sensation of a thing without 
necessarily including its meaning’ (CEC2: 159). In 1955, in a disputatious exchange of letters 
with F.R. Leavis, he opposes what he characterises as Leavis’s claim that ‘one can so 
adequately exhibit in words one’s grounds for an aesthetic judgement that agreement with it 
is compelled by the rules of evidence and logic’ by challenging Leavis to refute ‘in practice 
or theory’ Kant’s argument that ‘one cannot prove an aesthetic judgement in discourse’ and 
instead ‘one can appeal only to the other person’s taste as exercised through experience of the 
work of art under discussion’ (CEC3: 216). In 1961, he takes recourse to Kant in claiming 
that discursive logic does not legislate for ‘[q]uality in art,’ affirming that ‘[e]xperience alone 
rules in this area’ (CEC4: 118); in 1964 he asserts that he concurs with Kant that ‘nobody has 
yet been able to show [...] anything of essential quality in any kind of art that called on one’s 
reasoning powers for either its appreciation or its creation’ (CEC4: 201). In these 
proclamations, then, it is clear that, in terms of his criticism, Greenberg’s self-identification 
as Kantian is grounded in his conviction that reception of artworks should be rooted in the 
intrinsic intelligibility of the given artwork resonates with a spectator independent of 
determinate categories. This, then, parallels the way in which I showed in Chapter 7 his 
criticism discerns in the production of Abstract Expressionist artworks the kind of rational 
construction guided by particularity which Adorno contends intimates the possibility that 
technical rationality might serve material necessity, rather than the expropriation of surplus 
value. In the next chapter, I will argue that, accordingly, rather than occluding the somatic 
appeal which the critics surveyed in this chapter rightly glean in Abstract Expressionism, 
Greenberg’s account of the reception of Abstract Expressionism, in its inextricability from 
the artworks’ particularity, registers precisely the way in which the artworks bindingly solicit 
the embodied and affective elements of experience of which a rationality worth the name 
would take account.  
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Chapter Nine 
The Silent World of the Sensible 
 
  When discussing Caroline A. Jones’s account of Greenberg above, I noted that she argues 
Greenberg’s supposed efforts in bureaucratising the sensorium can be traced back to the work 
of early Soviet theorists for whom art was to serve the purpose of subject formation. While 
Jones accordingly speculates that Greenberg was informed by Mikhail Lifshitz, I suggested 
that, for the purposes of her argument, she might have adduced certain declarations by 
Trotsky as to how the production of new human beings was an exigency for communism. 
Indeed, in their account of how Trotskyism became art-for-art’s sake on the New York art 
scene of the ‘30s and ‘40s, Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock contend that Greenberg mapped 
‘the steeping of painting in its own cause’ not only on to Trotsky’s ‘claim for a special 
freedom for art,’ as I discussed in Chapter 1, but also on to Trotsky’s affirmation that art 
should act ‘as a form of consciousness of the world and [...] a necessary precondition of the 
building of a new consciousness’ (181). However, while the passage from Trotsky I quoted in 
the previous chapter implies the kind of disciplining of the senses of which Jones accuses 
Greenberg, if we return to Trotsky’s writings on art, it is clear that for him art’s role in the 
cultivation of new consciousnesses was rather to negate the prevailing negation of affective 
elements of experience. In Chapter 1, I showed that Trotsky asserts that for art to be 
revolutionary, it cannot abide prescribed content, as it was forced to under Stalin, and instead 
the artist must follow art’s laws. Yet, as I briefly acknowledged, for Trotsky this freedom 
from heteronomous laws allows art to register elements of experience unmet or repressed by 
the status quo, which thus call for the latter’s transformation. Trotsky contends that art is ‘an 
expression of man’s need for a harmonious and complete life, that is to say, his need for those 
major benefits which a class society has deprived him’ (LA: 104), but this expression is not 
to be guided or managed in the manner of political strategy, while it might inform the latter, 
because it is largely unconscious on the part of the artist (LA: 76-77). For Trotsky, art does 
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not evoke such need discursively, but in so far as it engages ‘in some way [one’s] feelings 
and moods’ (LA: 67). In making this point in a speech given to the Press Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1924, Trotsky criticises Fyodor Raskolnikov 
for ignoring ‘in works of art [...] that which makes them works of art,’ and claims, contrary to 
his fellow Bolshevik, that Dante’s Divine Comedy was not of value simply as a historical 
document of the Florentine petty bourgeois of the thirteenth century, but retained puissance 
six centuries after its publication because Dante, living in a class society with ‘certain 
common features’ to the contemporaneous present, had lent ‘feelings and moods [...] broad, 
intense, powerful expression’ and thus the Divine Comedy could be approached ‘as a source 
of aesthetic perception’ despite Dante’s class position (LA: 67-8). 
  As I noted in Chapter 1, Trotsky is generally dismissive of art which is ostensibly non-
representational. In a piece from 1926 entitled ‘Culture and Socialism’ – which Greenberg 
could not have read prior to the publication of his essays, as it went untranslated into English 
until 1962 – Trotsky goes so far as to condemn abstract art as reactionary, because he 
surmises it amounts to ‘a depreciation in art of the role of the intelligence in favour of a 
formless feeling,’ its expression refracted ‘through a person’s nerves’ to too great a degree 
(LA:  87). However, he consistently implies that the ‘feelings and moods’ invoked by 
authentic art are bound up with somatic affect. As early as Literature and Revolution, against 
reducing art to a one-to-one superstructural expression of a society’s economic base, Trotsky 
compares ‘the need for art’ to ‘the need for food and warmth’ (LA: 36-7). This somatic 
appeal of art for Trotsky is especially clear in the 1938 Partisan Review essays ‘Art and 
Politics in our Epoch’ and ‘Towards a Free Revolutionary Art’ which I showed in Chapter 1 
most likely directly informed ‘Kitsch’ and ‘Laocoon.’ While in ‘Culture and Socialism’ 
abstract art is derided for its refraction through the nerves, in ‘Art and Politics’ he proclaims 
that art ‘is basically a function of the nerves and demands complete sincerity,’ and in 
‘Towards a Free Revolutionary Art’ he and Breton assert that, to serve the revolution, an 
artist must ‘subjectively assimilate [...] social content’ to the extent that they ‘feel in [their] 
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very nerves its meaning and drama’ (LA: 106; 120). Furthermore, in a letter to Breton which 
was published in Partisan Review, Trotsky figures art’s role in definitively corporeal terms, 
affirming that ‘truly independent creation cannot but be revolutionary by its very nature, for it 
cannot but seek an outlet from intolerable social suffocation’ and anticipating that the FIARI 
would provide such an outlet by oxidising ‘the atmosphere in which artists breathe and 
create’ (LA: 124). This phraseology is not simply metaphorical. As Raymond Spiteri notes, it 
was Trotsky and Breton’s contention that ‘the artistic imagination was a sensorium that 
rearticulated the relation between mind and body’ (2016: 126). Thus, it seems as if for 
Trotsky following art’s laws entails the objectivation and engagement of affective experience 
hitherto stymied by class society. 
  It is in this spirit that Trotsky writes ‘the new man cannot be formed without a new lyric 
poetry’ borne of the poet, having internalized the lessons of the bourgeois art of the past, 
feeling ‘the world in a new way’ (LA: 32). And it was through a ‘radical reconstruction of 
society’ so as its fundamental determinants did not ride roughshod over or dismiss the 
feelings thus registered, that with Breton Trotsky claimed authentic art would ‘allow all 
mankind to raise itself to those heights which only isolated geniuses have achieved in the 
past’ (LA: 117-118).  For Adorno, too, ‘there is no human being, not even the most wretched’ 
who, if what they are for society and their material bodily existence were reconciled, ‘has not 
a potential which, by conventional bourgeois standards, is comparable to genius’ (2002a:  
132-133). And, while Adorno notoriously averred that to write lyric poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric, he repeatedly qualified this as an expression of the antinomious situation of art after 
WWII, wherein art, like all culture, rang hollow after the systematic murder of millions in a 
supposedly civilised society, and yet nevertheless to accordingly do away with art would be 
to surrender to the reigning logic of exchange whereby people are made identical with their 
concept for society, which in its extreme manifestation allowed for their annihilation as 
specimens (ND: 362-3; 2007c: 188; 2002a: 110). As should be clear from the preceding 
chapters, for Adorno, art resists this logic not in addressing ‘itself to human beings [and 
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giving] something to them,’ but rather ‘by not thinking of them [and] being purely and 
consistently formed within itself’ (2002a: 118-119). In Chapter 5, I established that 
Greenberg’s account, despite serving the co-optation of Abstract Expressionism, bears 
witness to the way in which the artworks oppose the status quo in these terms, because they 
are particulars which are undeniably authoritative, while exceeding and defying prevailing 
universals. At the close of Chapter 7, I proleptically adumbrated how this particularity, 
cultivated through mimetic comportment on the part of the artist, invites from spectators a 
similarly mimetic response which, in its assimilation to the nonconceptual, lends authority to 
affective elements of subjective experience. And in the previous chapter, I began to develop 
this claim, by arguing that Greenberg takes recourse to Kant’s third Critique in an attempt to 
elucidate such a response to art, in spite of the consistent accusations from critics over the 
past few decades that Greenberg occludes or regiments affective experience in the service of 
the status quo. As should be clear, this experience of affect elicited by art ‘consistently 
formed within itself’ should not be conceived in discursive terms whose easy 
instrumentalisation by identity-thinking I elaborated in Chapter 6. Instead, as Adorno writes 
of aesthetic feeling, this affect is borne of ‘astonishment vis-à-vis what is beheld rather than 
what it is about’ as the spectator is ‘overwhelmed by what is aconceptual and yet 
determinate’ (AT: 164). It contests the diremption of sensuality and intellect not with 
catharsis, but with ‘a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity’ whereby the subject is 
covered in ‘goose bumps’ (AT: 331).90 In this chapter, I will further elaborate how 
Greenberg’s account of Abstract Expressionism registers this affect, and thus, even when his 
                                                          
90 Here, we might note that an account of being ‘overwhelmed’ by Abstract Expressionist canvases, 
specifically those of Barnett Newman, is elaborated in Jean-Francois Lyotard’s essay ‘Newman: The 
Instant,’ first published in 1989. In this essay, Lyotard describes the experience of Onement I as that of 
being confronted with an event which eludes rules and categories, opening the viewer to radical 
indeterminacy. As we have seen, Adorno similarly understands the experience of art as an experience 
which undermines conceptual reification. However, as Espen Hammer notes, whereas Lyotard is 
‘agnostic’ about what this experience involves, ‘remaining mainly at a formal level,’ for Adorno such 
aesthetic experience reverberates with ‘primordial experience that, during the process of rationalisation, 
is supposed to have been repressed and virtually forgotten’ (2015: 69). In chapter 7 I elaborated how we 
might understand Abstract Expressionist artworks as objectivating the latter, and in this chapter I will 
contend that, accordingly, we might identify the radical conceptual indeterminacy which Lyotard 
identifies in Newman’s paintings with affective elements of experience delegitimated by rationalisation. 
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theory was ostensibly depoliticised, indicates how the movement fulfilled the task which 
Trotsky sets for art, while the world it thus calls for is yet to be realised. 
  Now, as I noted in the previous chapter, in ‘Laocoon,’ an essay which we can assume was 
written under the immediate tutelage of Trotsky’s Partisan Review articles, Greenberg is 
explicitly concerned with the role of ‘feeling’ in the apprehension of avant-garde art. He 
writes that, in its rejection of bourgeois society, avant-garde art’s striving for self-sufficiency 
resulted in an ‘emphasis [...] on the physical, the sensorial’ as art became abstract in the sense 
of being ‘almost nothing else except sensuous’ and, in the form of ‘pure painting and pure 
sculpture,’ sought ‘above all to affect the spectator physically’ (CEC1: 32-3). Nevertheless, 
as I also acknowledged, Caroline A. Jones dismisses this focus on ‘feeling’ as antecedent to 
Greenberg’s commitment to regulating the senses. It is often argued that Greenberg’s 
attendant denigration of undifferentiated sensation and imposition of a transcendental 
consciousness befitting the status quo is evident in his apparent ocularcentrism. Martin Jay 
exemplifies this subordination of the ‘corporeal and omnisensual’ in favour of ‘pure visuality, 
concerned solely with formal optical questions’ by contrasting Greenberg’s account of 
Cézanne with Merleau-Ponty’s account of the painter, in which Cézanne’s work is lauded as 
exemplary of art which returns consciousness to its inextricability from the somatic (1993: 
160). However, in what follows I want to contend that, not only can Greenberg’s account of 
Cézanne be read to cohere with Merleau-Ponty’s in terms of the response both thinkers claim 
is invited by Cézanne’s painting, but furthermore that this is precisely the response invited by 
Abstract Expressionism’s rational objectivation of mimesis in particularity, which I argued in 
Chapter 7 provides the substratum compelling Greenberg’s emphasis on medium-specificity. 
To first address Merleau-Ponty’s account, in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ (1945), the first of the 
philosopher’s three essays on painting, Merleau-Ponty indeed argues, drawing from the 
artist’s writing and correspondence, that in his work Cézanne lends binding authority to the 
kind of affective perception I showed in the previous chapter Greenberg is accused of 
delegitimizing in favour of pregiven visual schemata. As Galen A. Johnson summarises 
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brilliantly, in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt,’ Merleau-Ponty details how, rather than orienting his 
painting from a ‘univocal, planimetric perspective,’ Cézanne places ‘emphasis on the lived 
perspective as the visible world arises in relation to [his] living body,’ and ‘the primacy of the 
solidity and constancy of the secondary, lived qualities of the visible world, especially colour 
and tangibility’ (1993: 13). In this, Merleau-Ponty contends, Cézanne’s art constitutes 
something of a recovery of the nonidentical. That is, whereas in habitual perception we forget 
‘the viscous, equivocal appearances, go through them straight to the things they present,’ for 
Merleau-Ponty, Cézanne ‘recaptures and converts into visible objects what would, without 
him, remain walled up in the separate life of [his] consciousness’ (PP: 68). Merleau Ponty, 
then, argues that in disregarding the polarity of subject and hypostatised object, and 
distinctions between touch and sight, Cézanne ‘does not try to use colour to suggest the 
tactile sensations which would give shape and depth,’ but rather portrays objects as 
simultaneously present to all his senses, and thus attempts ‘to make visible how the world 
touches us’ (PP: 65; 70).  
  On the other hand, Greenberg’s 1951 Partisan Review essay on Cézanne effectively traces 
how the painter’s work constitutes a stage in the Modernist determinate negation of Inhalt, 
whose contemporaneous instantiation for Greenberg was of course Abstract Expressionism. 
However, this is not to say that Greenberg demotes sensual apprehension of Cézanne’s 
canvases with recourse to categories of medium-specificity, and in fact the proximity of 
Greenberg’s and Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of Cézanne’s working methods imply that the 
former was informed by the latter (‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ was first translated and published in 
Partisan Review in 1946). To be sure, unlike for Merleau-Ponty, Greenberg argues that 
Cézanne’s achievement is not selfsame with the artist’s stated and conscious ambition. 
Instead, Greenberg claims that Cézanne’s attempt to render with solidity his preconceptual 
apprehension of objects resulted in paintings for which ‘every sensation [...] was equally 
important once its “human interest” was excluded,’ and thus inadvertently Cézanne’s work 
does justice less to primordial perception, than to the ‘flat surface’ of the canvas (CEC3: 87). 
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Yet, while he writes that, in Cézanne’s attempt to directly represent the distance from his eye 
of every object, the painter disregarded ‘the texture, the smoothness and roughness, hardness 
and softness, the tactile feel of objects [in] seeing colour exclusively as a determinant of 
spatial position,’ this for Greenberg reverts to tactility as ‘the picture surface [receives] its 
due as a physical entity’ (CEC3: 86-7). According to Caroline A. Jones, such references to 
physicality in Greenberg’s criticism confines physicality ‘to a display on the part of the 
canvas, to be consumed by the disembodied eye rather than felt by a kinaesthetic body’ (EA: 
17). However, quite contrary to a disembodied taxonomical gaze, Greenberg describes the 
experience of a Cézanne painting as ‘indescribably racy and sudden’ (CEC3: 85). That is, he 
accounts for it precisely in terms of kinetic empathy. 
  All of this is surely to describe the experience of Cézanne’s painting in similar terms of 
sensory miscegenation as does Merleau-Ponty. That is, for Greenberg, Cézanne’s emphasis 
on painting’s ‘flat surface’ is not in the last instance a display of medium-specificity to be 
optically apprehended and subsumed by accordant categories. Instead, Greenberg contends 
that Cézanne’s negation of objectivist vraisemblance (for Cézanne, of course, in the service 
of greater vraisemblance), means that rather than illusorily suggesting tactility, Cézanne’s 
work elicits a mode of response for which the apprehension of its physical tactility by an 
equally inescapably corporeal spectator is paramount. This, I will argue, is precisely the 
response invited by Abstract Expressionism, whose negation of illusionism did not result in it 
becoming, as Peter de Bolla put it recently, ‘less and less material, moving from objects, 
things, stuff in the world towards essence, spirit, Platonic form,’ but ‘instead, it 
[dematerialised] only to rematerialise as itself’ (2016: 13). Gilles Deleuze succinctly 
identifies this dynamic in Greenberg’s criticism.91 He claims that when ‘American critics 
who took the analysis of abstract expressionism very far’ (he does not cite these critics by 
                                                          
91 Deleuze albeit makes this observation in order to subordinate Abstract Expressionism to the work of 
Francis Bacon in what Paul Crowther has referred to as his ‘hierarchical and essentialist’ account of 
painting (2012: 201). 
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name, but one can safely assume he means Greenberg and his acolytes, particularly Michael 
Fried), detail how ‘pictorial space lost […] the imaginary tactile referents which, in classical 
three dimensional representation, made it possible to see depths and contours, forms and 
grounds,’ they are not describing ‘the creation of a purely optical space, exclusively optical,’ 
but rather accounting for how the eschewal of illusory palpability refuted the ‘relative 
subordination of the hand to the eye, of the manual to the visual’ expressed by ‘these tactile 
referents of classical representation’ (2003: 107).92 Indeed, in the discussion following a 
lecture by Greenberg entitled ‘State of Art Criticism’ given in 1981, Greenberg indicates that 
his claims for abstract art’s opticality should be understood in this sense, when he affirms that 
‘[y]our whole being is involved in aesthetic intuition. You don’t look with your eye alone’ 
(1990: 116). With respect to Merleau-Ponty in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt,’ then, Greenberg differs 
from the philosopher not in terms of his account of the response invited by a Cézanne 
painting, but instead in so far as for Greenberg, as Adorno writes of authentic artworks’ 
‘indispensable sensual element,’ Cézanne’s canvas is not corporealised ‘through any special 
content [Inhalt]’ by which the artwork ‘[flees] into concretion’ (AT: 135). Whereas in 
‘Cézanne’s Doubt,’ although not, as we will see, in later essays on art, Merleau-Ponty 
contends that Cézanne engenders embodied perception through such ‘special content’ by 
faithfully portraying his conceptually unsaturated apprehension of things, Greenberg 
contextualises this experience in terms of Cézanne’s (unconscious) negation of reified 
techniques which were impeding somatic apprehension of his paintings in a manner which 
anticipates Abstract Expressionism.93 I have already established that Greenberg does not 
                                                          
92 Ironically, Laura U. Marks accuses Deleuze of failing precisely to make this distinction in his film theory, 
when she affirms that the philosopher’s ‘focus on filmic images of hands’ in terms of film evoking haptic 
sensation, is to conceptualise film doing so through identification, which leads him to miss how art might 
engender perception which ‘bypasses such identification and the distance from the image it requires’ (8). 
93 Here it is certainly notable that, while, as far as I can find, Adorno never mentions Cézanne, Hullot-
Kentor adduces Cézanne’s painting as exemplary of an artwork inviting mimetic comportment from its 
spectator in an Adornian sense. He asserts that ‘something other than human intention’ is ‘evident in the 
dense, rhythmical groupings of Paul Cézanne’s brush stroke, composed so that the way into the 
brushwork never permits exit by the path of entry. Instead, elusive gates continually open transitions 
between the bunched strokes so that the eye passes consecutively, plane to plane, beyond its own 
intelligence, at every pointy coherently arriving where the eye would never have had in mind to go on its 
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seem to value the medium-specificity which he so often approvingly attributes to Abstract 
Expressionism as an end in-itself, but more as a precondition of apprehending artworks as 
without a pre-given conceptual framework, and for Greenberg it is often clear that such 
reception engages the viewer corporeally. 
  In 1948, for instance, when Greenberg describes Gorky’s work as celebrating and displaying 
‘the processes of painting for their own sake,’ it is with ‘unproblematic voluptuousness’ and 
‘sensuous richness’ (CEC2: 219). In the same year he identifies Pollock’s concentration on 
‘texture and tactile qualities’ as central to his painting’s effect, citing the ‘overpowering 
surface […] stalagmited with metallic paint’ of Phosphorescence (1947) (CEC2: 202). In a 
1953 foreword to a de Kooning exhibition, he praises the ‘physical force’ of the painter’s 
work (CEC3: 122). And, when in 1962 he describes Still as ‘one of the greatest innovators of 
Modernist art,’ he asserts that ‘there is no question that the tactile irregularities of his surface, 
with their contrasts of matt and shiny, paint coat and priming, contribute to the intensity of 
his art’ (CEC4: 129-130). Even Greenberg’s 1952 description of Kline’s work as restrained, 
which Caroline A. Jones alights upon as exemplary of Greenberg’s efforts to regulate feeling, 
has to be tactically falsified for her to make her point. Greenberg writes that  
Kline’s large canvases, with their blurtings of black calligraphy on white and gray 
grounds, are tautness quintessential. He has stripped his art in order to make sure of it 
– not so much for the public as for himself. He presents only the salient points of his 
emotion. Three or four of the pictures in his two shows already serve to place him 
securely in the foreground of contemporary abstract painting, but one has the feeling 
that his gifted and accomplished artist still suppresses too much of his power. 
Perhaps, on the other hand, that is exactly the feeling one should have. (CEC3: 104) 
As is typical with Greenberg, in this assessment of Kline, authoritative declaratory assertions 
as to quality in hierarchical terms, accompany oblique attempts to account for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
own, catching its breath while the relentlessly static object insists that the activity is entirely its 
prerogative’ (64). 
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nondiscursive affect which compels such qualitative judgements. Jones, however, in quoting 
this passage, conspicuously replaces the word ‘perhaps’ with the non-synonymous ‘but,’ and 
italicizes what follows. She accordingly casts Greenberg’s commendation of Kline in terms 
of the artist’s work providing an object lesson in comportment for the modern subject; 
Kline’s judiciousness eliciting ‘exactly the feeling one should have’ because it aims at 
‘targeted perception reflex’ rather than ‘generalised, nonspecific and undifferentiated 
‘feeling’ (EA: 52). However, for me it seems clear that, contrarily, what Greenberg registers 
in this account of Kline’s work is the way in which it bindingly engages somatic response in 
a manner which refutes any delegitimation of feeling. As I noted in Chapter 5, Kline’s 
ambition in his work was for it to convey a sign’s sense of signification, while nevertheless 
prohibiting the work’s translation into discourse independent of the work itself. This is 
evident in the paratactical composition which sets his paintings apart from the calligraphic 
writing whose resemblance to Kline’s ‘blurting’ black strokes is undeniable. As Greenberg’s 
reference to both might imply, these black strokes are not in a hypotactic relationship with the 
paintings’ ‘white and gray grounds.’ Instead, as Dore Ashton points out, Kline’s paintings 
‘break a profound visual habit of regarding white as background and black as figure,’ with 
the ‘vast and overwhelming steppes’ of the former being just as methodically worked as the 
latter, resulting in ‘paintings in which white is the equal of black’ (1990: 300-1). This is 
evident especially in a painting such as Untitled from 1952, the year in which Greenberg 
made the above-quoted assessment (fig. 10). In Untitled, the white sections are laid on with 
impasto, both colours have clearly been overpainted with the other multiple times, and there 
is thus no reason to consider one subordinate to the other. Yet, this is not a peaceful 
coexistence. As Elaine de Kooning notes, ‘Kline’s blacks and whites jostled each other for 
position in a tense, unrelieved conflict’ (1994: 198). That the white sections of his paintings 
receive as much attention as the black sections does not detract from the way in which, in 
Ashton’s words, the ‘lunging marks’ of the latter ‘quicken the pulse of the spectator’ (1990: 
300). Kline’s paintings thus bear a kind of pregnancy which invokes in the spectator a 
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reciprocal tensing of muscles, and I think this dynamic is what Greenberg is referring to in 
his ambivalence over Kline’s paintings. Far from discrediting feeling in the name of the 
understanding, the sense that the painting entails a suppression of power indicts the 
dividedness of feeling and understanding, and the subordination of the former to the latter. It 
attests to how, while emphatically more than simple stimuli, Kline’s compositions bear a 
tension which, while undeniably meaningful, evades subsumptive comprehension, and can 
only be intuited somatically. 
  Admittedly, while I showed in chapters 5 and 7 that Greenberg makes certain suggestive 
assertions throughout his criticism which imply that avant-garde art both indicts the 
reifications of capital, and prefigures a rationality which would do justice to particularity, 
Greenberg certainly does not claim that the nondiscursive elements of experience which the 
artworks engage call for a transformation in the relations of production as Trotsky asserts the 
‘feelings and moods’ invoked by artworks do. In 1948, when discussing the paratactical 
nature of the ‘all-over’ style which Pollock, following Tobey and Janet Sobel, had recently 
adopted, Greenberg claims that its ‘dissolution of the picture into sheer texture, sheer 
sensation [...] seems to answer something deep seated in contemporary sensibility’ (CEC2: 
224). However, he says nothing conclusive as to what this might be. Even in ‘Laocoon,’ 
where his Trotskyist commitment to revolutionary socialism exists alongside an emphatic 
stress on the somatic appeal of modernist artworks, he does not draw a connection between 
the two, despite maintaining a nebulously defined affinity between avant-garde art and the 
abolition of capitalism. Thus, it is easy to see how his self-declared positivism is interpretable 
as a phenomenological correlate to his stated conviction, surveyed in Chapter 3, that after 
WWII avant-garde art no longer worked towards transcending the status quo, confirming the 
notion that the Abstract Expressionists, as Annette Cox puts it, ‘had forsaken utopian 
elements in their art’ (1982: 31). This is especially clear when Greenberg approaches the 
matter of spectators’ embodiment in terms strikingly similar to those for which he criticises 
Rosenberg’s account of the movement as ‘action painting,’ by affirming that the determinate 
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negation of illusionism renders artworks nothing more than things among things. He claims, 
for example, that that ‘the physical fact of the [abstract] canvas itself’ enters ‘the actual 
presence of the spectator on the same terms, and as completely, as do the walls [and] the 
furniture’ (CEC1: 140), and asserts that the abstract picture is ‘an object of literally the same 
spatial order as our bodies,’ and thus ‘returns [the spectator] to that space in all its brute 
literalness’ (CEC3: 191). It is due to assertions like this that a critic such as Ann Gibson 
surmises that Greenberg reduces Abstract Expressionist artworks ‘to the in-itselfness of 
observed fact’ (1990: 205). However, I want to argue that the terms in which Greenberg 
contends Abstract Expressionist artworks return the spectator to the spatial order of their 
bodies, implies that this solicitation of the gaze on the basis of physicality is radically 
different from the way in which we generally relationally perceive objects such as the walls 
and furniture. Indeed, in 1959 when surveying Hofmann’s oeuvre, and by extension Abstract 
Expressionism, Greenberg accounts for the movement’s significance precisely insofar as the 
artworks actively differentiate themselves from their surrounding environs. He writes that the 
movement, for all its divergences, was distinguished by the works’ ‘liveness of surface,’ 
pioneered by Hofmann’s paintings, which ‘breathe as no others do and open up to animate 
the air around them’ (CEC4: 73), a description which does not generally apply to walls or 
furniture.94 
  As I showed in the previous chapter, Greenberg characterises his methodology as 
‘positivist.’ As I also elaborated, Adorno conceives of positivism as the acceptance of the 
world as given, preformed in the interests of capital. Thus, and likely referring to his unhappy 
experiences on the Princeton Radio Project when in exile in America,95 he asserts that a 
positivistic approach to art understands artworks simply as organised systems of stimuli. For 
                                                          
94 It is notable here that breathing was precisely the metaphor adopted by Betty Parsons, gallerist for 
many of the Abstract Expressionists, in privileging somatic response to their paintings, when she claimed 
that, in providing open space and thus giving the artworks ‘space to breathe,’ her gallery was the first ‘to 
require physical engagement from [its] visitors’ (Davidson 2016: 90). 
95 For a good account of Adorno’s criticism of the positivistic approach of this project, which analysed the 
role of the radio in listeners’ lives, see Rose, 2014: 122-132. 
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Adorno, then, a positivistic approach towards art is true to the extent that ‘without the 
experience of art nothing can be known about it and there can be no discussion of it’ (AT: 
265), which I acknowledged is indeed what Greenberg intended in terming his criticism 
positivist. However, Adorno contends that, in disregarding how responses to art are mediated 
by the dictates of exchange-value, a positivistic approach ignores the distinction between a 
spectator simply using an artwork ‘as a backdrop for all kinds of [socially conditioned] 
psychological projections,’ and a spectator understanding ‘a work by submitting to the 
work’s own discipline’ (AT: 265). For Adorno, the latter is how one must approach authentic 
art. He asserts that ‘[o]ne does not understand a work of art when one translates it into 
concepts [...] but rather when one is immersed in its immanent movement [...] when it is [...] 
repainted by the eye’ (1992: 97). Accordingly, positivism is incapable of distinguishing 
between ‘the knowledge that is art from conceptual knowledge’ (AT: 125). Yet, it is precisely 
in terms of submitting to a work’s discipline that Greenberg describes aesthetic experience. 
As I delineated in Chapter 7, for Adorno ‘progressive rationality has reduced [mimetic 
comportment] to a marginal value’ (Ibid). However, just as he posits that art praxis recovers 
something of mimetic comportment, for Adorno the resultant artworks require mimetic 
comportment from spectators, as ‘only those who imitate them understand them’ (Ibid). As 
we have seen, Greenberg’s account of medium-specific praxis has affinity with the dialectic 
of construction and mimesis which Adorno contends is central to the production of authentic 
art, and Greenberg similarly implies that apprehension of authentic art entails assimilation to 
otherness. In ‘The Case for Abstract Art,’ for instance, Greenberg differentiates between 
abstract painting and (reified) representational painting on the basis that the former ‘drives 
home’ what he refers to as its ‘at-onceness’ with ‘greater singleness and clarity’ (CEC4: 81). 
For Greenberg, to apprehend an artwork’s ‘at-onceness’ is to be 
summoned and gathered into one point in the continuum of duration. The picture does 
this to you, willy-nilly, regardless of whatever else is on your mind; a mere glance at 
it creates the attitude required for its appreciation, like a stimulus that elicits an 
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automatic response. You become all attention, which means that you become, for a 
moment, selfless and in a sense entirely identified with the object of your attention 
(CEC4: 81) 
As Andrew Bowie notes, there is a distinction to be made ‘between the empiricist sense of 
immediacy, where – immediate – “sense data” are construed as arising from direct causal 
impacts on the organism and are used as the foundation of cognitive claims, and the sense [...] 
which has to do with the ways in which we are always already in contact with an intelligible 
world even before we conceptualise it,’ exemplary of which for him is ‘Merleau-Ponty’s 
insistence on the embodiment of mind’ (2013: 61). Now, Greenberg’s analogical rhetoric in 
the above quote seems to portray spectatorial receptivity in the terms of the former sense of 
immediacy. However, as I have indicated, his notion of the ‘at-onceness’ elicited by Abstract 
Expressionist artworks in fact implies the latter sense of immediacy, which Bowie observes 
Adorno does not dismiss as based on false immediacy so readily as the first, instead 
recognising it as registering ‘something that needs to be understood’ (ibid: 61-2). As I will 
now elucidate with recourse to both Adorno and Merleau-Ponty, what are registered in 
Greenberg’s notion of the ‘at-onceness’ of Abstract Expressionist artworks, and need to be 
understood, are precisely the affective elements of experience which his criticism supposedly 
subordinates in the service of the status quo.  
  Peter Dews has observed an affinity between Merleau-Ponty and Adorno, in so far as both, 
as fellow readers of Husserl,96 reject the latter’s conviction that transcendental subjectivity is 
determinable through ‘eidetic’ reduction, whereby one brackets any contingent or accidental 
considerations from acts of consciousness. Instead, Dews writes, the philosophers share a 
concern ‘to uncover the reef of facticity on which any transcendental enquiry must run 
aground’ by moving ‘“downstream” towards an account of subjectivity as emerging from and 
                                                          
96 Husserl was undeniably Merleau-Ponty’s most significant philosophical influence, while Adorno wrote 
his doctoral dissertation on Husserl, and years later developed its critique into the monograph Zur 
Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie (1956), subsequently translated as Against Epistemology (1982). 
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entwined with the natural and historical world’ (1987: 16-19).97 As should be clear from the 
previous chapter, for Adorno this is not simply an epistemological issue. According to 
Adorno, transcendental subjectivity reflects and legitimates the disregard for the corporeal 
particularity of subjects by the norms of capitalist second nature. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that idealism buttresses the sedimentation of regressive social institutions under 
capitalism. He consistently stresses how the oppression and exploitation by which capitalism 
is reproduced is justified with recourse to the idealist categories of classical liberalism, ‘[t]he 
purity of [whose] principles not only tolerates but even requires violence’ (1969: xiii). While 
maintaining critical support for the Soviet Union in 1947, he evidences how ‘[r]espect for law 
and liberty has served to justify police suppression of strikes in America [and] military 
suppression in Indochina or in Palestine and the development of an American empire in the 
Middle East’ (Ibid). And when he subsequently abandoned his hope in the emancipatory 
potential of the Soviet Union, it was on the basis that it, too, legitimated oppression on 
idealist grounds and, accordingly, he stressed that his rejection ‘in no way [implied] 
acceptance of the eternal laws of the capitalist order or any respect for this order’ (1973: 227). 
 Whereas idealism ignores the natural and historical particularity of subjects, for Merleau-
Ponty, as should already be clear, art provides a locus where carnal self-awareness is 
paramount, and the same is true of Adorno, for whom, as I showed in the previous chapter, 
aesthetic reflective judgment should be understood as engaging the empirical surplus of the 
transcendental subject. Crucial to this, for Adorno, is the fact that authentic art is not ‘an 
arbitrary system of signs, as if it merely reproduced the world without claiming to possess the 
same immediate reality’ (2007b: 159), but instead is qualitatively other than the world 
precisely because of its immediacy. That is to say, because authentic artworks are 
spiritualised not in harmony with the artist’s sovereign mind, but rather in mimetic 
                                                          
97 In spite of the affinities between the thinkers, which we will see have also been noted elsewhere, the 
only recorded encounter between them I can discover is Merleau-Ponty expressing ‘a heartfelt wish to 
stop what he took to be a scandal’ when, in a lecture at the College de France, Adorno ‘publicly 
vituperated’ Heidegger (qtd. in Gordon 2016: 122). 
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reciprocity with their materials, their ‘sensuousness [...] shines forth as spiritual’ (AT: 15). 
While this ‘spiritual content’ is not reducible to ‘what is individually, sensually given,’ as if 
an enumeration of the artwork’s physical properties could do justice to it, it is nevertheless 
‘constituted by way of this empirical givennness’ and could not be expressed without it (AT: 
129). As Sebastian Truskolaski summarises well, for Adorno, when an object is perceived as 
mediated by dominant rationality, ‘it is reflected [...] as relative to its conception of what 
knowledge is,’ and thus the ‘material moment of sensation [is designated as] purely a link in 
the chain of cognitive functions,’ and there remains not captured an ‘excess of physicality’ 
which concerns ‘the human body itself’ (2014: 17-20). On the other hand, Adorno contends 
that the experience of art solicits this excess of physicality in its resistance of dominant 
rationality by way of its irreducible particularity. He asserts that the artwork’s ‘irruption of 
objectivity into subjective consciousness,’ whereby the subject must submit to the work’s 
discipline mimetically rather than take recourse to reified schemata to understand it, occurs 
‘precisely at the point where the subjective reaction is most intense’ (AT: 245). Whereas 
when an object is ‘an object of cognition, its physical side is spiritualized from the outset by 
translation into epistemology,’ when the object takes precedence, as it does in the experience 
of authentic art, it is clear that there is no sensation – ‘the crux of all epistemology’ – without 
‘a somatic moment’ (ND: 192-3). As Zuidervaart puts it, Adorno argues that ‘[t]he object’s 
precedence’ in art ‘means that conscious cognition cannot do without sensation, a 
preconscious and corporeal feeling,’ and thus ‘the corporeal emerges as the ontic core of 
subjective cognition’ (1991: 108). For Adorno such mimetic behavior, which entails an 
‘adjustment to something extra-mental,’ engages ‘an impulse that is in a sense a bodily 
impulse that has not yet been subjected to the centralising authority of consciousness’ (2006: 
213). That is to say, as Jay writes, ‘[i]n more passively assimilating itself to the other, the 
subject of mimesis […] preserves the sensuous, somatic element that the abstractions of 
idealist reason factor out of cognition or sublate into a higher rationality’ (1997: 32). In 
Adorno’s work, however, focused as he is far more on production than reception of art, 
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description of this experience in the face of artworks is sparing. Merleau-Ponty, on the other 
hand, apportions far more attention to the phenomenal experience of art, and I will now show 
that in his writing on painting subsequent to ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ he elucidates it in very 
similar terms.  
  As Stephen Watson notes, Merleau-Ponty finds affinity with Adorno in that both privilege 
‘the nondiscursive and indemonstrable character of art’ (2009: 12). As Paul Crowther has 
acknowledged, both accordingly ‘adapt description to the irreducible concreteness of the art 
object’ emphasizing that the artwork ‘shows rather than says’ (2009: 5). In Merleau-Ponty’s 
second essay on painting, ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,’ he stresses that this 
showing rather than saying allows painting to render visible the ‘voices of silence’ – the 
precariousness of the silent forms of expression’  –  upon which language is dependent (PP: 
115-7), whose corporeal intuitability he further elaborates in his third essay on painting, ‘Eye 
and Mind.’ I have cited these essays twice in the thesis thus far in terms of their affinity with 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory. In Chapter 2, I took recourse to ‘Eye and Mind’ to show how 
Merleau-Ponty draws a parallel between Renaissance perspective and reification, and in 
Chapter 7, I briefly cited ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,’ to show that, like 
Adorno, he conversely elaborates an account of art-making wherein an artist does not impose 
form upon materials, but is rather processually guided by their materials. Merleau-Ponty 
illustrates this most lucidly by recounting a film of Matisse in which the painter is shown in 
slow-motion meditating before laying his brushstroke – trying other movements while 
hovering over the canvas, or brushing it lightly. Merleau-Ponty claims that to conclude from 
this that Matisse was equivocating over an infinite amount of gestures in order to ‘eliminate 
all but one’ is to falsify his praxis, because Matisse did not paint in slow-motion, but rather 
he, ‘within a human’s time and vision, looked at the still open whole of his work in progress 
and brought his brush toward the line which called for it in order that the painting might 
finally be that which it was in the process of becoming’ (PP: 83). For Merleau-Ponty, a 
painting such as Matisse’s thus similarly invites its spectator ‘to take up the gesture which 
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created it and [...] to rejoin, without any guide other than a movement of the invented line [...] 
the silent world of the painter, henceforth uttered and accessible’ (PP: 88). As I will now 
elaborate, to do so for Merleau-Ponty, is to be brought back to the inseparability of cognition 
from corporeality. 
  As in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt,’ for Merleau-Ponty the ‘silent world of the painter’ which is 
accessible to spectators who submit themselves to a work’s discipline, inscribes the painter’s 
preconceptual perception of things. This has lead to accusations that Merleau-Ponty, as 
Günther Figal asserts, ‘misses the decisive point,’ in that he ‘does not sufficiently pay 
attention to the painting as such,’ forgetting ‘the exteriority and the objective character of 
art,’ and neglecting the fact that ‘paintings are so obviously over there for the contemplator,’ 
emphatically inaccessible without ‘sensual presence’ (2010: 39). Yet, while Merleau-Ponty 
was ambivalent towards abstract painting in much of his writing,98 in ‘Indirect Language and 
the Voices of Silence’ and ‘Eye and Mind,’ he does not contend that this ‘silent world of the 
painter’ is conveyed so much through the re-presentation of this preconceptual perception, as 
through the rescue in semblance of a primordial relationship to objects without regression 
akin to Adorno’s account of mimesis. For Merleau-Ponty, while modernist painters ‘want 
nothing to do with a truth defined as the resemblance of painting and the world,’ they still 
intend ‘to signify something’ (PP: 94). However, unlike Schapiro’s account of modernist art, 
which I showed in Chapter 6 served the appropriation of Abstract Expressionism by US 
                                                          
98 As I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, Merleau-Ponty criticises Renaissance perspectivalist painting on the 
basis that it presents ‘a world dominated and possessed through and through’ (PP: 87). However, as Fóti 
writes, at the time of ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ a converse ‘appreciation of abstract painting’ was impeded by his 
approaching painting ‘as a proto-philosophical investigation of the constitution of visibility, in the service 
of a theory of truth’ (1996: 165). Singling out two Abstract Expressionist works contemporaneous with 
Merleau-Ponty’s writing, Pollock’s Lavender Mist (1950) and Newman’s Cathedra (1951), and concludes 
that it is ‘difficult to imagine what satisfaction such a quest could possibly find [in such] paintings’ (ibid). 
Indeed, in his second essay on painting, ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,’ Merleau-Ponty 
writes that abstract art constitutes ‘a negation or refusal of the world’ and testament only to ‘a shameful 
or despairing life’ (PP: 93). His examples are admittedly geometrical surfaces and infusorians and 
microbe-esque forms, but, as Fóti writes, he was more than likely familiar with Abstract Expressionism, 
as in 1952 there were two very significant exhibitions of abstract art in Paris, one group show featuring 
work by both Americans and Europeans entitled ‘Un arte autre,’ and a solo show by Pollock (2013: 29). In 
‘Eye and Mind,’ however, while still not discussing painting which eschews all figuration he turns to 
quasi-representational works by de Stael and Klee and asserts that the distinctions he had previously 
drawn between abstract and representational art were ‘wrongly posed [since] no painting, no matter how 
abstract, can get away from Being’ (PP: 147). 
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imperialism by subsuming the works under the exhibition-value of personal expression, 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that ‘the fact that modern painting seeks to be a creation’ rather than 
the arrangement of a pregiven system of signs, does not mean that it should be interpreted as 
signifying, in lieu of external reality, ‘a movement toward the subjective and a ceremony 
glorifying the individual’ (PP: 88). Instead, Merleau-Ponty claims, what modernist painting 
signifies is that which ‘still must be done in order to restore the encounter between [the] 
glance and the things which solicit it’ (PP: 94). That is to say, whereas instrumental reason, 
whose increasing prevalence I acknowledged in Chapter 2 Merleau-Ponty bemoans in the 
first section of ‘Eye and Mind,’ ‘manipulates things and gives up living in them,’ modernist 
painting brackets our comprehension in term of manipulability. As Mikel Dufrenne notes, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the painter ‘is not interested in [...] what Adorno calls the administered 
world, in which fruit bowls are machine-turned and mountains explored by geographers’ 
(260). As opposed to the administered world’s quantitative abstractions, Merleau-Ponty 
stresses how painting engages us in a way which ‘forbids us to conceive of vision as an 
operation of thought that would set up before the mind a picture or representation of the 
world’ and renders inescapable the fact that ‘the world is made of the same stuff as the body’ 
by returning us ‘to the “there is,” to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as 
it is in our life and for our body’ (PP: 121-125). Central to this, for Merleau-Ponty, is the way 
in which painting ‘awakens powers dormant in ordinary vision’ (PP: 142). As is the case for 
Adorno, for Merleau-Ponty this awakening of dormant powers is not so much prelapsarian 
yearning, as it is the attempt to save fleeting, ephemeral and transitory experience. Merleau-
Ponty typifies that which ‘the painter seeks’ by describing the experience of looking at a 
swimming pool, in which so-called secondary qualities seem as objectively binding as the 
measurable properties to which the swimming pool could be quantitatively reduced: 
When through the water’s thickness I see the tiled bottom of the pool, I do not see it 
despite the water and the reflections; I see it through them and because of them. If 
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there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it were without that flesh that I saw 
the geometry of the tiles, then I would cease to see it as it is and where it is. (PP: 142) 
It is notable that Merleau-Ponty chooses an aqueous image here, because in a 1972 exchange 
with Rosenberg when discussing the perceptual experience of painting, de Kooning defends 
the notion that, when one places a stick in the water to create the optical illusion that it is 
broken, ‘it’s broken while it’s in the water’ (2007: 147). He asserts this to make the 
analogous point that there is no such thing as an optical illusion in painting. Against 
Rosenberg, de Kooning argues that to override the subjective perception of artworks with 
recourse to measurable properties is precisely to ignore ‘the very strength of painting’ (Ibid). 
For de Kooning, this is far from ocularcentrism. As Richard Shiff observes, de Kooning’s 
self-description as a ‘slipping glimpser’ was rooted in his ‘directly material and physical’ 
attunement to the imbrication of the perceiver in the perceived world; to the way in which 
‘eyes really did slip in the light’ (Shiff, 2011a: 248).99 Such a synesthetic conflation of sight 
and touch, as which I noted above Deleuze insightfully suggests Greenberg’s emphasis upon 
opticality should be understood, was not uncommon among the artists and associated critics. 
For instance, Motherwell claims that when he looks at his painting ‘as detachedly’ as is 
possible, it appears to him ‘as warm, sensual [...] and felt’ (1992: 58); David Smith affirms ‘I 
touch with the eye’ (qtd. in Krauss 1971: 63); and in spite of my above assessment of his 
account, Schapiro at one point asserts that ‘the sensitive eye, which is the painter’s eye, feels 
the so-called abstract line with a [...] deep response that pervades the whole being’ (MA: 
230).  
                                                          
99 Pertinently, Shiff elsewhere suggests that Merleau-Ponty might have chosen de Kooning, rather than 
Cézanne, as an artist in whose work we might sense ‘the physical and emotional interconnectedness or 
“carnality” of life and all creation’ (2011b: 9). Indeed, Wayne J. Froman has developed such an account, 
although I would contend that he characterises de Kooning as portraying this interconnectedness rather 
than istantiating it. He writes that de Kooning’s work manifests the ‘space that sub-tends the spatiality of 
[things]’ by making visible on the canvas ‘the overlap of the field of vision and field of motor projects’ 
which is constituent of vision figured not from an objectivist perspective, but from ‘the seer’s location in 
the field of the visible, that is, the seer’s visibility’ (1993: 344). De Kooning’s paintings, claims Froman, 
‘mark tensive points in the specifically visual schema of the field of overlap between the visual and motor 
fields’ (1993: 346).   
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  While not directly in reference to painting, Merleau-Ponty perhaps elucidates this conflation 
best in the final completed chapter of his unfinished and posthumously published The Visible 
and the Invisible. Near the end of this chapter, to describe the moments of mimetic 
relationship with the world to which in ‘Indirect Voices’ and ‘Eye and Mind’ he claims 
painting attempts to hold fast, Merleau-Ponty cites Proust’s account of notions which are 
“without equivalents” and yet undeniably meaningful – Proust’s examples are “the notions of 
light [...] of relief, of physical voluptuousness”’ (VI: 149). Merleau-Ponty writes that such 
carnal ‘notions,’ ‘unlike those of science, cannot be detached from the sensible appearances 
and be erected into a second positivity’ (VI: 149). They ‘would not be better known to us if 
we had no body and no sensibility’ because ‘they could not be given to us as ideas except in 
a carnal experience’ (VI: 150). Such ‘notions’ accordingly make clear the ‘marvel too little 
noticed that every movement of eyes [...] has its place in the same visible universe that I 
itemise and explore with them,’ and thus that ‘the palpation of the eye is a remarkable 
variant’ of ‘tactile palpation’ (VI: 133-134). For Merleau-Ponty, then, these carnal ‘notions’ 
which provide the impetus for artistic production and which artworks instantiate, render 
inescapable the corporeality of perception. Now, the examples Merleau-Ponty reaches for in 
‘Eye and Mind’ are not de Kooning, Pollock, Mitchell, Krasner, Rothko and Still, but 
Giacometti, Cézanne, de Stael, Matisse, Klee, Richier and Rodin.100 However, it is in 
remarkably Merleau-Pontyan terms that Bernstein describes the mode of reception elicited by 
Abstract Expressionism on his Adornian account.101 For Bernstein, Abstract Expressionism’s 
opposition to societal abstraction by the affirmation of particularity through artistic 
                                                          
100 While Veronique Fóti acknowledges the fact that abstract painting seems to typify these carnal 
‘notions,’ she expressly does not draw on Abstract Expressionism, because she wants to deploy the sheer 
evidence of abstract painting ‘without a preconceived theoretical framework, allowing the theoretical 
implications to suggest themselves from out of the images themselves’ (1996: 138). I, on the other hand, 
am arguing that precisely the ‘preconceived theoretical framework’ of Greenbergian formalism implies 
how Abstract Expressionist artworks exemplify these carnal ‘notions.’ 
 
101 I can find nowhere where Bernstein has discussed Merleau-Ponty to any meaningful extent. However, 
in his first book, The Philosophy of the Novel (1984), he expresses approbation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (273, n24) and, crucially, in an endnote to 
Against Voluptuous Bodies, without elaborating whatsoever, he cites Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ as a 
reconfiguration of the Adornian mimesis (376, n4). 
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abstraction, forces the ‘eye [...] to take [its] corporeal embeddedness as a condition for [its] 
intellectual doings’ and thus ‘makes somatic silence articulate and unavoidable’ (AVB: 63; 
157). As he writes of Pollock’s Lavender Mist (1950), its tactility 
has the effect of embodying the eye of the viewer, of making the experience of seeing 
the painting an experience of being embodied as a condition of viewing without the 
painting at any point or moment denying its condition of being a  surface. That a 
sensuous, fragmented surface, a surface that robs the viewer of perspective and 
orientation with respect to it, like [de Kooning’s Excavation (1950)], can nonetheless 
hold the (embodied) eye gives back to sensuous immediacy a potential for statement 
as such. (AVB: 155) 
Thus, Bernstein writes, Abstract Expressionism ‘engages us on the ground of our bodily 
mortality, which the reigning universals eclipse as a condition for meaning’ by calling back 
and voicing ‘sensuous reality in its mortal coils’ (AVB: 163). Whilst, as I showed in Chapter 
5, Bernstein argues that Greenberg’s championing of Abstract Expressionism is compelled by 
the movement’s defence of (the semblance of) immanent meaning against the heteronomy of 
exchange-value, he ultimately contends that the critic ‘abstracts the human eye from the 
human body, seeing from touching, the optical from the tactile’ (AVB: 125). However, I have 
argued in this chapter that in Greenberg’s descriptions of Abstract Expressionist artworks 
during the course of his day-to-day criticism, his focus on the former term in each of these 
couplets always implies its inextricability from the latter.  
  While Greenberg’s criticism fails to account for the political significance of this challenge 
to the epistemological division of sensuality and cognition, I want to contend in the 
remainder of this chapter that to find an emphatic, if inexplicit and unsophisticated, 
acknowledgement of how the experience of Abstract Expressionism as described in this 
chapter indicts the  abstractions of capital, we must turn instead to the ‘metaphysical’ 
accounts of the movement espoused by artists such as Gottlieb and Newman, which 
Greenberg consistently opposed. The ostensible disagreement between Greenberg and these 
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artists is often noted. Anfam, for instance, writes that Rothko and Gottlieb ‘quite 
contradicted’ ‘Laocoon’ on the question of ‘whether aesthetic form should come before 
feeling’ (1990: 78). And the revisionist historian Michael Leja affirms that ‘Greenberg’s 
serious and challenging appraisal’ of Abstract Expressionism ‘in formal terms’ eschewed 
‘“metaphysics”’ (1993: 325). Leja asserts, correctly, that this ‘was a source of great 
frustration for the artists, who felt that their achievement was [thus] misrepresented by their 
critical supporters’ and accordingly Rothko, Newman and Still were all inclined ‘to “chew 
Clem Greenberg’s head off” now and then’ (Ibid: 34). Yet, as is common, Leja understands 
this as a genuinely insuperable rift between Greenberg’s and the artists’ readings of the art. 
For Leja, Greenberg’s account obfuscates the fact that Abstract Expressionism is 
‘simultaneously spiritual and material,’ placing the accent entirely on the latter (Ibid). 
However, Leja himself never properly accounts for this simultaneity. As Krauss notes, Leja’s 
reading of Abstract Expressionism is ‘resolutely representational,’ based on an art-historical 
model of intentionality whereby artists ‘express an idea through “pictures” of it’ (1993: 324), 
and his book is an investigation into the way in which these ideas chimed with the dominant 
discourse of the era. Thus, for Leja, the metaphysical nature that the artists ascribe to their 
artworks is something to be read out of the artworks discursively, and Greenberg’s failure to 
do so simply marks his inability to grasp these facets of the art. Conversely, I want to contend 
that the artists’ accounts of their art as metaphysical, are attempts to account for the same 
mimetic aspect which I have argued is the real referent of Greenberg’s acclaim, and to do so I 
will now turn to an example of one of these artists ‘chewing Greenberg’s head off.’ 
  In 1947, invited by Greenberg in his capacity as art critic for The Nation, Newman delivered 
an (ultimately unpublished) riposte to Greenberg’s review of a Gottlieb show, in which 
Greenberg grouped the artist among Rothko, Still and Newman as ‘a new indigenous school,’ 
and belittled ‘the importance this school attributes to the […] “metaphysical” content of its 
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art’ (CEC2: 189).102 Newman’s rebuttal is hyperbolic and impressionistic. However, I 
contend it nonetheless invites a reading in the terms governing my account of Abstract 
Expressionism thus far. From the outset, it is clear that Leja’s conception that the supposedly 
metaphysical nature of the paintings is to be discursively interpreted is not in keeping with 
the way in which Newman conceives of this metaphysical nature. As Yve-Alain Bois notes, 
‘if it is the meaning of his art that is [Newman’s] essential concern, this meaning does not lie 
in anything prior to its embodiment in a painting’ (1993: 190). Newman takes umbrage at the 
implication he gleans from Greenberg that ‘the artists are working from a set of a priori 
mystical precepts and are using their art for metaphysical exercises’ (SWI: 162). Instead, 
Newman claims the only reason why he had ever written about the art, was not to lay down a 
programme or prescriptions, but rather because the work so radically evades the 
contemporaneous ‘framework of established notions’ (SWI: 162). For Newman, the Abstract 
Expressionists were set apart from preceding European abstract art by the fact that, whereas 
the external referents of the latter are still evident, even if only in terms of geometry, the 
Abstract Expressionists employ ‘a kind of personal writing without the props of any known 
shape’ (SWI: 164). Thus, contrary to their antecedents’ ‘base in the material world of 
sensuality,’ the Abstract Expressionists’ work ‘can be discussed only in metaphysical terms’ 
(SWI: 162-3). Now, it is evidently not the case that the Abstract Expressionists had expunged 
all ‘known shape’ from their work, and indeed in the next chapter I will turn to the 
importance of their vestigial elements of representation. Nevertheless, I think Newman 
should be understood here as emphasising how reception of the artworks does not depend on 
the identification of imaginary tactile referents. His claim that the paintings can only be 
addressed in metaphysical terms is not an appeal to the spectator’s consciousness as if it were 
disembodied, elevating ‘interpretation to a cosmic [...] level beyond the [...] concrete’ as 
                                                          
102 Peter de Bolla prefaces his remarkably sensitive and astute account of Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis 
with the assertion that, ‘Newman himself made all sorts of claims for the art he and his fellow abstract 
expressionist painters created, but these claims, interesting as they are in relation to a cultural history of 
modern painting, are nothing in comparison with the claims made by the painting itself’ (2001: 33). I, on 
the other hand, will argue that Newman’s defence of the metaphysics of Abstract Expressionism certainly 
explicates the claims made by the painting itself. 
174 
 
Annette Cox surmises from Newman’s statements (1982: 9). Instead, as he puts it in his oft-
cited essay ‘The Sublime is Now,’ for Newman the ‘revelation’ provided by Abstract 
Expressionist artworks is ‘real and concrete’ (SWI: 173). Or, as he affirmed in conversation 
with Thomas B. Hess, when Newman says that his painting is metaphysical, what he is also 
saying is that his painting is physical (SWI: 280). Indeed, it has often been noted that the 
physicality of Newman’s paintings’ surfaces is far from inconsequential. Carol Mancusi-
Ungaro has recently stressed the importance of such tactility with recourse to an anecdote. 
She recounts how, subsequent to Gerard Jan van Bladeren’s 1986 vandalisation of Newman’s 
Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III (1967-68) in the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, 
the painting was sent to the US for its surface to be repaired and completely repainted. 
However, she writes, what resulted was an effective obliteration of ‘Newman’s staggeringly 
beautiful and carefully crafted layers of painting [because] it was accomplished by a restorer 
who seemed to be responding more to the widespread misinterpretation of Newman’s large 
and unprecedented colour than to the reality of his nuanced surfaces’ (2011: 340).103 Newman 
himself entreated spectators to adopt a micrological gaze attuned to these nuances when he 
tacked a sheet of notepaper to the wall of the Betty Parsons Gallery during his second one-
man show to inform visitors that his pictures were ‘intended to be seen from a short distance’ 
(SWI: 178), and when thus observed, to adopt a claim made by Rosenberg of Gottlieb, even 
in the case of Newman’s most implacable and imperceptibly worked canvases ‘“action” is 
quietly there,’ and, accordingly, ‘unique effects occur’ (1969: 195).  
  This begs the question of what it means to say that the physicality of Abstract Expressionist 
artworks, and the ‘unique effects’ thereof, are at the same time metaphysical. To return to 
Newman’s rebuttal of Greenberg, to characterise the metaphysical nature of Abstract 
                                                          
103 Carol Mancusi-Ungaro has also written of how crucial nuance is to Rothko’s painting. She refers to the 
‘visual eminence’ which accentuates the surface’s ‘difference in paint layers’ (1998: 287-288), elaborating 
how Rothko explored ‘the impact of every facet of his painting in terms of the physical object’ (Ibid: 283). 
She claims this is evident in the how ‘he used the colour, transparency, viscosity, and reflectance of paint 
in a relentless pursuit of […] refined surfaces’ and deplored ‘the use of varnish, which would diminish or 
even obliterate certain [of these] effects’ (Ibid: 283-284), and quotes Rothko himself, in his claim that his 
paintings ‘are here. Materially. The surfaces, the work of the brush and so on’ (Ibid: 289).  
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Expressionist artworks the artist appeals to ‘the idea that the realisation by Cézanne of his 
complete and pure sensation of his apples adds up to more than the apples’ (SWI: 163-4). 
Now, I have argued in this chapter that if something essential about Cézanne’s transcribed 
sensation is shared by Abstract Expressionist artworks, this is the case in so far as the 
artworks are attempts to save the fleeting, ephemeral and transitory promise of a mimetic 
relation to the world which Cézanne sought to depict, and that thus Abstract Expressionist 
artworks invite spectatorial assimilation in a manner which renders cognition emphatically 
inextricable from corporeality. Indeed, as Newman declares that his nuanced surfaces should 
be seen ‘from a short distance,’ Adorno claims that it is experiences attuned to the 
infinitesimal that provide ‘a haven for the mimetic element of knowledge, for the element of 
elective affinity between the knower and the known’ (ND: 45). To understand why such a 
haven might be understood as ‘metaphysical,’ we need only recall how, as I elaborated in the 
previous chapter, for Adorno it is of paramount importance that Kant maintains that there 
exist metaphysical things, of which Kant claims human beings cannot have possible 
experiences. Adorno understands this as a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that that our 
concepts are dependent on, and do not exhaust, the objects they conceive, and accordingly, if 
we take Kant’s transcendental conditions of experience to be historically contingent, a tacit 
acknowledgement that our experience of objects could be different under changed historical 
circumstances. If metaphysics is understood in this way, to denote the experience of art as 
metaphysical is not to elevate this experience to an otherworldly realm, but contrarily to 
claim that it concerns that which capitalist reification debars as orientational for praxis in the 
material world.  
  For Adorno, as I acknowledged at the outset of this chapter, the event of Auschwitz, as an 
extreme figure of the dialectic of Enlightenment, forces such metaphysical speculation. And 
similarly, as I noted in Chapter 2, Newman frames Abstract Expressionism as conditioned by 
the event of Hiroshima which, along with Nagasaki, Bernstein affirms to be as good an 
actualisation of instrumental reason at its worst as Auschwitz, ‘perhaps better since the ease 
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with which we accepted the immediate erasure of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives 
speaks more emphatically to the racism and provincialism that has systematically 
accompanied Western universalism throughout its history’ (2001: 393). These events, then, 
mark the nadir of a world of radical immanence in which ‘individuality [is] about to vanish as 
a form of mental reflection’ (ND: 365). And the notion that the embodied cognition which I 
have argued in this chapter is engaged by Abstract Expressionism, intimates a rationality 
which transcends this immanence, is for Adorno negatively corroborated by these events. 
This is because our outrage at such atrocities is rooted in a ‘practical abhorrence of the 
unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed’ (Ibid). Adorno contends that it 
does not suffice to condemn such events with reference to a general law of moral philosophy 
which subjects must obey as if they were interchangeable. This is not adequate because our 
aversion to the horror of these events is rooted precisely in the particularity of subjects. 
Rather than by appealing to pure ideas, the ‘metaphysical principle of the injunction that 
“Thou shalt not inflict pain” – and this injunction is a metaphysical principle pointing beyond 
mere facticity – can find its justification only in the recourse to material reality, to corporeal, 
physical reality’ (2002a:  117). For events such as Auschwitz and Hiroshima to be possible, 
then, it is clear that this somatic moment must be negated, and this renders emphatic the 
negation of ends dictated by affective experience and sensuous particularity in the name of 
capitalism’s irrational imperatives by which our lives are reproduced. As I have shown 
throughout this chapter, in the experience of Abstract Expressionism, cognition is 
inextricable from corporeality. Thus, it invites a mode of rationality for which this negation is 
negated. It is in this, that the micrological view advocated by Newman, as Adorno writes, 
‘cracks the shells of what, measured by the subsuming cover concept, is helplessly isolated 
and explodes its identity,’ and is thus united with metaphysics at a time when it appears as if 
all transcendence has been eliminated (ND: 408).  
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 In 1928, while elaborating his conviction that art should be ‘for man’s sake not for art’s 
sake,’ which I acknowledged in Chapter 3, the nineteen year old Greenberg wrote the 
following in a letter to Harold Lazarus: 
There always were the oppressors and the oppressed. And the downtrodden always 
sent up a wail for justice – if in the past their wail hasn’t taken the form of art, it 
doesn’t presuppose that their present and future wail shouldn’t. (2000: 3) 
There is a striking resemblance between these lines and Adorno’s proclamation in Negative 
Dialectics forty years later that art must go on because ‘[p]erennial suffering has as much 
right to expression as a tortured man has to scream’ (ND: 362), and, while by the time 
Adorno wrote these words Greenberg had of course long abandoned the idea that the wail of 
the suffering might take the form of art, in this chapter I have argued that his account of 
Abstract Expressionism bears witness to how the art lends voice precisely to that stratum of 
experience whose disregard by the fundamental determinants of everyday life perpetuates 
suffering. Despite the fact that Greenberg disclaimed ‘metaphysical’ accounts of Abstract 
Expressionism in favour of his self-declared ‘positivism,’ the latter identifies how Abstract 
Expressionist artworks engage perception in a manner which transcends the world as 
circumscribed by the capitalist identity-thinking with which his criticism is predominately 
read as homologous. While capitalism renders all subjects fungible, Greenberg’s account of 
Abstract Expressionism in fact alights upon the way in which the artworks bindingly engage 
subjective particularity. In Chapter 5, I argued that, despite the fact that the modernist lineage 
of which Greenberg proclaimed Abstract Expressionism to be the contemporaneous 
instantiation lent the artworks to deployment by US imperialism in its formal isomorphy with 
progressive historicism, it also traces art’s unconscious writing of history. In this chapter, I 
have argued that Greenberg’s account of the phenomenal experience of the affirmation of 
medium-specificity which for him was the fulcrum of this lineage indicates how this 
unconscious writing of history engages elements of affective experience which capitalism 
delegitimates as fundamental determinants for society. Accordingly, subsequent to the 
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ostensible depoliticisation of Greenberg’s criticism, the way in which he conceives of 
Abstract Expressionist artworks nevertheless aligns them with the ‘feelings and moods’ 
negated by bourgeois society which Trotsky affirmed should concern revolutionary art.  
However, in the next chapter I want to argue that it is not simply in negating this negation 
that Abstract Expressionism opposes the status quo. I will show how it also, by the same 
movement, anticipates a future state of reconciliation in which the needs it registers would be 
fulfilled. 
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Chapter Ten 
Denunciation and Anticipation  
  In the revisionist historians’ accounts, the notion that Abstract Expressionism somehow 
anticipates a reconciled society, if acknowledged, is ultimately framed solely as serving the 
movement’s neutralisation. Guilbaut characterises Abstract Expressionism’s utopian 
prefiguration primarily with recourse to Motherwell and Rosenberg’s editorial for the sole 
issue of their magazine Possibilities, which features artist’s statements from Baziotes, Smith, 
Rothko and Pollock, the latter two of which I cited in previous chapters. In the brief and 
rather gnomic piece, Motherwell and Rosenberg assert that they have founded their 
publication to represent artists who work in ‘an attitude of expectancy’ with the ‘question of 
what will emerge [...] left open’ (1947: 1). Such artists, Motherwell and Rosenberg write, are 
free from ‘academic, group or political formulas,’ guided as they are only by ‘their own 
experience’ (Ibid). Nevertheless, Motherwell and Rosenberg claim that, contrary to 
‘organised social thinking’ which is supposedly ‘“more serious”’ than such art praxis, but 
simply manipulates ‘the known elements of the so-called state of affairs,’ this art praxis 
necessitates ‘the extremest faith in sheer possibility’ (Ibid). For Guilbaut, this editorial 
provides superficially politically radical justification for the Abstract Expressionists’ retreat 
from politics. He surmises that, finding it ‘impossible to act, to transform social life or the 
world itself,’ artists were to project themselves ‘into the future, to think about “possibilities,” 
to fulfil his potential by escaping the confines of the present moment’ (NY: 157). Guilbaut 
contends that the editorial implies that the ‘new kind of art’ which the artist was thus to 
develop ‘in order to breathe, in order to gain some freedom of manoeuvre, however minimal’ 
was one which ‘served the goal of personal liberation’ (NY: 156). However, Guilbaut 
surmises, citing in addition to the editorial a catalogue essay from a Kootz Gallery group 
show of Abstract Expressionism by Rosenberg reproduced in Possibilities, the artist had to be 
alienated from society, because such a state of isolation ‘allowed for individual analysis and 
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introspection and preserved some “personal essence” through which it was possible to 
envisage the creation of another world, a world without alienation’ (NY: 159).  
  Guilbaut proposes that it is not by fortuity that this claim for the radical politicality of art 
guided by individual experience rather than political programme coincided with the collapse 
of state funding for the arts and, supposedly, the attendant solidarity between artists which 
had proliferated during the 1930s and early ‘40s. In Chapter 2, I noted that many of the 
Abstract Expressionists were formerly engaged in Social Realism or Regionalism. This was 
in no small part because the artists had been employed in public projects set up to help art 
students and early career artists as part of the New Deal, such as the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), which generally favoured art celebrating the dignity of manual 
workers (without, of course, throwing the division of labour into question).104 However, as 
the US economy recovered during the war, the WPA was dissolved and the private market for 
art grew. Guilbaut contends that, consequently, ‘artists found themselves alone on the 
marketplace, in competition with other artists’ and thus, ‘[w]hereas the target had once been 
the masses [...] the target became the elite’ (NY: 159; 46-7). However, Guilbaut’s 
presupposition that the turn towards an abstract aesthetic marked a turn towards the taste of 
private collectors is questionable, because, as Cox notes, ‘to the American artists of the 1940s 
it was not readily apparent that following the Modernist path would lead to great wealth,’ and 
with the exception of Pollock, who was fortunate enough to enjoy the patronage of Peggy 
Guggenheim, the majority of the Abstract Expressionists lacked financial security until the 
1950s (31). Indeed, in 1955, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of her gallery, 
                                                          
104 It should, however, be acknowledged that, as Cox notes, while the purpose of the Federal Arts Project 
was ‘to stimulate the creation of a national art that was authentically American and easily accessible to 
the masses [...] they actually hired artists on the basis of need rather than style or politics,’ and 
prescription was often withheld (24). Indeed, in 1955 Greenberg  asserts in retrospect that he doubts 
whether the Abstract Expressionists could have developed as they did ‘without the opportunities for 
unconstrained work that the WPA Art project gave most of them in the last ‘30s’ (CEC3: 219). Exemplary 
of this are the preparatory drawings for a mural which Krasner was commissioned to execute on the 
WNYC radio building. This project was never realised, because, as Krasner notes in an interview with 
Dorothy Seckler in 1964, the war effort necessitated the termination of the WPA before it was started. 
However, the studies clearly prefigure her mature style (Seckler 1964, 2 November). This is evident in 
one from 1941 particularly, in which a curved looping black line heads towards the top left hand corner, 
seemingly trying to escape from the otherwise geometric composition. 
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Greenberg lauded Betty Parsons for having shown ‘artists like Pollock, Hofmann, Still, 
Newman, Rothko, Ferber, Lipton at a time when they could bring her little prestige and even 
less money’ (CEC3: 256). Rather, if the shift towards abstraction was a shift towards the 
commodity form, it seems far more that the impetus lay in the freedom from heteronomy 
afforded to artworks as commodities, which I have shown Adorno contends allows an 
artwork to confront the existence for-another of exchange-value with the immanent 
determination of its fetish character. For example, Guilbaut himself quotes Elaine de 
Kooning’s claim that many artists opted to quit the WPA when they got the chance because 
they would rather not ‘make posters which is what they were asked to do’ (NY: 216, n. 114). 
And Jimmy Ernst affirms that he ‘would much rather be unattached to any part of society 
than to be commissioned to carve a picture of Mr. Truman’ (MAIA: 16).105 Moreover, while 
it is certainly true that, as the Abstract Expressionists garnered acclaim and fortune in the 
‘50s and ‘60s, increasing antagonism and rivalry was fomented amongst them,106 in 1947 
certainly, as the very existence of Possibilities attests, there seems to be little erosion in what 
David Smith refers to as the ‘unity,’ ‘friendship,’ and ‘collective defensiveness’ fostered 
between the artists while on the rolls of the WPA (qtd. in Cox, 24).107 Nevertheless, it is 
Guilbaut’s contention that the editorial for Possibilities typifies how the artists retained the 
sense that their work, in prefiguring a future reconciled society, was politically radical, even 
while ‘[c]ooperation gave way to “every man for himself”’ in the New York art scene (NY: 
159). 
                                                          
105 Ironically, considering Elaine de Kooning’s above-quoted disdain for making posters, she subsequently 
undertook a commission to paint John F Kennedy in 1962, a story told in Simona Cupic’s essay ‘JFK by E 
de K’ (2005). 
106 Notable here is Reinhardt’s hostility towards almost all of his former close friends from the mid-‘50s 
onwards for what he indeed characterised as their opportunistic capitulation to the market, which 
perhaps found its nadir in Newman taking Reinhardt to court for defamation, well documented by Cox 
(113ff); the acrimony between de Kooning and Pollock, exacerbated as a proxy for the above-mentioned 
rivalry between Rosenberg and Greenberg, which is well documented by Naifeh and Smith (1989: 713ff); 
and the incredibly aggressive public dispute between Newman and Motherwell in the pages of Art 
International (SWI: 225ff). 
 
107 A succinct account of this solidarity has recently been written by Carter Radcliffe in his ‘An Improvised 
Community’ (2016). 
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  For Jachec, on her part, as should be foreseeable from Chapter 6, the notion that Abstract 
Expressionism prefigures a disalienated society not only allowed the artists to maintain a 
superficial political radicalism, but also fostered the movement’s co-optation in the sense 
that, as we saw, characterisation of Abstract Expressionist praxis as disalienated in an 
otherwise alienated world, as typified by Schapiro’s account, was easily assimilable with the 
self-identification of the United States as ‘democratically pluralist.’ Like Guilbaut, Jachec 
claims that ‘because the present intellectual climate accepted industrialisation as a permanent 
feature of modern life, alienation now meant freedom from having to participate in 
mechanised means of production [and] to indulge in utopian imaginings’ (PPA: 148). Jachec 
contends that the emergence of the first-generation Abstract Expressionists’ ‘signature styles’ 
in 1947 and 1948, the development of which I traced in section 5 as the determinate negation 
of Inhalt and affirmation of particularity, marked the development of an art alienated in this 
way. Against the massification of society, she writes that Abstract Expressionism was 
‘expressly for individuals’ in an attempt to redefine knowledge subjectively rather than 
empirically, as prerequisite for an ideal society (PPA: 89-91). In this, she in fact credits the 
influence upon the Abstract Expressionists of Merleau-Ponty’s account of painting as 
preconceptual in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt,’ acknowledging the aforementioned publication of its 
translation in Partisan Review in 1946. In the previous chapter, I characterised the affinity 
between Abstract Expressionism and Merleau-Ponty’s account of Cézanne in terms of how 
Abstract Expressionist artworks emphatically urge as primary the so-called secondary 
qualities of colour and tactility, and I will address the notion that this dynamic anticipates 
reconciliation below. Jachec, on the other hand, synthesises various statements by the artists, 
including the Possibilities editorial, to conceive of the notion that Abstract Expressionism 
addresses ‘individual perception’ in terms of some kind of unmediated intersubjective 
communication. Jachec contends that the Abstract Expressionists strove to cultivate a 
‘utopian vision’ in so far as in their artworks ‘aspects of the objective phenomenal world 
[were] selected, transformed and improved by the subjective vision of the artist’ (PPA: 145). 
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For Jachec, this is typified by Motherwell’s 1954 essay ‘The Painter and the Audience.’ In 
this essay, the artist asserts that, since the artworks are imbued with ‘integrity, sensuality, 
sensitivity, knowingness, passion, dedication, sincerity,’ the aesthetic judgements elicited by 
Abstract Expressionist artworks are fundamentally ethical (1992: 107). I will return to this 
essay below, suffice it here to note that, for Jachec, the fact that it was disseminated across 
Europe by the International Council is evidence that the dynamics in the artworks for which 
Motherwell is attempting to discursively account, rendered Abstract Expressionism entirely 
compatible with the State Department’s promotion of the rights of free expression in the 
United States (PPA: 153-6).108  
  Yet, I will contend in this final chapter that everything I have argued throughout this thesis 
about the complexion of the praxis and reception of Abstract Expressionism, means that the 
utopianism to which these statements by Motherwell attest, if understood aright, is neither 
assimilable by the status quo, nor a spurious projection which leaves the latter untouched. 
Instead, Abstract Expressionism models reconciliation in the same movement by which, as I 
elaborated in the previous chapter, it testifies to the unreconciled, in a manner which calls for 
a complete transformation of the reigning relations of production. For Adorno, reconciliation 
is not to be affirmatively defined as a concept in identity with which society must be formed. 
Rather, he contends that a state of reconciliation would be substantiated by people 
                                                          
108 Jachec in fact at some points seems to be arguing that Abstract Expressionism frames mid-century 
social democratic capitalism as utopian. Taking recourse to the taxonomy of utopianisms enumerated by 
the political historians Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, Jachec argues that the utopianism of Abstract 
Expressionism can be identified as the utopianism which Goodwin and Taylor characteristic as the 
‘[j]justification of the present by reference to a hypothetical present,’ paradigmatic of which, for Goodwin 
and Taylor, is John Rawls’s theory of justice, in so far as it ‘sets out to hypothesize what form an ideally 
just society, viewed abstractly, would take, and arrives at an abstract, idealised account of Western liberal 
democracy’ (PPA: 148-9). Jachec’s manoeuvres in drawing this parallel, however, are somewhat 
disarticulated and hard to follow, and from what I can glean she does not in fact justify this 
characterisation. Granted, she adduces the fact that a number of the Abstract Expressionists were briefly 
members of the American arm of the CCF (without mentioning, however, that they likely had no 
knowledge that it was covertly funded by the CIA, as Sheila Christofides notes (2012: 46)). She also points 
to de Kooning’s assertion that he had the right in the United States to force ‘his attitude upon this world,’ 
and Gottlieb’s celebration of ‘the impressive body of creative work this side of the iron curtain’ (PPA: 148-
52). Yet, as I noted in the first chapter, there was by no means a uniform political shift rightwards among 
the Abstract Expressionists during the Cold War. Indeed, we have already seen that the FBI held files on 
Gottlieb, and in the quote above he is in fact expressing surprise at the fact that such a body of work was 
being created in an alienated society. 
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assimilating their material interests by reflection into their relationships, and through this 
surpassing these material interests (2005: 45). Adorno claims that, since the technical forces 
of production had by the mid-twentieth century reached a stage which could eliminate 
material want, and yet such elimination had not occurred, it had become more evident than 
ever that we must attribute extant suffering ‘to the forms of social production, the relations of 
production, not to the intrinsic difficulty of meeting people’s material needs’ (2006: 144). 
Accordingly, Adorno claims, what is necessary is that ‘humanity’s own global subject 
becomes sufficiently self-aware to come to its rescue after all [...] through the rational 
organisation of society as a whole in a manner befitting humanity’ (2006: 143-4). In the 
previous chapter, I argued that Abstract Expressionism elicits reception on the very somatic 
and affective stratum of experience which would be sated if society were organised thusly. 
Indeed, despite both Guilbaut and Jachec adducing his writing as emblematic of how Abstract 
Expressionism’s utopianism marked the movement’s capitulation to the status quo, in a 1950 
lecture, Motherwell identifies ‘the social implications’ of Abstract Expressionism as ‘protest 
against the suppression of feeling, above all of protest to the falsification of personal concrete 
experience’ which amounts to ‘a kind of dumb, obstinate rebellion at how the world is 
presently organised’ (1992: 78, my italics). Thereby, it might be argued that Abstract 
Expressionism anticipates reconciliation in so far as it invokes ‘a world-for-us, neither the 
“objective” world described by mathematics or physics nor a kind of mythic space that one 
could describe in the past tense, that one could thematise with symbols and ideographs,’ as 
Bois puts it in his Merleau-Pontyan account of how Newman’s work engages us on the 
preconceptual level of our corporeal imbrication in the world (1993: 195).109  That is, rather 
than, as Guilbaut and Jachec appear to have it, because the artworks somehow objectivate 
their artists’ subjective interiorities, the reception elicited by Abstract Expressionism projects 
‘a world-for-us’ in so far as, to quote Claude Lefort on Merleau-Ponty’s ‘exploration of [...] 
                                                          
109 Curiously, Bois draws only from Phenomenology of Perception in his reading, applying Merleau-Ponty’s 
early phenomenology to the experience of Newman’s painting, rather than taking recourse to Merleau-
Ponty’s writing on painting. 
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the sensible,’ the experience of an Abstract Expressionist artwork emphatically ‘does not 
allow us to forget its connection with the seer, the sentient who grasps it’ (1990: 6).  
  This is often stressed by the artists. Rothko, for instance, claims that his painting ‘lives by 
companionship, expanding and quickening in the eyes of the observer’ (Rothko, qtd. in 
Anfam, 1990: 154). And Richard Pousette-Dart affirms that his aim is to force spectators to 
‘just look [...] and try to find their own experience’ (MAIA: 14). Neither has the importance 
of the subjective experience of the spectator, rather than the paintings’ supposed depiction of 
subjectivity, gone unnoticed by critics. William Seitz, for instance, writes contemporary to 
the movement that an Abstract Expressionist artwork ‘completes itself only by the experience 
of the spectator’ (1983: 152). And in Paths to the Absolute, Golding claims that he is ‘seized 
with the strange and irrational but overpowering sense that a Rothko, when not being looked 
at, somehow ceases to exist,’ imagining that ‘when the doors of the art galleries shut at 
night,’ Rothko’s paintings remain ‘suspended in some nebulous half-world until the first 
visitor arrives to confront them the following morning’ (2000: 221-2). However, I want to 
contend that it is not simply by engaging perception on the basis of subjective experience 
which is usually dismissed or delegitimated, that Abstract Expressionism anticipates 
reconciliation. It does so in so far as it solicits such perception dialectically. To characterise 
the artworks as existentially dependent upon spectatorship as Golding does in the quote 
above, is to place too much weight on the subject in the experience of viewing an Abstract 
Expressionist artwork. As I have stressed throughout, Abstract Expressionist artworks 
command attention by way of their irreducible particularity. To the extent that they project a 
‘world-for-us’ as Bois contends, it is via an ‘in itself’ which, as Bernstein writes, ‘opposes the 
universal “for us” of rationalised society’ (AVB: 152).110 Adopting Aristotle’s definition of 
humans as beings among beings who need society in order to realise eudemonia, or human 
                                                          
110 Indeed, in an account which certainly chimes with my experience of the painting, Bois describes 
viewing Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950-1) in terms of being perpetually guided by the artwork. He 
writes that ‘in looking at a zip we are solicited by another one farther away, hence are constantly in the 
process of adjusting and readjusting the fundamental figure/ground opposition, never finding a moment 
of repose when the structure could coalesce’ (1993: 203). 
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flourishing, Adorno asserts that the self-exteriorisation this in-itself demands ‘determines the 
person who experiences art and steps out of himself as a ζῷον πολιτικόν [political animal]’ 
(AT: 243). In what follows, I will argue that this is the case not only because the assimilation 
to the other in the experience of Abstract Expressionism renders binding affective experience 
which would not be negated in a world oriented to the end of eudemonia for all. Furthermore, 
this assimilation to the other models the comportment which would obtain in such a world, 
and is necessary to bring this world about. 
  In the previous chapter, I posited that Greenberg’s conception of abstract art’s ‘at-onceness’ 
is indicative of how an Abstract Expressionist artwork returns experience to the subject by 
way of its particularity. Kuspit recognises something of this when he claims that Greenberg’s 
use of dialectic is ‘loosely Deweyan,’ in so far as Greenberg gives subject and object ‘equal 
weight in aesthetic experience’ (1979: 28-9). Kuspit does not elaborate upon this parallel, and 
Greenberg scarcely cites John Dewey in his writing. However, we might note that Adorno 
acknowledges his own affinity with Dewey, whom he describes as ‘unique and truly free’ 
(AT: 335). As Jay observes, both thinkers share ‘a belief that some sort of experimentation 
pointing toward the renewal of [unregimented] experience [is] possible even in [capitalism’s] 
totalising system of domination’ and ‘aesthetic experience in particular [is] its privileged 
laboratory’ (2004: 139). Accordingly, Adorno cites Dewey in elaborating how philosophical 
aesthetics must ‘sacrifice [...] each and every security that it has borrowed from the sciences’ 
in an openness which does not ‘judge art from an external and superior vantage point’ (AT: 
345). In the previous chapter, I stressed how it is in this repudiation of a superior vantage 
point in the experience of Abstract Expressionist artworks that the empirical subject stakes its 
claim against constitutive subjectivity. However, just as crucial is the way in which this 
comportment moves ‘with its object, listening to it and remaining open to the object’s 
speaking and asking’ (Guzonni 1997: 34). Indeed, de Duve has argued that, for Greenberg, 
the experience of modernist art ‘consists above all in surrendering to an irreducible 
otherness’ (1996b: 49). Yet, it is de Duve’s conviction that what is primarily at stake in this 
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surrender to otherness is the question of whether artworks are artworks. For de Duve, the 
addressee of modernist art takes up ‘the challenge of renegotiating the technical-aesthetic 
conventions of the medium by acquiescing to the broken or abandoned convention, that is, by 
sealing a new pact around the broken one’ (Ibid: 66). De Duve vaguely ascribes liberal 
political implications to this dynamic, speculating that ‘art lovers with a taste for such 
challenges have [...] an ethical respect for the social differend as such’ (Ibid).111 Conversely, 
however, I want to contend that understanding this surrender to an irreducible otherness as 
providing (the semblance of) unrestricted experience, aligns it with a far more radical 
political horizon. As I adumbrated in Chapter 5, allowing cognition to be guided by that 
which the exchange process between concept and object conceals, affirms not only the 
particularity of subjects, but also objects. The refutation of reigning universals in the name of 
the somatic and affective experience of subjects lays emphasis on the fact that these subjects, 
as Lisa Yun Lee writes of Adorno’s materialism, ‘are not abstract universal beings,’ but 
instead exist in reciprocity with objects (2005: 141). Adorno often formulates this in terms of 
the subject being brought to its objectivity, ‘as an object among objects’ (ND: 183). As he 
elaborates, 
An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something 
other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset an 
object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; 
but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of 
the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity 
to be a subject (Ibid) 
                                                          
111 In a recent essay on Frankenthaler’s ‘50s paintings, Shepherd Steiner has similarly suggested that 
Greenberg posits the relationship of a spectator to art as a model for extra-aesthetic relationality to 
otherness qua otherness. He cites Greenberg’s claim in 1962 that ‘openness’ is ‘not only in painting [...]  
the quality that seems most to exhilarate the attuned eyes of our time’ (CEC4: 131), and asserts that for 
Greenberg the term consequently ‘has very little to do with formalism’ and instead speaks ‘the language 
of civil rights as articulated from the unique perspective provided by the generalised problem of 
prejudice, centering on combating anti-Semitism, inclusive of the racial divide’ (2014: 16). 
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Of course, this is not to affirm naïve positivist realism. Contrarily, Adorno contends that the 
fact that the subject shares objectivity with objects means subjective mediations are ‘no 
longer a subtractible addendum to objectivity,’ and instead ‘[a]t times subject, as unrestricted 
experience, will come closer to object than the residuum filtered and curtailed to suit the 
requirements of subjective reason’ (1998a: 253). In such unrestricted experience, which we 
have seen Adorno contends authentic art provides, ‘[k]nowledge of the object is brought 
closer by the act of the subject rending the veil it weaves about the object’ (1998a: 254). This 
veil, then, is not rended by objectivistic reduction, but rather Adorno contends that, if the 
subject passively entrusts itself to its own experience of the object, what ‘shimmers through 
[is] that in the object which is not a subjective addition’ (Ibid).  
  A more sustained account of the relationship of subjects to objects once an external and 
superior vantage point has been repudiated is given by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the 
Invisible. As Jay parenthetically notes their affinity, both Adorno and Merleau-Ponty attempt 
to ‘avoid the extremes of separating subject and object too drastically or reconciling them too 
completely,’ but instead conceive of them as reversible but not totally coincident (1984b: 
381, n.92). As opposed to ‘philosophy that is installed in pure vision, in the aerial view of the 
panorama’ for which ‘there can be no encounter with another,’ Merleau-Ponty calls for 
perception which ‘receives its incitement’ from its content and is thus ‘implicated in the 
movement and does not view it from above’ (VI: 77; 90). In this, Merleau-Ponty details a 
general intercorporeity, which he terms ‘the flesh,’ in which subjects are also objects; in 
which those ‘who [see] cannot possess the visible unless [they are] possessed by it,’ that is, 
‘unless, by principle, according to what is required by the articulation of the look with the 
things [, they are each] one of the visibles’ (VI: 134-5). Thus, Merleau-Ponty contends that a 
subject who perceives should be characterised as ‘a sensible for itself,’ in that they are ‘a set 
of colours and surfaces inhabited by a touch, a vision’ (VI: 135). It is as a ‘two-dimensional 
being’ in this way, as a subject which is also an object, that Merleau-Ponty writes we might 
be brought ‘to the things themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but beings in 
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depth, inaccessible to a subject that would survey the from above, open to him alone that, if it 
be possible, would coexist with them in the same world’ (VI: 136). In this, the subject does 
not ‘hold [objects] as with forceps or [...] immobilise them as under the objective of a 
microscope, but [lets] them be and [witnesses] their continued being’ (VI: 101).  
  Now, Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘the flesh’ is often understood as a philosophical correlate 
to his contemporaneous disillusionment with revolutionary socialism in his political theory 
and consequent turn to a vaguely sketched reformist parliamentary politics, which he referred 
to as ‘new liberalism’ (1973: 225-227). In this interpretation, the elaboration of a general 
intercorporeity of which human existence is simply a variant is taken for a fundamental 
ontology, and thus to imply that, as Sonia Kruks puts it 
[t]he multiplicity of cultures, socio-economic systems, political systems, etc, can only 
be multiple expressions of a fundamental unity. Class divisions and struggle must thus 
become secondary phenomena, of little significance in comparison with the 
fundamental unity of human being. (1981: 121-2) 
This is not the place for a comprehensive account of Merleau-Ponty’s political trajectory.112 
Nevertheless, suffice it to say that he made the shift to ‘new liberalism’ compelled by similar 
developments as those which I noted in Chapter 6 lead much of the 1950s European Left to 
denounce the USSR as imperialist (for Merleau-Ponty, lacking knowledge as to the catalytic  
role of the US in the conflict, the definitive moment was the Korean War), a mass ideological 
apostasy which I showed the State Department’s Policy Planning Committee took as an 
auspicious moment for the proliferation of Abstract Expressionism as evidence that, contrary 
to the USSR, the freedom for personal expression flourished in the United States. However, 
quite aside from the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s disaffection with revolutionary socialism was 
                                                          
112 Probably the most succinct account of the development of Merleau-Ponty’s politics can be found in the 
chapter “Phenomenological Marxism: The Ambiguities of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Holism,” in Martin 
Jay’s Marxism and Totality (1984). Whole Monographs on the topic which I have also found useful are 
Sonia Kruks, The Political Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1981); Kerry H. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty 
and the Foundation of an Existential Politics (1988), and, from a conservative perspective but nevertheless 
containing a wealth of research, Barry Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism: From Terror to Reform 
(1979). 
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emphatically not a defection to capitalist imperialism, I do not think that Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of ‘the flesh’ should be understood as a legitimation of the status quo at all. Rather, I 
would suggest that the chiasmatic intercorporeity between subjects and objects which he 
describes might be read more fruitfully as a prefiguration of reconciliation extrapolated from 
unregimented experience. As I showed in the previous chapter, for Merleau-Ponty, it is the 
carnal ‘notions’ of aesthetics, which I contended Abstract Expressionist artworks typify, that 
return us to the site and soil of the sensible by stressing so-called secondary qualities 
otherwise dismissed by instrumental reason. In this, they not only engage otherwise 
delegitimated elements of somatic and affective experience, but also maintain substantiality 
irreducible to this relationality. As Adorno asserts that the subject’s objectivity means that it 
is when it is at its most subjectively contingent that subjective perception rends the veil by 
which reification shrouds objects, Merleau-Ponty claims that, due to the subject and object’s 
shared corporeity, by enveloping things, the subject’s look ‘does not hide them,’ but 
contrarily ‘unveils them’ (VI: 131). Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes in ‘Eye and Mind’ that art, 
as opposed to predominate operationalism, ‘awakens and carries to its highest pitch a 
delirium which is vision itself, for to see is to have at a distance’ (PP: 127). The 
exceptionalism of such a delirium surely does not encourage passive capitulation to a status 
quo fundamentally determined by instrumental rationality in the interests of private profit, but 
rather provides what Marjorie Grene has termed ‘the horizon toward which we can hope to 
move,’ borne of the glimpse unregimented experience provides of the way in which ‘in our 
very distance from things we are near them’ (1993: 232).113 Indeed, in a strikingly similar 
                                                          
113 Indeed, readings of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh which understand its implications as 
politically radical have been made. For an early, explicitly Marxist account see Dick Howard, ‘Ambiguous 
Radicalism: Merleau-Ponty’s Interrogation of Political Thought’ (1973). Howard contends that the notion 
that subjects are objects, that we are each ‘a thing in the world of things, the flesh of the world and the 
world of the flesh’ brings us to an awareness of our ‘being-with-others in an intersubjective world which 
we codetermine and which determines us in return’ and thus it provides ‘a horizon of historical 
intentionality’ premised on a legitimation of corporeal experience (1973: 157-8). For a far more recent 
account of the flesh as projecting a future society see Paul Mazzochi’s ‘Politics A L’Ecart: Merleau-Ponty 
and the Flesh of the Social’ (2015). In this essay, Mazzochi claims that the flesh discloses an 
intercorporeity in which ‘different perspectives, meanings and identities need no longer be conceived of 
as irreconcilable and in need of coincidence’ and thus ‘demands that we judge societies on the basis of the 
relations they attempt to create between [...] the self and others’ (2015: 79). Indeed, while in 1956 
191 
 
formulation to Merleau-Ponty, Adorno contends that aesthetic contemplation provides ‘the 
source of all the joy of truth’ amidst the domination of identity, asserting that ‘he who 
contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: a distanced nearness’ (2005: 89-90).114 
  A sense of distanced nearness is particularly emphatic in many Abstract Expressionist 
paintings, due to the optical dynamics which Seitz identifies as the artists’ shared ‘flatness-in-
depth,’ instancing the examples of ‘Motherwell’s objective overlap [...] Tobey’s 
impressionistic vibration, de Kooning’s flat landscape [and] Hofmann’s [...] deep push-and-
pull’ (1983: 151). We might understand these dynamics as that which is preserved of the 
perspectival elements of representational painting after what Adorno refers to as ‘the 
transformation of communicative into mimetic language’ (AT: 112), that is, after the negation 
of conventions impeding experiential openness on the part of the perceiving subject. To take 
Pollock as an example, Landau has noted that the ‘stratification of forms [which] create a 
feeling of deep space’ in his paintings might be attributed to the influence of his former 
mentor Thomas Hart Benton (1989: 222), whose work Pollock proclaimed as ‘important as 
something against which to react very strongly’ (qtd. in Doss 1991: 3). Indeed, this aspect of 
Pollock’s paintings, despite their palpable corporeality, is often noted. In 1946, Greenberg 
writes of the ‘infinity of dramatic movement and variety’ in Pollock’s work (CEC2: 76); Leja 
has acknowledged how allusions to webs proliferated in 1950’s writing on Pollock, due to the 
metaphor’s ‘distinct formal advantage over sky and sea in its ability to combine the 
articulation of a plane with a view through to a space beyond’ (310); and in his recent 
monograph on Mural (1943) (fig. 11), and Anfam describes how the painting’s ‘convulsive 
rhythms look to bound into the third dimension’ (2015: 110). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Merleau-Ponty claims that we should ‘relatavise the Marxist idea of a pre-history which is going to give 
way to [...] the complete, true Society in which man is reconciled with man and Nature,’ he is asserting 
that ‘there is no force in history which is destined to produce it,’ but nevertheless maintaining that such a 
state of reconciliation ‘is indeed what our social criticism demands’ (1964: 131). 
114 The affinity between Adorno’s notion of ‘distanced nearness’ and Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy has 
also been acknowledged by Alastair Morgan in his Adorno’s Concept of Life (2007), in an analysis far less 
sympathetic to Merleau-Ponty than my account (81-85). 
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  Of course, this sensation of distance is precisely what was at stake in Adorno’s debates with 
Benjamin concerning the ‘aura’ of artworks. Where Benjamin understands the latter’s erosion 
by technical reproducibility as democratising, Adorno forewarns against revoking ‘the 
reification of a great work of art in the spirit of immediate use-values’ (2007a: 123). The 
reasons for this should be clear from the first half of Chapter 8. Adorno contends that to 
repudiate art’s autonomy in the name of immediacy is to surrender to the mediation of 
capital. Thus, he asserts that, instead of ‘adapting itself to them in their degraded condition,’ 
the enigmaticalness of immanently determined autonomous art ‘respects the masses by 
presenting itself to them as what they could be’ (AT: 240). I think we might understand this 
claim in terms of how, as I delineated above, for Adorno the semblance of distance in 
aesthetic contemplation whose supplantation by distraction Benjamin celebrated, is 
inextricably bound up with subjective perception in reciprocity with its object in a way that 
art which caters to reigning needs is not. As Merleau-Ponty posits that in the intercorporeity 
of the flesh we might let things be and witness their continued being, Adorno surmises that 
the state of reconciliation would be neither 
the undifferentiated unity of subject and object or their hostile antithesis: rather it 
would be the communication of what is differentiated. Only then would the concept of 
communication, as an objective concept, come into its own. The present concept is so 
shameful because it betrays what is best—the potential for agreement between human 
beings and things—to the idea of imparting information between subjects according 
to the exigencies of subjective reason. In its proper place, even epistemologically, the 
relationship of subject and object would lie in a peace achieved between human 
beings as well as between them and their Other. Peace is the state of differentiation 
without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other. (1998a: 247) 
In so far as they invite assimilation which nevertheless does not exhaust its object, but rather 
is precisely the process by which this inexhaustibility is revealed, then, Abstract 
Expressionist artworks, as Bernstein writes, ‘open a possibility of responding and relating to 
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objects (including other subjects) that is not presently available’ (1997b: 198).  Here, we 
might recall the fact that, as I noted in the introduction, for Clark our inability to make 
Abstract Expressionism a thing of the past is an impediment to modernism’s task of 
imagining modernity otherwise. Against this, Bernstein contends that the response and 
relation whose possibility is opened by Abstract Expressionism provides ‘all the evidence we 
possess’ that modernity could be otherwise (AVB: 192). However, he concedes that this 
epistemological success is marred by its ‘lack of an adequate social basis’ (Ibid). If attention 
to suppressed particulars is to orient political action, he contends, it can do so only in terms of 
‘a negative politics of avoiding the worst’ (2010b: 51). Yet, while this is not the place to 
interrogate the prospects for collective political action, I would stress that the political 
horizon of such a response and relation nevertheless makes emphatic the intolerable 
insufficiency of anything less than a total transformation of society. We might note here that 
Adorno, routinely attacked for political quietism late in life,115 maintained that the hope of 
‘completely unshackled reality [remained] valid’ and the world contained ‘opportunities 
                                                          
115 The accusation that Adorno was, as activist students put it in a leaflet of 1968, ‘critical in theory, 
conformist in practice’ (qtd. in Leslie 1999: 118), is largely premised on his reluctance to unreservedly 
support the more aggressive action of the student movement, to the egregious extent of calling the police 
when activists occupied the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1969. However, Adorno’s attitude 
towards the student movement was not premised on a defence of the status quo so much as his 
conviction that the students’ protest was reified antagonism and took no account of objective conditions. 
As he put it, ‘[b]arricades are ridiculous against those who administer the bomb’ (1998a: 269). For a 
recent account of Adorno’s late politics see the sub-section ‘Accomodations’ in Chapter 4 of Andrew N. 
Rubin’s Archives of Critical Theory (2012). Pertinently to my thesis, Rubin recounts how during the 1950s 
Adorno contributed a number of essays to Der Monat, the German journal covertly supported by the CIA 
via the CCF. However, not only would I contend that the implications of his philosophy cannot be 
reconciled with capitalism; indeed, it is in one of the articles published in Der Monat which Rubin alights 
upon as particularly anticommunist, a rebuke to Lukács later translated as ‘Reconiliation Under Duress,’ 
that Adorno details most lucidly the critique of aesthetic realism which I marshalled in Chapter 2 to indict 
the complicity of Ben Shahn’s Social Realism with capitalist reification. Furthermore, as Rubin notes, 
whether or not he was aware of the CCF’s source of funding, Adorno subsequently stressed how  ‘slogans 
of struggle against Bolshevism have always served to mask those who harbor no better intentions toward 
freedom than do the Bolsheviks themselves’ (1998a: 94). 
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enough for success’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 36).116 In keeping with this notion, in the 
discussion which followed a 1958 lecture, he stressed the following: 
We are not only spectators looking upon this predominance of the institutional and 
the objective that confronts us; rather it is after all constituted out of us, this societal 
objectivity is made up of us ourselves. In this [...] surely lies precisely also the 
possibility of perhaps changing it (1998a: 298).  
I would contend that, while the emphatially reciprocal mediation of subject and object in the 
experience of Abstract Expressionism is only semblance, it nevertheless intimates and 
rehearses precisely this possibility of changing things. It is an experience which does not 
discount the myriad mediations of corporeal subjects in favour of reigning universals, and 
thus provides a monadological place-holder for a self-conscious global subject, in a world 
whose subjection to these reigning universals means life ‘purely as a fact will strangle other 
life’ (ND: 364). This chimes with how Newman claims his art anticipates a non-coercive 
society, when he expresses hope that the experience of his paintings would lend a spectator a 
feeling of their ‘own separateness [and] individuality,’ moving ‘in relation to other selves’ 
(SWI: 257-258). However, crucially, this experience does not reduce objects (including the 
corporeality of these subjects) to the contingent needs of these subjects. Thus, the global 
subject projected by this experience would avoid, ‘in the name of morality [, establishing] 
society itself as a vast joint-stock company for the exploitation of nature,’ as Adorno avers 
against, in keeping with his insistence, noted in Chapter 6, that labour should not be 
hypostasised as the sole source of use value (2000: 145).  
  To return to the essays which Guilbaut and Jachec adduce to characterise Abstract 
Expressionism’s utopianism as a facilely politically radical legitimation of the artists’ 
                                                          
116 Adorno makes these comments in discussions with Horkheimer in which Horkheimer reveals himself 
to be far more of a pessimist than Adorno, rebutting them with the assertion that ‘[i]n the long run things 
cannot change […] We can expect nothing more from mankind than a more or less worn-out version of 
the American system.’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 36). 
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capitulation to the status quo, we might thus read Motherwell and Rosenberg’s affirmation of 
one’s ‘own experience’ in defiance of ‘organised social thinking’ not as a retreat into 
interiority complicit with the status quo, but rather as experience attuned to its object in a way 
which is impossible so long as the status quo is determined by the exigencies of capital. 
Consequently, we might interpret Motherwell’s claims in ‘The Painter and his Audience’ as 
to the ethical nature of Abstract Expressionism, as the art which results from such experience, 
in terms of how the categorical anticipations of an ethical world emancipated from the 
exigencies of capital inhere in the distanced nearness of the works. Indeed, in ‘The Painter 
and his Audience,’ Motherwell stresses the ethical nature of Abstract Expressionism in 
counterposition to a world where ‘the possibility of collaboration between men on “ultimate 
concerns”’ is foreclosed by the needs of ‘big business,’ which ‘in the end [...] determine 
everything, including how [people] think about reality’ (1992: 106-7). Now, while Jachec is 
surely correct in her claim that this essay’s dissemination by the International Council marks 
an attempt to neutralise oppositional discourse through assimilation, I argued in Chapter 6 
that, in terms of the artworks themselves, this neutralisation depended upon the identification 
of the artworks with the exhibition-value of personal expression. However, the 
expressiveness of the artworks’ distanced nearness resists the conceptual subsumption 
necessary for such identification. While I showed that the latter was modelled on cultural 
pluralism within the pre-given co-ordinates of existent society, whereby, in Schlesinger’s 
term, ‘variegated emotions’ are imparted between subjects within the horizons delimited by 
the exigencies of capital, the artworks’ distanced nearness attests to the potential for 
agreement between human beings as well as between them and their Other, which could only 
be achieved were experience not governed in accordance with these exigencies.  
  All of this is particularly pertinent if we turn to Norman Lewis’s City Night (1949) (fig. 12), 
which is perhaps the one Abstract Expressionist painting most emblematic of this flatness-in-
depth, this obstinate planarity which nevertheless intimates more. An oil painting on wood, 
the work mainly consists of lengthy dark vertical brushstrokes. In the centre of the picture, 
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however, the strokes are lighter and more urgent, and form two illuminated pillars which 
appear to emerge and recede simultaneously without rupturing the inescapable corporeality of 
these strokes. City Night thus engages spectators on the grounds of embodied perception, 
while nevertheless maintaining a sense of unassimilable pregnancy. In Chapter 2, I briefly 
noted that Lewis, as the only African-American in the first generation of the New York 
School, made explicit that his choice to be an abstract painter, rather than represent the plight 
of African-Americans in his art, was on his account not an abandonment of the latter, but 
rather a refutation of the stereotypes which Social Realist art instantiated. His extra-aesthetic 
biography certainly bears out this commitment. While he was well-acquainted with his fellow 
Abstract Expressionists, especially Reinhardt but also Rothko, Smith, Kline, Pollock and 
Newman; took part in their seminal discussions at Studio 35; and exhibited alongside many 
of them when represented by the Willard Gallery, he was also dedicated throughout his life to 
collectively organising with, and promoting the work of, fellow black artists. Before the war 
he had been a member of the ‘306 Group,’ the collective of black artists founded in the 
Harlem Art Workshop, and treasurer of the Harlem Artists Guild, and he went on to co-found 
both the black artists collective Spiral, and the Cinqué Gallery, whose mission was to exhibit 
the work of young black artists, named for Joseph Cinqué, the leader of the 1839 Amistad 
slave ship mutiny.117 In a 1968 interview with Henri Ghent, he recounts why he nonetheless 
moved away from representing African-Americans in his art: 
I used to paint Negroes being dispossessed, discrimination, and slowly I became 
aware of the fact that this didn't move anybody, it didn't make things better and that if 
I had the guts to, which I did periodically in those days, it was to picket. And this 
made things better for Negroes in Harlem [...] But [the] kind of protest paintings that I 
was trying to do never solved any situation. I found the only way to solve anything 
was to go out and take some kind of physical action. And that painting, like music, 
                                                          
117 For art historical accounts of Norman Lewis’s aesthetic and political trajectory, see Anne Gibson, 
‘‘Norman Lewis in the ’Forties’ (1993), and David Craven, ‘Norman Lewis as Political Activist and Post-
Colonial Artist’ (1998). 
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had something inherent in itself which I had to discover, which has nothing to do with 
what exists, it has another kind of reality, that which is inherent in painting in those 
four sides; in sculpture which is around. So that with this kind of awareness naturally 
you really get with yourself and you wonder what can I say, what do I have to say that 
can be of any value, what can I say that can arouse someone to look at and feel awed 
about. (Ghent 1968, 14 July) 
Now, in a 1947 letter, Lewis claimed that he had come to such painting ‘which has nothing to 
do with what exists’ by approaching it ‘as a true Marxist’ (1989: 64). However, when 
elaborating upon such political grounds he often seems to appeal to a notion of abstract 
universalism. In a statement written in 1946, for instance, he asserts that his ambition is for it 
to be possible for an African-American artist ‘to be publicly first an artist [...] and 
incidentally, a Negro,’ and anticipates that an abstract aesthetic would allow for this, in so far 
as African-American artists could contribute ‘to a universal knowledge of aesthetics and the 
creative faculty which [...] exists [...] in all men’ (2005: 134). Framed in this way, Lewis’s 
shift to abstract painting has been criticised by Richard J. Powell as a ‘willingness to 
subordinate blackness and all that was associated with it’ for the sake of integration into ‘a 
larger, wider and, ultimately, whiter art world’ (1997: 102). For Powell, however, Lewis’s 
work never fully suppresses his particularity, because his paintings remain based on social 
themes, revelling in an aesthetic that ‘while camouflaged by artistic overtures to Abstract 
Expressionism,’ retains reference to ‘a Harlem-inspired art’ (Ibid: 103-5). Analogously to the 
critics of Greenberg surveyed in Chapter 8, then, Powell here conceives of the ‘purity’ of 
Abstract Expressionism as effacing particularity (in this case, blackness), and takes recourse 
to referents in Lewis’s paintings which belie this effacement. However, if we conceive of this 
‘purity’ in the terms in which I have framed it throughout this thesis, a painting such as City 
Night does justice to particularity in so far as what Powell refers to as a ‘camouflaging,’ is in 
fact a transformation of communicative into mimetic language; if the distanced nearness of 
Abstract Expressionism affirms embodied subjective experience in a manner receptive to its 
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object, Lewis’s abstract painting refutes external yardsticks and is united with the pickets and 
physical action which he found more effective for social change than Social Realist painting. 
That is, in rendering embodied affect emphatically binding in a reciprocal relationship with 
an object, and through this providing an experiential horizon of reconciliation, Abstract 
Expressionism is aligned with concrete struggle in the interests of the corporeal subjects and 
their Other by whom and which the world is reproduced, as opposed to the laws of capitalism 
as according to which these subjects are forced to reproduce the world, the total dissolution of 
which laws through the global socialisation of the means of production in a sustainable 
metabolic relationship with (inner and outer) nature, would be necessary to realise Abstract 
Expressionism’s promise. In this promise, Abstract Expressionism’s determinate negation 
of Inhalt still augurs the determinate negation of unfreedom. 
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Conclusion 
 
  In this thesis, I have argued that, while it is certainly true that Abstract Expressionism was 
adopted by the US establishment in the 1950s as revisionist historians have demonstrated 
since the ‘70s, the artworks’ Gehalt is intransigently opposed to the ends to which they were 
thus enlisted. While they were deployed in championing the pre-eminence of US capitalism, I 
have argued that the artworks register precisely that which exchange-value’s dominance 
delegitimates, suppresses and debars. Moreover, I have made this case, not by uncovering 
forgotten or unheeded aspects of the artworks, but with recourse to what Greenberg 
celebrates as ‘quality,’ the approbation of which as marking Abstract Expressionism as the 
pinnacle of European Modernism I showed in no small part informed the artworks’ 
deployment as indices of the United States’ cultural superiority. I have done so, by arguing 
that the referent of Greenberg’s acclaim is not so much the determinate negation of 
dispensable artistic conventions and affirmation of medium-specific elements. Instead, I have 
posited that in his judgements Greenberg is in fact tracing the determinate negation of reified 
conventions and affirmation of art’s mimetic language. Thus, I have argued that critics miss 
the mark when they dismiss Greenberg’s ‘formalism’ as homologous and complicit with 
dominant rationality because of its supposed subordination of subjects’ somatic and affective 
particularity to optically apprehended categories of medium-specificity. Instead, I have 
posited that the substrate of that which Greenberg celebrated in Abstract Expressionist 
artworks engages precisely this somatic and affective subjective particularity. I argued that 
this engagement of intense subjective experience differs from the way in which the 
revisionist historians demonstrate that the identification of Abstract Expressionism with 
subjectivity facilitated its co-optation by US imperialism. I showed that this contention is 
convincing in so far as this intense subjectivity is understood in terms of the Abstract 
Expressionists somehow manifesting their subjective interiorities in their artworks, and thus 
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supposedly attesting to the freedom for individual expression under capitalism in the United 
States. However, with recourse to the Abstract Expressionists’ accounts of their working 
methods, and phenomenal accounts of their art, I have argued that to contend Abstract 
Expressionist artworks objectivate subjective interiority in this way, is to falsify the 
experience of the works, and that instead the artworks engage subjective experience by 
inviting a relationship of openness to otherness which is extra-aesthetically unsustainable. 
  Analogously to Trotsky’s characterisation of the Divine Comedy, then, we might account for 
Abstract Expressionism’s enduring enigmatic power by the fact that experiential openness 
remains prohibited by the subsumption and determination of use-value by exchange-value. It 
is truer than ever that the forces of production could sustainably free the world’s population 
from want. However, this appears even less likely now than it did in the mid-century, due to 
persistent contradictions between the exigencies of profit and the needs of the corporeal 
subjects (and the nature of which they are a part) from which this profit is extracted.118 
Moreover, that an artistic locus of resistance might take the form of a nonconceptual, 
nonrigidified significative language becomes all the more evident as all subjective qualities 
which can be conceptually subsumed have been put in the service of capital, and the 
accordant revolutionary opportunities for the international body politic to ‘organize itself 
otherwise and discover an alternative to the global political body of capital,’ which Hardt and 
Negri, the most conspicuous expositors of this process, predicted would emerge immanently 
from labour and society thus having to ‘informationalize, become intelligent, become 
communicative, become affective’ have not occurred (2004: 189; 109). Whereas in Lukács’s 
account of reification under industrial capitalism, the Fordist work-process made ‘the human 
qualities and idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as mere sources of error’ 
(1971: 89), since the rise of post-Fordist communicative capitalism, while somatic and 
affective elements of experience are still delegitimated as fundamental determinants of 
society in favour of the interests of capital, human qualities and idiosyncracies have been 
                                                          
118 For an excellent recent account of how the 2008 financial crisis was a crisis of profitability, which has 
not been resolved, see Michael Roberts’s The Long Depression (2016). 
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ever further colonised by the latter. This is explicit in workplaces, especially the service 
sector, in which, as Ann-Marie Stagg, chair of the UK Call Centre Management Association 
has candidly put it, ‘employers are increasingly demanding that their employees deep act, 
work on and change their feelings to match the display required by the labour process’ (qtd in 
Couldry, 76). Yet, the extent to which ‘free-time’ also subserves the exigencies of profit is 
more obvious than ever. In 1946, Adorno observed how ‘[f]ree time remains the reflex-action 
to a production rhythm imposed heteronomously on the subject, compulsively maintained 
even in the weary pauses’ (2005: 175). Today, however, ‘free-time’ is unambiguously a site 
of capital accumulation, as ‘[s]tylistic choices, communicative networks, affective 
engagements with others, the expression and fulfilment of personal desires all contribute 
directly to the information economy, the construction and consolidation of which has been 
facilitated by the spread of social media’ (Bewes 2016: 54). 
  Yet, if the extant fascination of Abstract Expressionist artworks can be chalked up to the 
continued need for that which is not reducible to the determinate judgements of capital – 
‘something in reality, something back of the veil spun by the interplay of institutions and 
false needs’ (AT: 18) – this of course does not mean that this something finds its expression 
in abstract painting any longer. While this is not the place to substantiate this claim, I would 
contend that for the last few decades this something has found emphatic expression less in 
painting than in, for instance, underground experimental music.119 Indeed, in Chapter 7 I 
acknowledged that Greenberg declared that, by the late ‘50s, painterly abstraction had 
hardened into mannerism. Greenberg continued to champion painters, such as Noland and 
Olitski. However, over the subsequent decades abstract painting, and Abstract Expressionism 
especially, has increasingly taken the form of self-consciously conceptual work which 
dramatises ‘the false promises and ignominious deliquescence of the genre, pushing gestural 
abstraction to its stained, ripped, debased, and de-skilled limits,’ or concerns itself with ‘one 
more cool, laid-back critical feint in the supposed endgame of painting,’ as Michelle Kuo 
                                                          
119 For an Adornian reading of Japanese noise music along these lines, see Nicholas J. Smith, ‘Why 
Hardcore Goes Soft: Adorno, Japanese Noise and the Extirpation of Dissonance’ (2001). 
202 
 
writes (2011: 314). As exemplary of such work, Kuo highlights David Hammons’s 2011 
series of Abstract Expressionist paintings which he obscured with trash bags. Such work’s 
pointed disenchantment of Abstract Expressionism does away with Abstract Expressionism’s 
enigmaticalness, to the extent that this enigmaticalness is acknowledged and dismissed as 
amounting to ‘metaphysical aspirations,’ as the press release of a 2015 show of 1980s 
paintings by Günther Förg at White Cube Gallery in London differentiated the artist’s work 
from ‘the aesthetic legacy of Modernism [...] in particular [...] the painting of Mark Rothko 
[...] and Barnett Newman’ to which his painting formally indebted (Anonymous n.d.) (fig. 
12). Yet, as I argued at the end of Chapter 9, if Abstract Expressionism is metaphysical, it 
should be understood as thus in the sense that Adorno contends that we must repurpose the 
concept of metaphysical transcendence in materialist terms, and thus the ‘metaphysical 
aspirations’ of Abstract Expressionism entail the binding eloquence (in semblance) of the 
particularity of subjects and objects. I would suggest that the loss of this enigmaticalness, and 
thus the loss of their promise of reconciliation, is what Harry Cooper, the curator for modern 
and contemporary art at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, is attempting to account 
for when he laments that the ‘ambiguous homage’ of Christopher Wool, Martin Kippenberger 
or Josh Smith ‘does not do the trick’ for him, in so far as it 
does not bring back what I imagine or fantasize to be the ethos of the AbEx era. I miss 
the old contradictions (as opposed to their latter-day cartoon version), the loose ends, 
the overreaching. The agony of victory and the thrill of defeat. Painting today (forgive 
me) is too stylish, too self-conscious. Give me more of what Philip Guston, in one of 
his rare essays, called “Faith, Hope, and Impossibility” (1965). If possible, that would 
be a nice legacy. (2011: 319) 
Since the millennium, however, while, as I acknowledged in my introduction, in scholarship 
and criticism Abstract Expressionism is often still marked with the stigma of its supposed co-
optation by US imperialism, artists have increasingly, as Isabelle Graw has noted, taken to 
painting ‘without feeling any need to justify their decision, whereas artists who made the 
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same choice from the 1960s through at least the early 1990s had to face pressure for turning 
to a medium deemed problematic’ (2016: 260), and much of this new painting is abstract. 
Yet, as I will now show, such ostensibly unmediated abstract painting praxis generally tends 
to result in works for which there is no tension whatsoever between the artworks in their 
particularity and their exhibition-value, whether as arbitrary decor or autobiographical 
lyricism. 
  In terms of decor, the artist and critic Walter Robinson has coined the term ‘zombie 
formalism’ to describe the kind of ostensibly ‘straightforward, reductive, essentialist’ 
painting such as the work of Jacob Kassay, Aaron Aujila, Chris Duncan, or Lucien Smith 
which functions ‘well in the realm of high-end, hyper-contemporary interior design’ (2014, 3 
April) (fig. 13). For Robinson, such art ‘brings back to life the discarded aesthetics of 
Clement Greenberg’ (Ibid) However, I of course would argue that, if ‘zombie formalism’ is 
indeed reducible to its medium-specificity as paint applied to a support (which, in my 
experience, it often is), then it lacks precisely that to which Greenberg’s judgements in fact 
referred. Indeed, this is evident in Greenberg’s critical assessment of Jules Olitski, whose 
spray painted pictures are not unlike much ‘zombie formalism,’ for example Patutsky in 
Paradise (1966) (fig. 14). About these works, Greenberg claims the following: 
The grainy surface Olitski creates with his way of spraying [...] contrives an illusion 
of depth that somehow extrudes all suggestions of depth back to the picture’s surface; 
it is as if that surface, in all its literalness, were enlarged to contain a world of colour 
and light differentiations impossible to flatness but which yet manage not to violate 
flatness. (CEC4: 230) 
That is, he explicitly describes these pictures in terms of a distanced nearness which is absent 
from the ‘straightforward, reductive and essentialist’ work of the contemporary painters 
enumerated above. 
  In terms of autobiographical lyricism, on the other hand, working from the premise that 
Greenberg’s identifications of painting’s medium-specificity have been obviated by history, 
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Graw claims that painting can instead be defined as ‘a production of signs that is experienced 
as highly personalized’ (2012: 48-50). She has speculated that painting’s capacity to thus 
function as ‘a physical manifestation of its absent author’ is what makes it particularly 
appealing at our current historical conjuncture, when value is ‘extracted from cognitive and 
affective capacities’ (2016: 260-1). Graw marshals a vertiginous array of references in the 
essays and lectures in which she makes this case, and rather than elucidating her line of 
argument, this renders it somewhat oblique. However, it is clear that pivotal to her case is a 
misappropriation of Marx’s labour theory of value. She asserts that ‘[a]ccording to Marx’s 
labour theory, value can only be generated in a material thing if labour (and therefore life) 
has been stored in it,’ adducing Marx’s definition of value as ‘labour in its congealed state,’ 
to affirm that ‘for him value is the material realization of human labour’ (2016: 261). Of 
course, in all the references to value above, Marx is not referring to value per se, but 
exchange-value. Yet, Graw is apparently unaware of the difference between use-value and 
exchange-value, and seems to conceive of the distinction between abstract and concrete 
labour not as the distinction between economically valuable work time and particular useful 
activity, but between the latter and its concealment in reified commodities (2012: 55). 
Consequently, Graw does not understand why the labour theory of value would not apply 
directly to artworks, for which socially necessary labour time of course does not exist, and 
whose economic value is entirely determined in circulation.120 Instead, she writes that 
painting’s appeal lies in the fact that it makes the source of its value in labour evident, 
claiming that ‘[u]nlike most commodities, which obscure labour power, the art commodity – 
painting in particular – functions by emphasizing and cultivating the impression of labour’ 
(2016: 261). Furthermore, the historically conjunctural relationship Graw is attempting to 
                                                          
120 Graw is of course aware that artworks’ economic value is determined in circulation, but she asserts 
that this makes Marx’s theory of value theory more applicable to them. She writes that Marx ‘emphasized 
that no commodity is valuable in itself, that value is a "purely social" phenomenon,’ and stresses that ‘this 
is also true for artworks’ because ‘[n]o artwork is valuable per se – its value is the result of an ongoing 
and never-ending social negotiation’ (2012: 55). However, Marx’s claim that value is a ‘purely social’ is of 
course not the claim that value is intersubjectively determined, but rather that exchange-value is 
determinaed by socially necessary labour time rather than use-value. 
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posit between the appeal of painting’s consequent appearance as ‘literally saturated with the 
life of its author’ and the extraction of value from life under post-Fordism is underdeveloped 
and unclear (Ibid). Nevertheless, she undeniably identifies the exhibition-value of much new 
abstract painting which cannot be categorised as according to Robinson’s definition of 
‘zombie formalism.’ That is, while Graw is not describing how painting makes evident that 
its value is labour in its congealed state in a Marxist sense, she is describing how the 
exigencies of exchange-value necessitate that certain new paintings appear as congealed 
labour. A good example of this is the work of Oscar Murillo, whose paintings, full of 
vigorous markings, are often discussed in terms of the artist’s autobiographical background 
as a working-class Afro-Columbian migrant, and became incredibly popular amongst 
collectors around 2014, appreciating in price by 3,000 per cent in two years (figs. 15 and 
16).121 However, as I discussed in Chapter 6 in reference to Schapiro’s account of Abstract 
Expressionism, if artworks are of interest solely as the supposed manifestation of an artist’s 
autobiographical expression, their dynamics are effectively homologous with the conceptual 
subsumption of identity thinking. Indeed, one writer claims that Murillo’s affirmation of 
subaltern identity displays ‘disregard for the [...] class ridden art world,’ and yet adduces as 
evidence of this purported radicality an eminent example of its assimilation by bourgeois 
gallerists, asserting that Murillo’s ‘private views become traditional Colombian food 
                                                          
121 This figure is taken from an article in Vulture by Carl Swanson entitled ‘Oscar Murillo Perfectly 
Encapsulates the Current State of the Contemporary Art World’ (2014, 3 July) It is evident from almost all 
the literature on Murillo that Murillo’s autobiography is crucial to his work, in both commercial and 
critical terms. Murillo’s biography on the website of David Zwirner, the commercial gallery by which he is 
represented, stresses how his paintings are ‘tied to a notion of community stemming from the artist's 
cross-cultural ties to diverse cities and places in which he travels and works, and Colombia, where he was 
born in 1986.’ In the catalogue for a 2014 group show of new African and South American art at the 
Saatchi Gallery, by Gabriela Salgado – who oddly writes uncritically in her introduction of the fact that 
‘artists based outside of the West are often required to display a sense of native belonging and specific 
cultural codes in order to be considered by an increasingly global art market’ (2014: 5) – Murillo’s use of 
‘recycled materials and mediums’ is interpreted as informed by the ‘gestures of adjustment that [he] 
seems to have acquired from his border experience: born in Colombia and emigrating to London as a 
child, he had to adopt language, customs and cultural codes, being inescapably transformed by the 
unending process of migration’ (Ibid: 115). A review in Art in America of Murillo’s 2014 show at South 
London Gallery by James Cahill affirms that ‘Murillo has sought to make art out of the unlovely or 
overlooked stuff of life—specifically his own life, as a Colombian-born immigrant to London’ (2014: 163). 
A review by Agnieska Gratza in Frieze of a Murillo show at Carlos/Ishikawa in 2013 notes how Murillo’s 
‘Colombian origins are often emphasized in his painterly [...] practice’ (2013: 228). 
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gatherings that do away with the sterility of white cube cocktail rituals’ (Salgado 2014: 
115).122 
  The exhibition-value of the digital paintings of the so-called post-internet artist Petra 
Cortright, which superficially resemble gestural Abstract Expressionism, might also be 
understood in terms of autobiographical lyricism, especially in light of the fact that self-
portrait webcam videos make up another significant strand of her praxis. Yet, I want to end 
by suggesting that, contrarily, more than any other contemporary painter of which I am 
aware, Cortright places her work in the service of the nonidentical. Cortright’s paintings are 
made using the raster graphics editor Adobe Photoshop. To produce the paintings, Cortright 
sources her colour palate by browsing the internet, especially websites such as the image-
sharing network Pinterest. She then creates a raster layer for every brushstroke she makes, 
and her paintings consist of hundreds of such layers, which are added and retracted before a 
combination is printed onto a substrate, such as linen, silk, aluminium or paper. In a recent 
critical account of Adorno’s aesthetics, Julianne Rebentisch concedes that the ‘dynamic in 
artistic production in which the internal logic of "the thing itself’ surpasses the artist’s 
intention,’ which I have argued the Abstract Expressionists’ praxis bears out, is still 
‘corroborated by the self-description of artists who organize their own material’ (112). This is 
certainly true of Cortright. Cortright describes her artistic process as aconceptual and yet 
binding.123 She claims that she ‘actively’ tries not to think when she chooses the images 
which provide her colours, or digitally paints with these colours. Yet, the presuppositions of 
this self-characterisation are surely borne of identity-thinking’s diremption of sensuality and 
intellect, wherein only the latter qualifies as cognition, because, on her account, Cortright’s 
working method is far from an abandonment of rational construction to the aleatory. This is 
                                                          
122 This is rendered all the starker with the knowledge that, as Agnieska Gratza reports of a fundraising 
dinner for Carlos/Ishikawa, ‘the artist's relatives who cooked tamales for us sat at their own table’ (2013: 
228). 
123 The quotes from Cortright are all taken from two interviews, one with Charlotte Jansen of Artsy 
entitled ‘Petra Cortright is the Monet of the 21st Century’ (2016, 13 May) and another with A Will Brown 
of Studio International headlined ‘Petra Cortright: ‘I wanted to raise questions about the way we view 
women in a digital landscape”’ (2015, 23 September) 
207 
 
evident in her claim that her attempt to not think is active. Rather than framing ‘not thinking’ 
as simply the negation of thought, she describes it as something which she ‘taps into,’ and in 
this, I would suggest, she is describing a praxial openness to nonidentity whereby cognition is 
not forsaken, but rather guided by its object. Indeed, unintentionally deploying Kantian 
terminology, Cortright confirms that her process escapes discourse in a way which is not 
arbitrary but directed by sensory encounter, when she asserts that ‘it’s very hard to articulate 
– something will just catch [her] eye – it’s very intuitive.’ And the same holds for her choice 
of substrate, whose reciprocal tension with the digital image as a palpable material surface 
she stresses is crucial.124  
  In this, Cortright makes clear that she does not want to ‘hide or remove’ elements of the 
digital, but instead ‘they are celebrated.’ This is decisive to her paintings’ rescue of the 
fleeting and ephemeral at a time when abstract painting’s form has otherwise reified as 
regards that which it forms. In a 2007 interview with Joan Waltemath in The Brooklyn Rail, 
Bernstein expresses his anxiety about the implications of digitisation for art’s ability to stake 
a claim for the particular. Without medium-specificity, he posits, there is no sensuous 
particularity. Without sensuous particularity, there is no assimilation to the other, and somatic 
silence stays silent. However, Bernstein identifies the large-scale photographs of Jeff Wall as 
work which, nevertheless, gives him hope that this is not the case, because Wall ‘lets the 
concrete image carry autonomous significance’ and thus, ‘despite every possible form of 
mediation and construction,’ his art lives ‘through and on a moment of immediacy’ 
(Waltemath 2007, 4 September). Yet, I would contend that Cortright’s work lives through 
and on immediacy not in spite, but by way of its mediation. The pseudo-immediacy of 
‘zombie formalism’ and contemporary autobiographical lyricism, no matter their 
sensuousness, is always-already mediated, as decor in terms of the former and conceptually 
(and as decor) in terms of the latter. The evident mediatedness of Cortright’s paintings, on the 
                                                          
124 As she says, ‘Working with physical materials has got me thinking a lot about how digital content 
translates depending on the surface – screen v silk v aluminium, etc. Everything we see on a screen is 
contextualised with light, so I look for physical materials that hold light in different ways.’ 
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other hand, is what allows for their immediacy. As we have seen, the Abstract Expressionists 
painted in the language of repressed nature by determinately negating representational 
content, and consequently Greenberg, who recognised this language, often discussed it in 
terms of ‘the irreducible essence of pictorial art’ (CEC4: 131). Similarly, Cortright’s 
determinate negation of that which impedes mimetic comportment results in work whose 
digital ‘medium-specificity’ is evident. I would even go so far as to say that her paintings’ 
‘brushstrokes’ do not appear as simulacra of lines of pigment applied to a support with an 
implement topped with bristles at all, but rather as entities in their own right, especially in 
recent works such as nude drawing model in Eisenhower bibliography spine (2016) (fig. 17). 
Due to this, for me at least, the aesthetic affect of Cortright’s work is markedly different to 
the above-discussed currents in contemporary abstract painting. In the face of Petra 
Cortright’s work, I experience the same exhortation to submit to the work’s discipline, and 
consequent somatic exhilaration and kinetic empathy as in the best works of Abstract 
Expressionism. 
  Twenty-six years ago, in his Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(1991), Fredric Jameson famously posited the difference between Van Gogh’s painting of 
peasant shoes and Andy Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes (1980) as microcosmic of the 
difference between modernism and postmodernism. While he does not put it in these terms, 
this account essentially hinges on his identifying in the Van Gogh painting the nascent 
determinate negation of communication and affirmation of mimetic language which I have 
argued is what, rather than medium-specificity, found its apotheosis in Abstract 
Expressionism.125 Jameson posits that, conversely, Warhol’s painting, far from ‘producing a 
whole new Utopian realm of the senses,’ is flat, depthless and superficial ‘in the most literal 
sense’ (6-10). For Jameson, this waning of affect is due to organisational bureaucracy’s 
dissolution of the centred subject who could express things. Thus, an artwork such as Van 
Gogh’s is rendered unfeasible in postmodernity, and ‘stylistic innovation is no longer 
                                                          
125 Indeed, it should be noted that, twelve years before, in an essay entitled ‘Towards a Libidinal Economy 
of Three Modern Painters’ (1979), Jameson made an almost identical case for De Kooning’s art. 
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possible, all that is left is to imitate dead styles’ (1985: 115). However, to claim this is to 
work from a model of artistic intentionality which, in terms of Abstract Expressionism, I have 
opposed throughout this thesis. That is to say, I have posited that the expressiveness of 
Abstract Expressionist artworks should not be understood as the outward expression of the 
artists’ subjective interiorities, but rather that such a conception serves to neutralise the 
artworks. Instead, I have argued that, precisely by not subjecting their materials to the 
sovereignty of their subjectivities, but neither molding their materials in accordance with the 
abstractions which rule extra-aesthetically, the Abstract Expressionists objectivated fleeting, 
ephemeral and transitory moments when it appears as if the fundamental determinants of 
everyday life could go through the perceptual experience of the extra-aesthetically decentred 
subject, in reciprocity with other subjects and objects. While, as I have explored throughout 
this conclusion, it is certainly the case that the majority of contemporary painting is flat, 
depthless and superficial, I would contend that Cortright’s paintings do something similar. 
This is of course very provisional, and would require more elaboration to fully justify it, but it 
seems to me as if, without reverting to the reified semiotic system of Abstract Expressionism, 
but instead following mimetic impulses where they want to go of their own accord, Petra 
Cortright has created paintings which refuse to cede Abstract Expressionism’s promise. 
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